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
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


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That life is led most happily wherein  
all Virtue is exercised without impediment or  
let. p. 51







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HOOKER

BOOK I

OF THE LAWS OF  
ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY

*Richard  
W. Willm*  
EDITED BY  
R. W. CHURCH, M.A.

DEAN OF ST. PAUL'S  
FORMERLY FELLOW OF ORIEL

Oxford

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Ἡμεῖς ἐστὶ πᾶσι τὸ φρονεῖν· ἐν νόμῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ  
ξυνῷ πάντων ὅκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλις καὶ πόλιος ἰσχυροτέρως· τρέφονται  
γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπινοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσούτον  
ὁ κόσμος ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκέει πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.

*Heraclitus of Ephesus.*

Cum lex aeterna sit ratio gubernationis in supremo gubernante, necesse  
est quod omnes rationes gubernationis quae sunt in inferioribus gubernan-  
tibus a lege aeterna deriventur. . . Unde omnes leges in quantum  
participant de ratione recta, in tantum derivantur a lege aeterna.

*Thomas Aquinas.*

## INTRODUCTION.

HOOKEK'S life was nearly coincident with the reigns of Mary and Elizabeth. Born about the same time as Raleigh, Spenser, and Sir Philip Sidney<sup>a</sup>; a few years later than Cervantes, Cardinal Bellarmine, and Paul Sarpi<sup>b</sup>; and only a few years earlier than Lord Bacon, Galileo, and Shakespeare<sup>c</sup>, he belongs to that last quarter of the sixteenth century, in which the results of its earlier years, both good and evil, were becoming mature, and which was so fruitful in great men, great events, and new and bold beginnings in politics, religion, and philosophy. His education was under the characteristic influences which marked the age and reign of Elizabeth, and he lived to be one of the most original and worthy representatives of its spirit: the one adequate exponent of its religious ideas and policy. With these no one more fully sympathized; and no one conceived them in so comprehensive and masterly a manner. The results of the religious movement of the time had taken shape under the resolute but cautious hand of the Queen in a Church polity, which was thought at the time, and has proved to be, unique; but which has also proved singularly suited to the character of the English nation. Of this system, which looks like the growth of accident, though it was really rooted in the conditions of the people whose history it has since so profoundly affected, Hooker discerned the effective and governing principles; he divined what was permanent and capable of life

<sup>a</sup> Raleigh, 1552. Spenser, 1552, or 1553. Sidney, 1554.

<sup>b</sup> Bellarmine, 1542. Cervantes, 1547. Sarpi, 1552.

<sup>c</sup> Bacon, 1561. Shakespeare, 1564. Galileo, 1564.

in it, in comparison with clamorous and more plausible rivals; he gave it a broad and defensible theory, and he seized, and exhibited in an impressive form, all that it contained of what was noble and attractive. Nor was it only its strong and lasting features of which his work is the display: faithfully reflecting the stage of thought when it was written, it reveals equally what was weak and temporary in the Elizabethan Church polity.

Richard Hooker was born, according to Izaak Walton, at Heavitree near Exeter, about the year 1553. Mr. Keble found no record of him in the register books of Heavitree, nor in those of the Cathedral, or St. Mary Major in Exeter; and the best data for fixing the year of his birth seem to be supplied by the President's register, at Corpus Christi College in Oxford. From two entries in this it would appear that he was born about Easter-time, in what we should call 1554<sup>d</sup>: that is, according to the old division of the year, in 1553, if he was born before the 25th of March,—in 1554 if he was born on or after March 25.

His family was one of some consideration in the city of Exeter, and members of it had for more than one generation filled the chief municipal offices, and had represented Exeter in parliament\*. But his father was a poor man, and intended to bind him apprentice to a trade. At school, however, probably the Grammar School at Exeter, the boy shewed such parts and promise, that his uncle, John Hooker, the chamberlain of the city, a man of wealth and consequence, with some learning and literary tastes, and strong opinions in favour

<sup>d</sup> In the President's register, under date December 24, 1573, it is said that Hooker would be twenty years about Easter next following (April 11, 1574). Under date of September 16, 1577, he is said to be twenty-three years, about the Easter last past (April 7, 1577.) So, Fulman, probably from these data, says, 'Richardus Hooker ap. Heavitree juxta civitatem Exoniam natus est circa finem Martii mensis, anno 1554 ineunte.' (Vide Keble's notes on Walton, notes 5, 6, 29.) Easter Day in 1554 was on March 25. (Sir Harris Nicolas, Chron. of Hist.) Walton's chronological notices cannot always be trusted.

\* The family name seems first to have been Vowel, alias Hoker or Hooker. (Vide Keble's ed. 1845, vol. i. p. cviii. and p. 9, note 10.)

of the reformed religion, was induced by the representations of the schoolmaster to undertake to give his nephew the chance of obtaining a University training. The plan proposed is characteristic of the period. 'The schoolmaster,' writes Walton, 'was very solicitous with John Hooker to take his nephew into his care, and to maintain him for one year in the University, and in the mean time to use his endeavours to procure an admission for him into some college, though it were but in a mean degree: still urging and assuring him that his charge would not continue long: for the lad's learning and manners were so remarkable, that they must of necessity be taken notice of; and that doubtless God would provide him some second patron, that would free him and his parents from their future care and charge.' John Hooker was a friend of Jewel, himself a Devonshire man, and, as John Hooker is said to have been, a disciple and admirer of the reformer, Peter Martyr. Looking about for a patron for his nephew, he applied to Jewel: and it was arranged that the lad was to be sent to Oxford at the joint charge of his uncle and the bishop, and under Jewel's protection. Jewel had belonged to Corpus Christi College, one of those recent foundations which had been set up with lavish munificence by men attached to the old opinions, in order to raise up a race of learned defenders for them, but which had followed the time and passed into the hands of their opponents. It was a college from the first of high name and success, and Jewel's old connection with it led him to find 'a clerk's place' there for the lad who was to be its most illustrious name. Hooker, according to Walton, was admitted a clerk at Corpus in 1567<sup>f</sup>.

Bishop Jewel, whom, according to Walton's pleasant story, he visited more than once in the course of his journey on foot from Oxford to Devonshire, died in September 1571. The

<sup>f</sup> 'About the *fifteenth* (*fourteenth*, 1st ed.) year of his age.' (Walton.) The *fourteenth* would suit 1567, the *fifteenth* 1568. Probably the last is right. Dr. Cole, to whom Walton says that he was recommended, became President July 19, 1568. (Keble's note. i. 10.) No record remains of his University matriculation. See note at the end.

loss of his patron left Hooker to depend on what he could do for himself; but he was becoming known in the University; and Sandys, Bishop of London, afterwards Archbishop of York, who had heard of him from Jewel, committed his son Edwin to his care. Edwin Sandys and another pupil, George Cranmer, both of them trained by him at Corpus, and both of them afterwards distinguished men, became the chief friends of his after life, and to their criticism he submitted his works. He became M.A., and was admitted Fellow of the college in 1577. Besides Walton's general statement, probable enough, of his reputation and range of learning, little is told of his Oxford life, except that in a college quarrel, which is not explained, he was expelled for a few months, in company with his tutor and friend, Dr. John Rainolds, a distinguished Calvinist, by a Vice-President, afterwards known for his zeal against Puritans:—that in the illness of the Professor of Hebrew, Hooker was appointed to read the lecture:—and that he was intimate with Henry Savile, afterwards the editor of Chrysostom. His first public appearance in London was in preaching at St. Paul's Cross, according to Walton, about 1581. He married soon afterwards, and left Oxford for the living of Drayton Beauchamp in Buckinghamshire, where, according to Walton, he stayed for about a year. Walton's account of Hooker's marriage and married life is well known. His story exalts Hooker's simplicity at the expense of his good sense and good feeling, in a way which provokes suspicion. Walton's idea of humility and meekness, charming as are the pictures in which it is embodied, had in it something which often strikes a modern reader as one-sided and unreal; and his account is not consistent with what Hooker discloses of his own character in his writings, which, as Mr. Keble has remarked, shew, as far as writings can shew, not only abundant shrewdness of observation, but much sensitiveness and quickness of temper, and are further marked throughout by humour and very keen irony. Hooker, at any rate, is not likely himself to have told the story. It is much more like the guess of pitying or indignant

friends who disliked his wife. The marriage was probably a mistaken and ill-assorted one. But we do not want an excess of coarse scheming in a mother-in-law, and of credulous simplicity in a son-in-law, to account for all the mistakes in marriage of great and wise men. Hooker, it is to be noticed, entrusted his wife, and apparently his father-in-law, together with his pupil Edwin Sandys, with the execution of his will<sup>g</sup>.

The decisive event in Hooker's life was his appointment to the Mastership of the Temple, March 17, 1584-5. He was appointed, probably at the recommendation of Sandys, Archbishop of York, and by the influence of Whitgift, against a strong effort made in favour of a distinguished Puritan leader, Travers, who was already on the spot, as afternoon reader or lecturer, and was supported by Lord Burghley. Hooker's appointment has the appearance of a compromise between Travers' friends and the archbishop, who had proposed another man. This brought Hooker to London, and into direct contact with Whitgift, and perhaps, to a certain extent, with Lord Burghley. It also brought him into declared controversy with two of the chief men of that powerful and growing school which acknowledged the theological supremacy of Calvin, and which aimed at fundamental changes in the Church government of England,—with Travers and Cartwright, and in consequence, with the whole party of which they were representatives. And this controversy became the business of his life. It is a harsh and unphilosophical judgment, unworthy of Mr. Hallam's sagacity and largeness, to see nothing but 'vulgar' quarrels in these debates, and 'caitiff brawlers' in those engaged in them: but it is true, as he says, that Hooker, compared with those about him, descended into them 'like a knight of romance with arms of finer temper<sup>h</sup>.' He had been brought up, as they

<sup>g</sup> Keble's ed. of Hooker, i. p. 89. \*

<sup>h</sup> Hallam, *Const. Hist.* ch. iv. (i. 215). 'But while these scenes of pride and persecution on the one hand, and of sectarian insolence on the other, were deforming the bosom of the English Church, she found a defender of her institutions in one who mingled in these vulgar controversies like a knight of romance among caitiff brawlers, with



had been, in the absolute principles of the school of Calvin. But the progress of debate and history had driven one class of minds, as the tendency is in schools, ever more forward into narrower lines and more peremptory demands. His inquisitive and freer mind, beginning by testing and limiting Calvin's doctrine where others assumed and developed, had ended in the construction of a broader system which was to take its place. He witnesses in a memorable passage<sup>1</sup> to the imposing greatness of Calvin's theological position. But the parting of the roads had come: probably it had been long going on unnoticed by others or himself.

His great work grew out of the disputes, of which the Temple was the scene, in 1585 and 1586. Travers, an earnest and able man, who still preached in the afternoon, and had a considerable party of citizens and of the younger lawyers on his side, did not become more moderate in his denunciations and protests because Whitgift had succeeded in foiling his attempt to establish his paramount influence in so important a post as the Temple, and because the morning sermons of the Master represented, with new vigour, a line of religious opinions at once more independent and more conservative than his own. 'The pulpit,' says Fuller, 'spake pure Canterbury in the morning, and Geneva in the afternoon.' Travers was not the man to spare any deviation from the rigid exactness of Calvinistic doctrine, and his sermons became attacks on what he represented as the latitudinarianism and error of Hooker's. Whitgift put a stop to the opposition by silencing Travers, who had only received ordination according to the Presbyterian form in a congregation abroad: and this led to a personal controversy between Travers and Hooker. Travers appealed to the council against Hooker's alleged false doctrine, and Hooker answered him. But the dispute, which, though keen, was carried on by both Travers

arms of finer temper and worthy to be proved in a nobler field.' Seen, as we look back on it, in its completeness, from either side, it seems a sufficiently noble field.

<sup>1</sup> Preface, ch. ii.

and Hooker with a dignity and a respect for one another, rare at all times and especially then, led Hooker to a deep and comprehensive consideration of the matters involved in it. He began to meditate a treatise which should go to the bottom of the question, what is the ground on which, in general, Church laws and government rest? He began this work at the Temple: but he found the place uncongenial, and he asked Whitgift to remove him to the country, 'where,' he said, 'I might behold God's blessing spring out of my mother earth, and eat my own bread without oppositions.' In 1591 he exchanged from the Temple to the living of Boscombe near Salisbury; and there he finished the first four of his proposed 'Eight Books of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity.' The volume was entered at Stationers' Hall, March 9, 1592-3, and submitted to Lord Burghley about the same time; but it was not published till 1593 or 1594. In July 1595 he moved from Boscombe to the better living of Bishopsborne near Canterbury, to which he was presented by the crown, doubtless at Whitgift's recommendation: and there he continued till his death. Walton's description of him, probably received from the Cranmers, Hooker's pupils at Bishopsborne<sup>k</sup>, may be quoted as a picture of a country parson of the sixteenth century. After saying that travellers turned out of the road to Dover to see a famous writer and divine, Walton proceeds: 'What went they out to see? a man clothed in purple and fine linen?' 'No, indeed; but an *obscure, harmless man; a man in poor clothes, his loins usually girt in a coarse gown, or canonical coat; of a mean stature, and stooping, and yet more lowly in the thoughts of his soul; his body worn out, not with age, but study and holy mortifications; his face full of heat-pimples, begot by his unactivity and sedentary life*<sup>l</sup>.' And to this true character of his person, let me add this for his disposition and behaviour: God and nature blest him with so blessed a bashfulness, that as in his younger days his pupils might easily look him out of countenance; so neither then, nor in his age, *did he ever willingly*

<sup>k</sup> Walton's Introd. to his Life of Hooker.

<sup>l</sup> 'Probably the very words of Walton's informant.' *Kemble's Note.*

look any man in the face; and was of so mild and bumble a nature, that his poor parish clerk and he did never talk but with both their hats on, or both off, at the same time: and to this may be added, that though he was not purblind, yet he was short or weak-sighted: and where he fixt his eyes at the beginning of his sermon, there they continued till it was ended; and the reader has liberty to believe, that his modesty and dim sight were some of the reasons why he trusted Mrs. Churchman to choose his wife.' The Fifth Book of the Ecclesiastical Polity came out by itself in 1597. But Hooker did not live to publish the three which remained to complete the work. He died in 1600, probably November 2<sup>m</sup>.

There seems no reason to doubt that he left the last three Books in a state of forwardness, if not ready for immediate publication. The fact is distinctly asserted within four years after his death by his friend and posthumous editor Dr. Spencer<sup>n</sup>: and his statement has, apparently, independent confirmation<sup>o</sup>. But it is certain that if they were in any sense completed, the finished copies have disappeared. The Sixth Book, as Mr. Keble has proved, has been utterly lost, and replaced by matter irrelevant to its argument, though doubtless taken from Hooker's papers. The Seventh and Eighth are more like what they might have been expected to be; and there is no reason to doubt that they are in substance Hooker's; but they have gone through other hands.

<sup>m</sup> This date is given by Walton on the authority of a note of Laud. Hooker's will was made Oct. 26, 1600, and proved the following Dec. 3.

<sup>n</sup> 'There is a purpose of setting forth the three last books also, their father's *Posthumum*. For as in the great declining of his body, spent out with study, it was his ordinary petition to almighty God, that if he might live to see the finishing of these books, then, *Lord let thy servant depart in peace* (to use his own words), so it pleased God to grant him his desire. For he lived till he saw them perfected; and though like Rachel he died as it were in the travail of them, and hastened death upon himself, by hastening to give them life; yet he held out to behold with his own eyes, these *partus ingentii*, these *Benjamins*, sons of his right hand, though to him they were *Benonies*, sons of pain and sorrow.'

—Spencer, 'To the Reader,' ed. 1604.

<sup>o</sup> See Keble's Preface, p. xxi. Andrewes' letter, in Keble, i. p. 91.

Spencer's intention of publishing the 'draughts'<sup>p</sup> was never fulfilled; but it is probably through his care that they were preserved, and put in order<sup>q</sup>: in this form manuscript copies were taken of them, especially of the Eighth Book; and from these copies, apparently, what we have as the last three Books were published by different editors more than fifty years after Hooker's death. The loss of the completed Books was laid to the charge of Hooker's wife and executrix, and her Puritan relations, by those who sympathized with his theology. The accusation made by his first editor, and supported by a circumstantial story told by Izaak Walton, has been discredited by authorities like Hallam<sup>r</sup> and Coleridge<sup>s</sup>, who suggest that if there was suppression, Hooker's friends were as likely to suppress as his opponents. The chief objection to the story of Walton arises from the known bias of the narrator; for the statement, which has nothing incredible in it, is made with more than usual appearance of precision and care about evidence: and bias must be taken into account, not only as against Walton's credibility, but against those who question it. All that can be said to be certain is, that at the time of Hooker's death the three Books were believed to be complete, or nearly so; that if they were so, they have been lost; and that a few days after Hooker's death great anxiety was expressed about them and his other papers, and about the possible conduct of his representatives with regard to

<sup>p</sup> 'Some evil-disposed minds, whether of malice, or covetousness, or wicked, blind zeal, it is uncertain, as if they had been Egyptian midwives, as soon as they were born and their father dead, smothered them, and by conveying away the perfect copies, left us nothing but certain old, unperfect and mangled draughts, dismembered into pieces, and scattered like Medea's Absyrtus, no form, no grace, not the shadow of themselves almost remaining in them. Had the father lived to see them brought forth thus defaced, he might rightly have named them *Benonies*, sons of sorrow. But seeing the importunities of many great and worthy persons will not suffer them quietly to die and to be buried, it is intended that they shall see them as they are.'—Spencer, 'To the Reader,' ed. 1604.

<sup>q</sup> See extracts from the letters of H. Jackson, Dr. Spencer's amanuensis, in Keble i. 103.

<sup>r</sup> Constit. Hist.—Literature of Europe.

<sup>s</sup> Notes on English Divines.

them<sup>t</sup>, and their fate in the 'great hands' into which they might come.

Hooker's writings, and especially his great work, of which the First Book is here given, have a threefold interest; theological, philosophical, and literary. They mark an epoch at once in the history of English thought, and in the progress of the English language. In all these ways, they are of high importance, not only in themselves, but as illustrative of the remarkable age in which they were produced and of which they bear the stamp. The last ten years of the century and of Elizabeth's reign saw, besides the five Books of the Ecclesiastical Polity, the publication of the first works of Shakespeare, the first Essays of Bacon, the Faery Queene of Spenser. Ten years have not often produced such fruit.

Hooker, like Shakespeare and Bacon, may be said to have opened a new vein in the use of the English language. He shewed that it was possible to write of theology in English in a way which should at once raise the level of thought in the learned, and be of interest to the public. There had been a long preparation going on in the sixteenth century for a great philosophical work in English prose, in which its powers should be applied to the adequate treatment of subjects which were filling the thoughts of men, but which had been long reserved for the schools, and for which the appropriate language still seemed the Latin. Though men who aimed at systematic and scientific treatises still wrote in Latin, like Calvin, Bellarmine, or Suarez, the questions which had arisen touched all men's hearts too nearly not to be discussed in their mother tongue. On all sides there was no want of ability or earnestness: men were thoroughly warmed to their work, and eager to speak: and in the English prose of the Reformation times, from Sir Thomas More and Latimer downwards, so great a portion of which is theological and controversial, there is no want either of vigour and richness, or of spirit, play, and versatility. The elements of a most

<sup>t</sup> Bp. Andrewes' letter to Dr. Parry, Nov. 7, 1600, in Keble's Hooker, i. 91. See Keble's note.

powerful and flexible instrument of expression are visible. But no one had risen to the conception of a great plan and idea; of a wide and philosophical survey, which the English language should be called upon to interpret and illustrate, of the deeper and more permanent relations of the pressing questions of the time. No one had thought of more than attack or defence, on the well-known ground and with the customary well-known arguments, turned to such account as each writer's skill and resources allowed. The grasp and largeness, the peculiar power which was attracted by great ideas, and also at home among the minute intricacies of scholastic argument, above all, the poetical fire, the self-devotion and enthusiasm of literary creation, the romantic belief in the deep and universal interest which was masked under what seemed dry and subtle questions, and the romantic passion to accomplish a work which should bring out their significance in regard to what all men understand and wish for,—this had been wanting; for all this means really genius; and the marked ability which is to be seen in the controversialists on both sides was something much short of genius. But their function was the ordinary one, in the spring-time of a literature, of fitting and moulding a new and growing language for new work, to be done by stronger hands than those of the pioneers who had made the success possible;—with freer and bolder thought, and a more delicate sense of greatness, truth, and beauty. The story told by Walton of the learned English Romanist, Cardinal Allen or Dr. Stapleton, who said to Pope Clement VIII that he had never met with an English Book whose writer deserved the name of an author till he read the first four Books of a 'poor obscure English priest, on Laws and Church Polity,' at least expresses the fact that Hooker is really the beginner of what deserves to be called English literature, in its theological and philosophical province.

Yet it is curious to observe how the circumstances of the time have left their mark on what he produced. Though eminently a work of theory and principles, it grew out of the occasion of a personal controversy, the details

of which now excite the astonishment of most reasonable men. The fundamental idea of law with its consequences and applications, which he has made the inheritance of the English mind, appears to have absorbed and possessed him; it shines through all his writings: what we have of his may be described as one great work on this theme, beginning with fragments, such as the Sermons; then, with one completed portion intervening in the middle, the first five Books on the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity; and ending with fragments, the uncertain or unfinished Books VI to VIII. But this work, of which his conception was wider and greater than even his attempted execution of it, was designed to meet a special occasion; it was in form simply an apology for a partial and to a great extent accidental settlement of the difficult questions raised by the Reformation. He appears to write from a point of view to which the religious compromises of Elizabeth's reign wore the aspect of an absolute and unimprovable ideal; yet nothing could be further from his principles, or from the drift of his writings.

Into the theological points of Hooker's system this is not the place to enter. Every one knows that he defended the Anglican side against the Puritan. But Hooker was one of those rare controversialists who are more intent on shewing *why* their opponents are wrong than even the fact that they are so, and who are not afraid of the challenge to build as well as to destroy, or of the task of replacing what they have refuted by a positive construction, which invites the test of a wide application to facts. To what he considered the fundamental mistake of the Puritans, an exaggerated and false theory of the purpose and function of Scripture as the exclusive guide of human conduct, he opposed his own more comprehensive theory of a rule derived not from one alone, but from all the sources of light and truth with which man finds himself encompassed. It has been said that Hooker's argument is one which depends much on authority: but this is a partial way of stating his method. He argues from authority, where he thinks the argument in place; but his whole theory

rests on the principle that the paramount and supreme guide, both of the world and of human action, is reason. Mr. Hallam finds Hooker's 'fundamental position' in the doctrine of the 'mutability of positive law.' This is hardly accurate; for Hooker certainly held some positive laws to be immutable to man. If we are to fix on any 'fundamental position,' as the key of his method of arguing, I should rather look for it in his doctrine, so pertinaciously urged and always implied, of the *concurrence and co-operation*, each in its due place, of all possible means of knowledge for man's direction. Take which you please, reason or Scripture, your own reason or that of others, private judgment or general consent, nature or grace, one *presupposes*—it is a favourite word with him—the existence of others, and is not intended to do its work of illumination and guidance without them: and the man who elects to go by one alone, will assuredly find in the end that he has gone wrong. His point is that the philosophical mistake, that is, the mistake as to fact and experience, made by his opponents is at least as great as their religious mistake; and that their whole system and case rest on a radical misconception of the moral nature of man, his means of knowledge, his appointed manner of action, the kind of evidence on which his belief is based. The Reformation was in one sense an appeal to reason, so far as any appeal against usurped or unjust authority implies the power of recognising wrong, and to a certain point shakes the principle itself of mere authority: but philosophically considered, it was quite as much an appeal to authority: that is, it appealed to one authority against another; and, further, it appealed to the authority of Scripture against reason; reason, in the service of the Roman schools, or reason enlisted by the philosophers of the *renaissance*. Puritanism was the most extreme and absolute form of that appeal to authority against reason, and shewed the consequences of sacrificing fact to theory. Consistently carried out, it came to impossibilities; and even without being consistent, it began to threaten what not Churchmen alone, but all reasonable men, held essential to



society. Hooker's purpose is to meet this false direction of the religious mind in England, by exhibiting a broader system of the grounds of human knowledge and action, beside which the mother error of the aggressive schools should be seen in its true character of manifest narrowness and disproportion. The universe governed in everything, great and small, by law, and that law, not the edict of mere will, but either identical with reason or its result, was the conception which he opposed to those who found in the letter of Scripture, interpreted by the traditions of the great Swiss teachers, the sole guide and the authority without appeal, of all that Christian men ought to do or to allow. Conceiving of law as reason under another name, he conceived of God himself as working under a law, which is His supreme reason, and appointing to all His works the law by which they are to work out their possible perfection. Law is that which binds the whole creation, in all its ranks and subordinations, to the perfect goodness and reason of God. Every law of God is a law of reason, and every law of reason is a law of God. Laws, which are of God, cover the whole field of nature, moral as well as physical, and that by which they are ascertained, and their authority is recognised, is reason. All this is antecedent to Scripture, the supernatural law, and is presupposed both in the proof and in the matter of Scripture. The natural laws remain where they were when the supernatural were added to them: one law may limit, explain, confirm another; but each class of laws rests on its own basis, and Scripture was given to supply and correct the natural law, not to supersede it and take its place. There are laws of God, before and beyond His supernatural law, equally and as really part of the great system of law of which He is the source, and of which Scripture is a part, the most gracious part, but only a part: and the faculty which recognises and applies these laws is reason. Authority occupies a great and varied place in the direction of human action. But there is no authority without reason; no just authority which cannot give its reason: no authority which is not at last based on reason

which can be tested and verified. The will of God is the supreme authority: but he utterly rejects the notion of arbitrary will; that 'of the will of God to do this or that, there is no reason besides His will; though many times no reason known to us.' \*

The importance of Hooker's work in the ecclesiastical history of England can hardly be overstated. He did not arrest Puritanism: but he did two things for the Church, which bore fruit, even after reverses and disasters. He provided it with a theory, broad, intelligible, and worthy of the occasion, even if incomplete and open to attack. And he brought out the nobler features of the system he defended, its fitness to be the Church of a great nation, its adaptation to human nature and society, the reasonableness of its customs, the largeness of aim and the freedom and elevation of spirit in its principles and working, compared with what claimed to take its place. The book was a warning, and also set a standard to its own side: both warning and standard were wanted, and have not been without effect. And it has further an interest derived from its general influence on English thought and literary culture. It set the example of an attempt to exhibit in English, in a shape suited to an intelligent English reader, a serious theory of the order of the world, the principles on which it is governed, the nature of society, and the relations of its different parts: a theory which, after all the criticisms upon it, and with all its famous successors and rivals, still occupies the thought of modern enquirers. Apart from the particular doctrines which he laid down, Hooker did this; he drew from the occasion of a specific and rather narrow controversy the lesson, that those who want to clear their way must go down to some general principles, and the deeper and broader the better; and that a theory, theological or otherwise, which is to be of service in human life, must be one which acknowledges and respects its real facts, not one which cuts through them from the starting-point of some narrow assumption. Further, it first revealed to the nation what English prose might be: its power of grappling

with difficult conceptions and subtle reasonings, of bringing imagination and passion to animate and illuminate severe thought, of suiting itself to the immense variety of lights and moods and feelings which really surround and accompany the work of the mind; its power of attracting and charming like poetry, its capacity for a most delicate or most lofty music. The men who first read the early books of Hooker must have felt that their mother-tongue had suddenly appeared in a form which might bear comparison with the great classical models for force or beauty. The singular excellence of Hooker's prose was recognised in his own age, and was even made the subject of a sneer by his opponents<sup>u</sup>, who professed to find in it a proof of his undue regard for human culture and philosophy. A great master of style<sup>x</sup>, at a very different period and of a very different school, singles him out—curiously enough, along with a writer whom few now know more than by name, Parsons the Jesuit—as an author who, in contrast with his more polite contemporaries, had written English so naturally and simply that his works survived the changes of fashion, and could be read without offence in the days of Addison and Pope. In modern times his merits have been pointed out with equal discrimination and warmth by Mr. Hallam<sup>y</sup>.

The character of Hooker's prose is, like that of most of his contemporaries, greatly influenced by the Latin models with which all learned men were so familiar. It was capable of the easy felicity and straightforward directness and simplicity which became the features of the best styles at a more advanced period of English history and language: but its tendency was to array its words in forms which, though dictated by a severe and strict attention to argumentative fulness, seem to us cumbersome and stiff. Like the shapes of mechanism, or the ornamentation of the weapons, the ships, or the furniture of the time, the constructive part was encumbered with much that

<sup>u</sup> Christian Letter, in Keble's Hooker, i. pp. xi. 72.

<sup>x</sup> Swift; Tatler, No. 230.

<sup>y</sup> Constit. Hist. ch. iv. Literature of Europe.

was superfluous and heavy, and the very object sought by ornamentation was found in time to be better gained by merely leaving out the ornament. Yet the arts, as well as the language of the time, if they were sometimes clumsy and complicated, wanted not solidity and genuine strength on the one hand, nor, on the other, richness, dignity, and grandeur. In Hooker's case, the antique fashion which governs the structure of his style is compensated for by two things, over and above the intrinsic interest or value of the thought expressed: by his clear and strong perception of the laws of argumentative connection and sequence; and by his keen sensitiveness to the grace and fitness of words, and to the musical charm of a well-ordered arrangement of them. Hooker is no doubt a writer who exacts from his readers attention; but it is attention required by ingenuity or abundance, not by confusion and slovenliness, and those who give it find that it has not been thrown away. Hooker's constructions are unfamiliar to a modern reader; but though often elaborate and artificial, they are not involved; there is an exact order discernible, as soon as they are carefully looked at, and all the parts are found to be connected and hinged together, so as to give compactness and strength, where at the first glance, perhaps, we suspected mere wanton intricacy. One great distinction between his style and our own is that he brings within the compass of a single period linked into one structure by a great variety of connecting words, a series of clauses related to one another, which we should distribute into separate sentences, often leaving to the reader himself to supply the logical threads of connection, which in Hooker and the older writers are expressed. Another governing influence with him is the wish to place the emphatic word in the emphatic place. This determines the place of adverbs and modifying words in a degree which to us would appear over-bold or forced. This leads him frequently to reverse what to us seems the simple and natural order of the sentence: to place the object of the verb or the predicate of the sentence first, or to reserve the completing verb of the period till the last. This is also the reason which leads him

sometimes to separate the antecedent from the relative, to put the relative first, and to imitate the Latin construction of relatives in a way which we have since dropped. In his use of the substantive and auxiliary verbs the same aim at close and forcible compression of meaning is seen. Except, however, in his correctness, his clear grasp of his own meaning, and complete command over his intended construction, he but represents the style to which the English of philosophical and political writing had reached in his day. What is peculiar to him, and must strike the most superficial reader of his works, is his singular sensitiveness to the rhythm and musical expression of his sentences. Varied, and suiting itself with ease and flexibility to the nature of the matter in hand, but always disclosing a careful and well-trained ear, this rhythm rises to passages of almost poetical melody in places where it accompanies some burst of lofty and passionate eloquence. To this, as a peculiarity, may perhaps be added his manifest endeavour after terseness and economy of words, which he certainly strove after, though he did not always attain it. There was a tendency at the time to accumulate words, not merely for prolixity and a pompous display of verbal resources, but from the wish to bring out all the sides and associations of the subject spoken of. Hooker, either from habit or imperfect skill, is sometimes liable to the charge of excess in words. But many of his more unusual and less obvious constructions are the result of his continual effort to spare words as far as is consistent with the proportions and symmetry of his general style, and to put his meaning, after comprehending a variety and complication of relations, into a compact form. Fuller<sup>2</sup>, in speaking of Hooker's

\* In Keble's Hooker, i. 79. Fuller contrasts him unfavourably as a preacher with Travers, whose 'utterance was graceful, gesture plausible, matter profitable, method plain, and his stile carried in it *indolem pietatis*, a genius of grace flowing from his sanctified heart.' 'Hooker,' says Fuller, 'may be said to have made good music with his fiddle and stick alone, without any rosin, having neither pronunciation nor gesture to grace his matter.' Walton, from another point of view, gives the same account: his 'Sermons were neither long *nor earnest*,' (observe the use of the word,) 'but uttered with a grave zeal and an humble voice,

preaching, has caught with his usual cleverness the prominent features of his style, and the way in which different classes of readers are affected by it. 'His stile was long and pithy, drawing on a whole flock of clauses before he came to the close of a sentence.' And he goes on to observe that 'when the copiousness of his stile met not with proportionable capacity in his auditors, he was unjustly censured for perplex, tedious, and obscure.' And he adds in another place that 'such who would patiently attend and give him credit all the reading or hearing of his sentences, had their expectation ever paid at the close thereof.'

Of Hooker's work, the First Book, which forms a whole by itself, is here given. It is a treatise on the idea and grounds of government generally: and though it is meant to provide a basis for his conclusions in the following Books, both on the larger and the more detailed questions of the moment about 'Ecclesiastical Polity', its theory is applicable, and he himself applies it, in a wider range. The outlines of the theory are to be found in the great work of Thomas Aquinas, the *Summa Theologiae*, in which he systematized the philosophy which S. Augustine had derived from Greece: but, as Mr. Hallam observes, Hooker 'was perhaps the first of our writers who had any considerable acquaintance with the philosophers of Greece,' and he brings out this knowledge not merely in quotation, but in a 'spirit

his eyes always fixt on one place to prevent his imagination from wandering, insomuch that he seemed to study as he spake: the design of his Sermons (as of all his discourses) was to shew reasons for what he spake; and with these reasons, such a kind of rhetoric, as did rather convince and persuade, than frighten men into piety.'

\* He uses the words *Ecclesiastical Polity*, 'the rather, because the name of Government, as commonly men understand it in ordinary speech, doth not comprise the largeness of that whereunto in this question it is applied.' Government is understood of 'the exercise of superiority in Rulers;' *Polity* contains 'both Government and also whatsoever besides belongeth to the ordering of the Church in public;'. 'a form of ordering the public spiritual affairs of the Church of God.' (bk. iii. ch. i. 14.) It had been used by the Puritans; 'Disciplina est Christianae Ecclesiae Politia.' (Lib. de Eccl. Disc., quoted bk. iii. ch. x. 8.) The term '*Ecclesiastica Politia*' is used by Gerson in the fifteenth century.

of reflection and comprehensiveness, which the study of antiquity alone could have infused,' and which fills out the precise and severe outlines of the schools with a life and richness of meaning which belong to the works and the times in which philosophy began. The Book 'On the Nature of Law in General' falls into three main divisions: (1) On law, conceived as governing all intelligent working, and therefore the working of God himself; and as imposed by Him on creation, whether on unconscious nature, or on moral beings beyond our sphere (ch. i—iv.); (2) On the *law natural*<sup>b</sup>, the law of action for men, as shewn by nature, that is, by reason, as it guides individuals, societies, and the relations of societies among themselves, and is the foundation of human law (ch. v—x.); (3) On the *law supernatural*, of which the record and exponent is Scripture, and which, presupposing and embodying the law natural or rational, adds knowledge and guidance beyond it, and makes up for its defaults and completes it: on the true domain and purpose of the law of Scripture, and on the conditions on which is grounded the distinction between laws immutable and mutable (ch. xi—xvi.). With this comprehensive survey as given in the headings of Hooker's chapters we may compare the abstract given by Mr. Hallam<sup>c</sup> of a nearly contemporary work, the *Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo legislatore* of Suarez, 'by far the greatest man in the department of moral philosophy which the order of Loyola produced, in this age, or perhaps in any other<sup>d</sup>.' Suarez was probably writing at the same time as Hooker; but his book was not, I believe, published till the beginning of the next century. 'Suarez,' says Mr. Hallam, 'begins by laying down the position, that all legislative as well as all paternal power is derived from God, and that the authority of every law resolves itself into his. For either the law proceeds

<sup>b</sup> 'Law of Nature' is used by him in three senses: (1) The law of creation generally (ch. iii. 2.); (2) The law of unconscious nature, distinguished from that of voluntary agents (ib.); (3) The law of human nature, discovered by reason, distinguished from the supernatural law (ch. vii. viii. 8).

<sup>c</sup> Literature of Europe, ii. 502.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid.

immediately from God, or, if it be human, it proceeds from man, as his vicar and minister. The titles of the ten Books of his large treatise are as follows:—(1) On the nature of law in general, and on its causes and consequences; (2) On eternal, natural law, and that of nations; (3) On positive human law, considered relatively to human nature, which is also called civil law; (4) On positive ecclesiastical law; (5) On the difference of human laws, and especially of those that are penal, or of the nature of penal; (6) On the interpretation, the alteration, and the abolition of human laws; (7) On the unwritten law, which is called custom; (8) On those human laws which are called favourable or privileges; (9) On the positive divine law of the old dispensations; (10) On the positive divine law of the new dispensation.' Mr. Hallam proceeds also to give the heads of the Second Book:—'(1) Whether there be any eternal law, and what is its necessity; (2) On the subject of the eternal law, and on the acts which it commands; (3) In what act the eternal law exists, and whether it be one or many; (4) Whether the eternal law be the cause of other laws and obligations through their means; (5) In what natural law consists; . . . . (13) Whether its Precepts be intrinsically immutable; (14) Whether any Human Authority can alter or dispense with the Natural law.' . . . . The similarity in the general conception of the two writers and their ways of laying out the ground is obvious. With much general agreement in leading principles, the contrast is equally great in their different manners of handling enquiries of this kind.

In printing the text of this portion of Hooker I have followed for the most part Mr. Keble's third edition, comparing it with the edition which appeared in Hooker's lifetime, and with Dr. Spencer's reprint\*. The corrections

\* The first four Books of the Ecclesiastical Polity were entered at Stationers' Hall, March 9, 1592-3, and sent to Lord Burghley on the 13th of March following (Keble's Hooker, vol. i. pp. v. and 117). The first edition of them is said to be 1594 (Keble, vol. i. pp. vi. vii; Walton, ib.



needed are few and not important. I have preserved Mr. Keble's sections, both for the convenience of reference, and because the readers for whom the book is designed are not accustomed to passages of such unbroken length as Hooker's chapters, and might thus find additional difficulty in following his argument. But I am not quite sure whether such breaking up does not too much assume the right of imposing a meaning on the text itself. Divisions, as well as pointing, affect that look of a passage which goes for a good deal in a reader's interpretation of it: and it may perhaps be said that the effect of a train of thought, intended to be followed on continuously without these divisions, is not the same when it is interrupted by paragraphs or sections. If, however, breaks were less needed in a folio page, where so much is under the eye at once, they can hardly be dispensed with in a smaller size, where without them the appearance of a long series of pages without a pause is wearisome. But readers must remember that the divisions are not the writer's own, and that his chapters run on without breaks, though of course, in many places, a break in the matter is obvious.

p. 66); but of the early editions no copy which I have seen has any year on the title-page at the beginning, except Dr. Spencer's, 1604. The title always speaks of eight Books (there being only five); and the Fifth Book has a fresh title, with a date.

The copies which I have looked at are—

1. What I presume to be the first edition of the first four Books (Windet, no date), bound up with the first edition of the Fifth Book (Windet, 1597), with *fresh* paging. (Bodl.)
2. Dr. Spencer's reprint of the first four Books (Windet, 1604), calling itself (in his Epistle to the Reader) the *second* edition, bound with the Fifth Book (Stansby, 1622,) with *different* paging; the Fourth Book ending p. 208; the Fifth beginning at p. 181, with a sheet of title and dedication, &c. (Mells Park.)
3. A reprint of Spencer, calling itself (in his Epistle) the *sixth* edition. General title, Stansby, no date: Fifth Book, 1622. (Bodl.)
4. A reprint of Spencer, also calling itself the *sixth* edition; but a different impression from the last, as to the first four Books. General title, Stansby, no date: Fifth Book, 1632. (Wells Cathedral Libr.)

Books of this period vary often so strangely in different copies of what appears to be the same edition, that I have specified the copies which I have looked at.

As regards spelling, it was thought better in a book of this kind to spell as we spell now; and in this too I have followed Mr. Keble's text. To have printed the text as Hooker wrote it, or as his printer printed it, would have made it look unfamiliar and odd to the readers for whom it is meant, without any adequate reason; for spelling in Hooker's time, and for long afterwards, was not only anomalous, as ours also is, but anomalous with an apparent unconsciousness of the possibility of regularity. The spelling of the same word sometimes varies within two lines. The use of double letters, or the interchange of vowels and diphthongs in the same word, often seems a mere matter of hap-hazard. But of course this is within limits; there are visible tendencies towards some forms rather than others; and in a certain number of cases, the difference from modern usage is constant, or nearly so. As regards the use of capitals, I have followed for the most part the first edition, discarding the accumulation of them which grew up in the successive reprints, some of which survived even into Mr. Keble's edition. Hooker's own notes and references, as being part of his work and often meant by him to be seen in connection with his text, have been retained as they stand, together with Mr. Keble's corrections and more exact verifications of the references. Whatever is Mr. Keble's is included in brackets<sup>f</sup>. A few notes have

<sup>f</sup> The materials of the preceding sketch I owe to Mr. Keble's edition of Hooker. I am indebted to the late President of Corpus and to the Warden of Wadham, who is also Keeper of the Archives, who have been good enough to examine afresh the contemporary registers, for the following further particulars relating to Hooker's Oxford life.

There is no record remaining of his admission to the college, or of his matriculation; but this last seems to have been either in 1569 or in 1570.

Walton says that he was admitted to 'a clerk's place.' The statutes of Corpus Christi College say nothing of 'clerks'; but among the *ministri*, they speak of two *choristae*, to be appointed by the President, to retain their place till change of voice, and to be taught grammar either in the college or at Magdalen school. The President's register, during Dr. Coles' presidency, does not notice the admission of any 'ministri.'

The Warden of Wadham has found the date of Hooker's B. A. degree, to which he was admitted the first day of term, Jan. 14, 1573-4. The

been added at the end: and an index of more unusual or remarkable words. In this I have only aimed at directing the student's attention to some of the more observable peculiarities in the meaning or use of words in the First Book of Hooker. For exact and adequate philological explanations I have not the requisite knowledge.

[1873.]

R. W. C.

'grace' for a degree at that time was always asked for, and either granted or refused, some day previous to the admission. Hooker's 'grace' is found to have been granted the preceding Michaelmas term 1573 (on some day between October 16 and December 9), and he might have been admitted B. A. in that term, which ended December 17. He must therefore have been at that time four years, or sixteen terms, from his matriculation, which must have been at the latest in Lent term 1569-70, and probably in Michaelmas term 1569. No doubt, as the Warden suggests, the degree was delayed, to enable Hooker to be elected *Discipulus* in his college (December 24, 1573).

There is a point relating to this election, first noticed by the late President, which is of considerable interest as a proof of Hooker's early reputation. The twenty *Discipuli*, like the twenty *Scholares* or Fellows, were to be elected from certain counties and dioceses, not more than two from each, and the *Discipuli* were to be under 19 when elected. But Hooker was not far from 20 when admitted; (he would be 20, the register notes, the following Easter; Keble's Hooker, i. 6. 15). It appears that his own county, Devonshire, was full at the time of his previous residence, and he was elected at last, by a not uncommon arrangement, for Hampshire, one of the other counties of the foundation, from which he would be transferred, on a vacancy, to his own. But the relaxation in point of age is more remarkable. It was in accordance with a permission, given by the Founder in the 'conclusion' of his statutes, in favour of an *Externus* of extraordinary attainments. Hooker, therefore, must have been elected as such an *Externus*, whether the word means a person not belonging to the college, in which case Hooker's connection with it had been temporarily broken, or, simply, not on the foundation. But the case seems to stand alone. The Warden of Wadham noticed no other instance of the permission having been acted upon, except in Hooker's election.

It appears from the Register of Convocation that Hooker was admitted to the degree of M.A. March 29, in the Lent term of 1577. He became full M.A. at the following Act, July 8.

Nothing has been found on examination of the college books to supply Walton's unsatisfactory notices of the dates of Hooker's middle life; his ordination, his leaving Oxford, his marriage, and going to Drayton Beauchamp.

# TABLE OF HISTORICAL EVENTS.

HOOKER'S LIFE.	A.D.	EVENTS.	A.D.
		†Francis Xavier . . . . .	1552
		Mary Queen . . . . . 6 July	1553
Born about end of March	1553-4	Wyatt's rebellion; execution of Lady Jane Grey . . . . .	1553-4
		†Ignatius Loyola . . . . .	1556
		Elizabeth Queen . . . . . 17 Nov.	1558
		†Calvin . . . . .	1564
Came to Oxford about	1567-8	†Jewel . . . . .	1571
		†Knox . . . . .	1572
Scholar ( <i>discipulus</i> ) Corpus 'Christi College	24 Dec. 1573		
B.A. . . . .	14 Jan. 1573-4	†Parker, Abp.; †Bullinger	1575
M.A. . . . .	29 March 1577		
Fellow ( <i>scholaris</i> ) Corpus Christi College	16 Sept. „		
Hebrew Lecturer . . . . .	1579		
Temporary expulsion . . . . .	1580		
Ordination (?)			
Marriage (?)			
Instituted to Drayton Beau- champ . . . . . (?)	9 Dec. 1584	†Grindal; Whitgift, Abp.	1583
Master of the Temple		Virginia settled under Ra- leigh . . . . .	1584
	17 Mar. 1584-5		
Controversy with Travers	1585-6	Zutphen; †Sir Philip Sidney	1586
Ecclesiastical Polity begun	„		
		Shakespeare at Blackfriars	1589
		Spenser's Faery Queene, I-III	1590
		Sidney's Arcadia published	„
Instituted to Boscombe . . . . .	1591		
Subdean and Prebendary of Sarum . . . . .	23 July „	†Montaigne . . . . .	1592
Ecclesiastical Polity entered at Stationers' Hall, 9 Mar.	1592-3	Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis . . . . .	1593
„ Books I-IV published (?)	1594		
Instituted to Bishopsborne			
	7 July 1595	†Tasso (b. 1552) . . . . .	1595
		Spenser's Faery Queene, 2nd edit. . . . .	1596
		Bacon's Essays . . . . .	1596-7
Ecclesiastical Polity, Book V. published . . . . .	1597		
Died . . . . .	2 Nov. 1600	†Spenser . . . . .	1598-9

# DATES CONNECTED WITH MATTERS OF RELIGION IN HOOKER'S LIFE.

REFORMED.	A.D.	ROMAN CATHOLIC.	A.D.
		Jesuit schools in Germany	
			1551-1566
Diet of Augsburg . . .	1555	Paul IV, Pope; Philip II, King of Spain, &c. . .	1555
Beza (1519-1605) at Ge- neva . . . . .	1559	Peace of Câteau-Cambrésis	1559
Acts of Supremacy (1 Eliz. 1); Uniformity (1 Eliz. 2); Queen's Injunctions about Habits; <i>Parker, Abp.</i> . .	"		
Scottish Confession; Knox's Book of Discipline . . .	1560		
Conference of Poissy . . .	1561	Mary lands at Leith . . .	1561
		Act of Assurance (5 Eliz. 1) imposing Oath of Supre- macy . . . . .	1562
XXXIX Articles . . .	1562-3	Last Session of Trent, 4 Dec.	1563
		Counter-reformation in Ger- many, Netherlands, France	
Contests about Habits; the 'Advertisements' for con- formity . . . . .	1564-5		
Sampson and Humphrey de- prived; Puritans begin to separate; Suspension of London Ministers . . .	1565	Pius V, Pope . . . . .	1566
'Plummer's Hall' meeting; Puritans first imprisoned	1567	Mary's abdication . . . .	1567
Scottish act 'anent the true and holy Kirk' . . . .	"		
Murray Regent . . . . .	"	Langside . . . . .	1568
		S. Francis de Sales, . . b.	1568
		d. 1622	
		Mary in England; Alva at Brussels; Douay founded	"
		Rising in the North . . .	1569

REFORMED.	A.D.	ROMAN CATHOLIC.	A.D.
Cartwright (1535-1602) at Cambridge; expelled . . .	1570	Deposing Bull of Pius V. . .	1570
†Murray . . . . .	"	Act (13 Eliz. c. 2) against Bulls or Reconcilers; Lepanto . . . . .	1571
Act of Subscription (13 Eliz. 12) . . . . .	1571		
Puritan 'Admonitions to Parliament'; Controversy between Cartwright and Whitgift (1572-77); Presbyterian Associa- tions; 'Order of Wands- worth'; Dering, Charke, and others silenced . . .	1572	Norfolk executed; S. Bar- tholomew; Gregory XIII, Pope . . . . .	1572
†John Knox . . . . .	"		
Morton, Regent . . . . .	"	Projects for a Catholic League . . . . from	1573
		†Kirkaldy and Lethington . . .	"
†Abp. Parker; succeeded by <i>Grindal</i> . . . . .	1575	Cuthbert Mayne, priest, hanged . . . . .	1577
A. Melvill's 'Second Book of Discipline' . . . . .	1576-8		
'Prophecys' (1570-77) put down . . . . .	1577	Desmond's insurrection; Spaniards in Ireland . . .	1579
'Family of Love' . . . . .	1579	Gregory XIII sends Par- sons and Campion Jesu- its, into England . . .	1580
'Brownists' . . . . .	1580	Act against Reconciling (23 Eliz. 1); Campion exe- cuted . . . . .	1581
Act against Seditious words (23 Eliz. 2) . . . . .	1581	†S. Teresa . . . . .	1582
†Morton . . . . .	"	Reformation of Calendar . . .	"
Second Book of Discipline adopted by the Kirk; Triumph of Presbyterians in Scotland . . . . .	1581-3	†G. Buchanan . . . . .	"
Thacker and Coping hanged for 'Brownist' Books; †Grindal; <i>Whitgift Abp.</i> (†1604); High Commis- sion Court . . . . .	1583	'Execution of Justice in England' . . . . .	1583

REFORMED.	A.D.	ROMAN CATHOLIC.	A.D.
		Act for Queen's Safety (27 Eliz. 1); The 'Association'; Act against Jesuits (27 Eliz. 2)	1584
†William of Orange . . .	1584		
Puritan book on Discipline; Travers; Cartwright . . .	"	Sixtus V, Pope . . .	1585
		Babington's Plot . . .	1586
Puritan 'Classes' in Northamptonshire, &c. . .	1587	Mary Queen of Scots executed . . .	1587
		Bellarmino (1542-1621). 'Controversies' published	1587-90
'Marprelate' libels; †Leicester; Bancroft's Sermon at Paul's Cross . . .	1588	Armada; †Duke of Guise	1588
		†Henry III . . .	1589
'Second Book of Discipline' set up in Scotland; Cartwright imprisoned . . .	1590	Gregory XIV, Pope . . .	1590
†Walsingham . . .	"		
Hacket hanged . . .	1591	Clement VIII, Pope . . .	1592
		†Prince of Parma . . .	"
Act (35 Eliz. 1) against Nonconformists; Barrow and Greenwood (April 6); Penry (May 29), executed for 'Seditious Words' . . .	1593	Henry IV abjures . . .	1593
Lambeth Articles . . .	1595	Jesuits expelled from Paris	1595
†Burghley . . .	1598	Peace in France; Treaty of Angers; Edict of Nantes	1598
		Peace of Vervins; †Philip II	"

OF THE

LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY.

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THE FIRST BOOK.

CONCERNING LAWS AND THEIR SEVERAL KINDS IN GENERAL.

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THE MATTER CONTAINED IN THIS FIRST BOOK.

- I. The cause of writing this general discourse concerning laws.
- II. ✓ Of that law which God from before the beginning hath set for himself to do all things by.
- III. The law which natural agents observe, and their necessary manner of keeping it.
- IV. The law which the Angels of God obey.
- V. The law whereby man is in his actions directed to the imitation of God.
- VI. Men's first beginning to understand that law.
- VII. Of man's will, which is the first thing that laws of action are made to guide.
- VIII. Of the natural finding out of laws by the light of reason to guide the will unto that which is good.
- IX. Of the benefit of keeping that law which reason teacheth.
- X. How reason doth lead men unto the making of human laws whereby politic societies are governed, and to agreement about laws whereby the fellowship or communion of independent societies standeth.



- XI. Wherefore God hath by scripture further made known such supernatural laws as do serve for men's direction.
- XII. The cause why so many natural or rational laws are set down in holy scripture.
- XIII. The benefit of having divine laws written.
- XIV. The sufficiency of scripture unto the end for which it was instituted.
- XV. Of laws positive contained in scripture, the mutability of certain of them, and the general use of scripture.
- XVI. A conclusion, shewing how all this belongeth to the cause in question.

I. HE that goeth about to persuade a multitude, that  
The cause of writing this general discourse. they are not so well governed as they ought to be, shall never want attentive and favourable hearers; because they know the manifold defects whereunto every kind of regiment is subject, but the secret lets and difficulties, which in public proceedings are innumerable and inevitable, they have not ordinarily the judgment to consider. And because such as openly reprove supposed disorders of state are taken for principal friends to the common benefit of all, and for men that carry singular freedom of mind; under this fair and plausible colour whatsoever they utter passeth for good and current. That which wanteth in the weight of their speech, is supplied by the aptness of men's minds to accept and believe it. Whereas on the other side, if we maintain things that are established, we have not only to strive with a number of heavy prejudices deeply rooted in the hearts of men, who think that herein we serve the time, and speak in favour of the present state, because thereby we either hold or seek preferment; but also to bear such exceptions as minds so averted beforehand usually take

against that which they are loth should be poured into them.

[2] Albeit therefore much of that we are to speak in this present cause may seem to a number perhaps tedious, perhaps obscure, dark, and intricate; (for many talk of the truth, which never sounded the depth from whence it springeth, and therefore when they are led thereunto they are soon weary, as men drawn from those beaten paths wherewith they have been inured;) yet this may not so far prevail as to cut off that which the matter itself requireth, howsoever the nice humour of some be therewith pleased or no. They unto whom we shall seem tedious are in no wise injured by us, because it is in their own hands to spare that labour which they are not willing to endure. And if any complain of obscurity, they must consider, that in these matters it cometh no otherwise to pass than in sundry the works both of art and also of nature, where that which hath greatest force in the very things we see is notwithstanding itself oftentimes not seen. The stateliness of houses, the goodliness of trees, when we behold them delighteth the eye; but that foundation which beareth up the one, that root which ministereth unto the other nourishment and life, is in the bosom of the earth concealed; and if there be at any time occasion to search into it, such labour is then more necessary than pleasant, both to them which undertake it and for the lookers-on. In like manner, the use and benefit of good laws all that live under them may enjoy with delight and comfort, albeit the grounds and first original causes from whence they have sprung be unknown, as to the greatest part of men they are. But when they who withdraw their obedience pretend that the laws which they should obey are corrupt and vicious; for

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better examination of their quality, it behoveth the very foundation and root, the highest wellspring and fountain of them to be discovered. Which because we are not oftentimes accustomed to do, when we do it, the pains we take are more needful a great deal than acceptable, and the matters which we handle seem by reason of newness (till the mind grow better acquainted with them) dark, intricate, and unfamiliar. For as much help whereof as may be in this case, I have endeavoured throughout the body of this whole discourse, that every former part might give strength unto all that follow, and every later bring some light unto all before. So that if the judgments of men do but hold themselves in suspense as touching these first more general meditations, till in order they have perused the rest that ensue; what may seem dark at the first will afterwards be found more plain, even as the later particular decisions will appear I doubt not more strong, when the other have been read before.

[3] The laws of the Church, whereby for so many ages together we have been guided in the exercise of Christian religion and the service of the true God, our rites, customs, and orders of Ecclesiastical government, are called in question; we are accused as men that will not have Christ Jesus to rule over them, but have wilfully cast his statutes behind their backs, hating to be reformed, and made subject unto the sceptre of his discipline. Behold therefore we offer the laws whereby we live unto the general trial and judgment of the whole world; heartily beseeching almighty God, whom we desire to serve according to his own will, that both we and others (all kind of partial affection being clean laid aside) may have eyes to see, and hearts to embrace, the things that in his sight are most acceptable.

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And because the point about which we strive is the quality of our laws, our first entrance hereinto cannot better be made, than with consideration of the nature of law in general, and of that law which giveth life unto all the rest, which are commendable, just, and good ; namely the law whereby the Eternal himself doth work. Proceeding from hence to the law, first of nature, then of scripture, we shall have the easier access unto those things which come after to be debated, concerning the particular cause and question which we have in hand.

II. All things that are, have some operation not violent or casual. Neither doth any thing ever begin to exercise the same, without some fore-conceived end for which it worketh. And

Of that law which God from before the beginning hath set for himself to do all things by.

And the end which it worketh for is not obtained, unless the work be also fit to obtain it by. For unto every end every operation will not serve. That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same we term a *Law*. So that no certain end could ever be attained, unless the actions whereby it is attained were regular ; that is to say, made suitable, fit and correspondent unto their end, by some canon, rule or law. Which thing doth first take place in the works even of God himself.

[2] All things therefore do work after a sort according to law : all other things according to a law, whereof some superior, unto whom they are subject, is author ; only the works and operations of God have him both for their worker, and for the law whereby they are wrought. The being of God is a kind of law to his working : for that perfection which God is, giveth perfection to that he doth. Those natural, necessary, and internal operations of God,

the *generation* of the Son, the *proceeding* of the Spirit, are without the compass of my present intent: which is to touch only such operations as have their beginning and being by a voluntary purpose, wherewith God hath eternally decreed when and how they should be. Which eternal decree is that we term an eternal law.

Dangerous it were for the feeble brain of man to wade far into the doings of the Most High; whom although to know be life, and joy to make mention of his name, yet our soundest knowledge is to know that we know him not as indeed he is, neither can know him; and our safest eloquence concerning him is our silence, when we confess without confession that his glory is inexplicable, his greatness above our capacity and reach. He is above, and we upon earth; therefore it behoveth our words to be wary and few<sup>a</sup>.

Our God is one, or rather very *Oneness*, and mere unity, having nothing but itself in itself, and not consisting (as all things do besides God) of many things. In which essential unity of God, a Trinity personal nevertheless subsisteth, after a manner far exceeding the possibility of man's conceit. The works which outwardly are of God, they are in such sort of him being one, that each person hath in them somewhat peculiar and proper. For being three, and they all subsisting in the essence of one deity; from the Father, by the Son, through the Spirit, all things are. That which the Son doth hear of the Father, and which the Spirit doth receive of the Father and the Son, the same we have at the hands of the Spirit, as being the last, and therefore the nearest unto us in order, although in power the same with the second and the first<sup>b</sup>.

[3] The wise and learned among the very Heathens

<sup>a</sup> [Eccles. v. 2.]

<sup>b</sup> John xvi. 13-15.

themselves have all acknowledged some first cause, whereupon originally the being of all things dependeth. Neither have they otherwise spoken of that cause than as an Agent, which knowing *what* and *why* it worketh, observeth in working a most exact *order* or *law*. Thus much is signified by that which Homer mentioneth, Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή<sup>c</sup>. Thus much acknowledged by Mercurius Trismegistus, Τὸν πάντα κόσμον ἐποίησεν ὁ δημιουργὸς οὐ χερσὶν ἀλλὰ λόγῳ<sup>d</sup>. Thus much confest by Anaxagoras and Plato, terming the maker of the world an *Intellectual* worker<sup>e</sup>. Finally the Stōics, although imagining the first cause of all things to be fire, held nevertheless that the same fire having art, did ὁδῷ βαδίζειν ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου<sup>f</sup>. They all confess therefore in the working of that first cause, that *counsel* is used, *reason* followed, a *way* observed, that is to say, constant order and law is kept, whereof itself must needs be author unto itself. Otherwise it should have some worthier and higher to direct it, and so could not itself be the first. Being the first, it can have no other than itself to be the author of that law which it willingly worketh by.

God therefore is a law both to himself, and to all other things besides. To himself he is a law in all those things whereof our Saviour speaketh, saying, *My Father worketh as yet, so I*. God worketh nothing without cause. All those things which are done by him have some end for which they are done; (and the end for which they are done is a reason of his will to do them.)

<sup>c</sup> Jupiter's *counsel* was accomplished. [II. A. 5.]

<sup>d</sup> [C. 7. § 1.] The creator made the whole world, not with hands, but by *reason*.

<sup>e</sup> Stob. in Eclog. Phys. [ed. Canter. 1575. pp. 2, 5.]

<sup>f</sup> Proceed by a certain and a set *Way* in the making of the world.

<sup>g</sup> John v. 17.

His will had not inclined to create woman, but that he saw it could not be well if she were not created; *Non est bonum, It is not good man should be alone; therefore let us make a helper for him*<sup>h</sup>. That and nothing else is done by God, which to leave undone were not so good.

If therefore it be demanded, why God having power and ability infinite, the effects notwithstanding of that power are all so limited as we see they are: the reason hereof is the end which he hath proposed, and the law whereby his wisdom hath stinted the effects of his power in such sort, that it doth not work infinitely, but correspondently unto that end for which it worketh, even all things *χρηστῶς*, in most decent and comely sort, all things in *measure, number, and weight*<sup>i</sup>.

[4] The general end of God's external working is the exercise of his most glorious and most abundant virtue. Which abundance doth shew itself in variety, and for that cause this variety is oftentimes in scripture exprest by the name of *riches*<sup>k</sup>. *The Lord hath made all things for his own sake*<sup>l</sup>. Not that any thing is made to be beneficial unto him, but all things for him to shew beneficence and grace in them.

The particular drift of every act proceeding externally from God we are not able to discern, and therefore cannot always give the proper and certain reason of his works. Howbeit undoubtedly a proper and certain reason there is of every finite work of God, inasmuch as there is a law imposed upon it; which if there were not, it should be infinite, even as the worker himself is.

[5] They err therefore who think that of the will of

<sup>h</sup> Gen. ii. 18.

<sup>k</sup> Ephes. i. 7; Phil. iv. 19; Col. ii. 3.

<sup>l</sup> Sap. viii. 1; xi. 20.

<sup>i</sup> Prov. xvi. 4.

God to do this or that, there is no reason besides his will. Many times no reason known to us; but that there is no reason thereof, I judge it most unreasonable to imagine, inasmuch as he worketh all things *κατὰ τὴν βουλήν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ*, not only according to his own will, but *the counsel of his own will*<sup>m</sup>. And whatsoever is done with counsel or wise resolution hath of necessity some reason why it should be done, albeit that reason be to us in some things so secret, that it forceth the wit of man to stand, as the blessed Apostle himself doth, amazed thereat<sup>n</sup>: *O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, &c.* That law eternal which God himself hath made to himself, and thereby worketh all things whereof he is the cause and author; that law in the admirable frame whereof shineth with most perfect beauty the countenance of that wisdom which hath testified concerning herself<sup>o</sup>, *The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, even before his works of old I was set up, &c.*; that law which hath been the pattern to make, and is the card to guide the world by; that law which hath been of God and with God everlastingly; that law, the author and observer whereof is one only God to be blessed for ever: how should either men or angels be able perfectly to behold? The book of this law we are neither able nor worthy to open and look into. That little thereof which we darkly apprehend, we admire; the rest with religious ignorance we humbly and meekly adore.

[6] Seeing therefore that according to this law he worketh, *of whom, through whom, and for whom, are all things*<sup>p</sup>; although there seem unto us confusion and disorder in the affairs of this present world, *Tamen quoniam*

<sup>m</sup> Ephes. i. 11.    <sup>n</sup> Rom. xi. 33.    <sup>o</sup> Prov. viii. 22.    <sup>p</sup> Rom. xi. 36.



*bonus mundum rector temperat, recte fieri cuncta ne dubites*<sup>a</sup>, let no man doubt but that every thing is well done, because the world is ruled by so good a guide, as transgresseth not his own law, than which nothing can be more absolute, perfect, and just.

The law whereby he worketh is eternal, and therefore can have no shew or colour of mutability: for which cause, a part of that law being opened in the promises which God hath made, (because his promises are nothing else but declarations what God will do for the good of men,) touching those promises the Apostle hath witnessed, that God may as possibly *deny himself*<sup>r</sup> and not be God, as fail to perform them. And concerning the counsel of God, he termeth it likewise a thing *unchangeable*<sup>s</sup>; the counsel of God, and that law of God whereof now we speak, being one. Nor is the freedom of the will of God any whit abated, let, or hindered, by means of this; because the imposition of this law upon himself is his own free and voluntary act. This law therefore we may name eternal, being *that order which God before all ages hath set down with himself, for himself to do all things by*.

III. I am not ignorant that by law eternal the learned

The law which  
natural agents  
have given them  
to observe, and  
their necessary  
manner of keep-  
ing it.

for the most part do understand the order, not which God hath eternally purposed himself in all his works to observe, but rather that which with himself he hath set down as expedient to be kept by all his creatures, according to the several condition wherewith he hath endued them. They who thus are accustomed to speak apply the name of *Law* unto that only rule of working which superior authority imposeth; whereas we somewhat more en-

<sup>a</sup> Boet. lib. iv. de Consol. Philos. [p. 105. ed. Lugd. Bat. 1656. pros. 5.]

<sup>r</sup> 2 Tim. ii. 13.

<sup>s</sup> Heb. vi. 17.

larging the sense thereof term any kind of rule or canon, whereby actions are framed, a law. Now that law which, as it is laid up in the bosom of God, they call *eternal*, receiveth according unto the different kinds of things which are subject unto it, different and sundry kinds of names. That part of it which ordereth natural agents we call usually *nature's law*; that which Angels do clearly behold and without any swerving observe is a law *celestial and heavenly*; the law of *reason*, that which bindeth creatures reasonable in this world, and with which by reason they may most plainly perceive themselves bound; that which bindeth them, and is not known but by special revelation from God, *Divine law*; *human law*, that which out of the law either of reason or of God, men probably gathering to be expedient, they make it a law. All things therefore, which are as they ought to be, are conformed unto *this second law eternal*; and even those things which to this eternal law are not conformable, are notwithstanding in some sort ordered by *the first eternal law*. For what good or evil is there under the sun, what action correspondent or repugnant unto the law which God hath imposed upon his creatures, but in or upon it God doth work according to the law which himself hath eternally purposed to keep; that is to say, the *first law eternal*? So that a twofold law eternal being thus made, it is not hard to conceive how they both take place in all things<sup>t</sup>.

<sup>t</sup> 'Id omne, quod in rebus creatis fit, est materia legis aeternae.' Th. 1. 2. [Thom. Aquin. Summ. Theol. Ima 2<sup>da</sup>] q. 93. art. 4, 5, 6. 'Nullo modo aliquid legibus summi Creatoris ordinationique subtrahitur, a quo pax universitatis administratur.' August. de Civit. Dei. lib. xix. cap. 12. [quoted by Aquin.] Immo et peccatum, quatenus a Deo juste permittitur, cadit in legem aeternam. Etiam legi aeternae subicitur peccatum, quatenus voluntaria legis transgressio poenale quoddam incommodum animae inserit, juxta illud Augustini, 'Jussisti Domine, et sic est, ut poena sua sibi sit omnis animus inordinatus.' Confess. lib. i. cap. 12. Nec male scholastici, 'Quemadmodum,' inquit, 'videmus res naturales contingentes,

[2] Wherefore to come to the law of nature: albeit thereby we sometimes mean that manner of working which God hath set for each created thing to keep; yet forasmuch as those things are termed most properly natural agents, which keep the law of their kind unwittingly, as the heavens and elements of the world, which can do no otherwise than they do; and forasmuch as we give unto intellectual natures the name of *voluntary* agents, that so we may distinguish them from the other; expedient it will be, that we sever the law of nature observed by the one from that which the other is tied unto. Touching the former, their strict keeping of one tenure, statute, and law, is spoken of by all, but hath in it more than men have as yet attained to know, or perhaps ever shall attain, seeing the travail of wading herein is given of God to the sons of men, that perceiving how much the least thing in the world hath in it more than the wisest are able to reach unto, they may by this means learn humility. Moses, in describing the work of creation, attributeth speech unto God: *God said, Let there be light: Let there be a firmament: Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together into one place: Let the earth bring forth: Let there be lights in the firmament of heaven.* Was this only the intent of Moses, to signify the infinite greatness of God's power by the easiness of his accomplishing such effects, without travail, pain, or labour? Surely it seemeth that Moses had herein besides this a further purpose, namely, first to teach that God did not work as a necessary but a voluntary agent, intending beforehand and decreeing with

hoc ipso quod a fine particulari suo atque adeo a lege aeterna exorbitant, in eandem legem aeternam incidere, quatenus consequuntur alium finem a lege etiam aeterna ipsis in casu particulari constitutum; sic verisimile est homines, etiam cum peccant et desciscunt a lege aeterna ut praecipiente, reincidere in ordinem aeternae legis ut punientis.

himself that which did outwardly proceed from him: secondly, to shew that God did then institute a law natural to be observed by creatures, and therefore according to the manner of laws, the institution thereof is described, as being established by solemn injunction. His commanding those things to be which are, and to be in such sort as they are, to keep that tenure and course which they do, importeth the establishment of nature's law. This world's first creation, and the preservation since of things created, what is it but only so far forth a manifestation by execution, what the eternal law of God is concerning things natural? And as it cometh to pass in a kingdom rightly ordered, that after a law is once published, it presently takes effect far and wide, all states framing themselves thereunto; even so let us think it fareth in the natural course of the world: [since the time that God did first proclaim the edicts of his law upon it, heaven and earth have hearkened unto his voice, and their labour hath been to do his will: He *made a law for the rain*<sup>u</sup>; He gave his *decree unto the sea, that the waters should not pass his commandment*<sup>x</sup>. Now if nature should intermit her course, and leave altogether, though it were but for a while, the observation of her own laws; if those principal and mother elements of the world, whereof all things in this lower world are made, should lose the qualities which now they have; if the frame of that heavenly arch erected over our heads should loosen and dissolve itself; if celestial spheres should forget their wonted motions, and by irregular volubility turn themselves any way as it might happen; if the prince of the lights of heaven, which now as a giant doth run his unwearied course<sup>y</sup>, should as it were through a languishing faintness begin to stand and to rest himself; if the

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<sup>u</sup> [Job xxviii. 26.]<sup>x</sup> [Jer. v. 22.]<sup>y</sup> Psalm xix. 5.

moon should wander from her beaten way, the times and seasons of the year blend themselves by disordered and confused mixture, the winds breathe out their last gasp, the clouds yield no rain, the earth be defeated of heavenly influence, the fruits of the earth pine away as children at the withered breasts of their mother no longer able to yield them relief: what would become of man himself, whom these things now do all serve? See we not plainly that obedience of creatures unto the law of nature is the stay of the whole world?

[3] Notwithstanding with nature it cometh sometimes to pass as with art. Let Phidias have rude and obstinate stuff to carve, though his art do that it should, his work will lack that beauty which otherwise in fitter matter it might have had. He that striketh an instrument with skill may cause notwithstanding a very unpleasant sound, if the string whereon he striketh chance to be incapable of harmony. In the matter whereof things natural consist, that of Theophrastus taketh place, Πολὺν τὸ οὐχ ὑπακούον οὐδὲ δεχόμενον τὸ εὖ ᾧ, *Much of it is oftentimes such as will by no means yield to receive that impression which were best and most perfect.* Which defect in the matter of things natural, they who gave themselves unto the contemplation of nature amongst the heathen observed often: but the true original cause thereof, divine malediction, laid for the sin of man upon these creatures which God had made for the use of man, this being an article of that saving truth which God hath revealed unto his Church, was above the reach of their merely natural capacity and understanding. But howsoever these swervings are now and then incident into the course of nature, nevertheless so constantly the laws of nature are by

\* Theophrast. in Metaph. [p. 271. l. 10. ed. Basil. 1541.]

natural agents observed, that no man denieth but those things which nature worketh are wrought, either always or for the most part, after one and the same manner <sup>a</sup>.

[4] If here it be demanded what that is which keepeth nature in obedience to her own law, we must have recourse to that higher law whereof we have already spoken, and because all other laws do thereon depend, from thence we must borrow so much as shall need for brief resolution in this point. Although we are not of opinion therefore, as some are, that nature in working hath before her certain exemplary draughts or patterns, which subsisting in the bosom of the Highest, and being thence discovered, she fixeth her eye upon them, as travellers by sea upon the pole-star of the world, and that according thereunto she guideth her hand to work by imitation: although we rather embrace the oracle of Hippocrates <sup>b</sup>, that *Each thing both in small and in great fulfilleth the task which destiny hath set down*; and concerning the manner of executing and fulfilling the same, *What they do they know not, yet is it in shew and appearance as though they did know what they do; and the truth is they do not discern the things which they look on*: nevertheless, forasmuch as the works of nature are no less exact, than if she did both behold and study how to express some absolute shape or mirror always present before her; yea, such her dexterity and skill appeareth, that no intellectual creature in the world were able by capacity to do that which nature doth without capacity and knowledge; it cannot be but nature hath some director of infinite knowledge to guide her in all her ways. Who the guide of nature, but only the God

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cf.  
Mutability  
Control

<sup>a</sup> Arist. Rhet. i. cap. 39.

<sup>b</sup> Τὴν πεπωμένην μοῖρην ἕκαστον ἐκπληρῶ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέγαν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μείον.—ὁ πρῆσσουν οὐκ οἶδαν, ὃ δὲ πρῆσσουν δοκέουσιν εἰδέναι, καὶ θ' ἂ μὲν δρῶσι οὐ γινώσκουσι.

of nature? *In him we live, move, and are* <sup>c</sup>. Those things which nature is said to do, are by divine art performed, using nature as an instrument; nor is there any such art or knowledge divine in nature herself working, but in the guide of nature's work.

Whereas therefore things natural which are not in the number of voluntary agents, (for of such only we now speak, and of no other,) do so necessarily observe their certain laws, that as long as they keep those forms<sup>d</sup> which give them their being, they cannot possibly be apt or inclinable to do otherwise than they do; seeing the kinds of their operations are both constantly and exactly framed according to the several ends for which they serve, they themselves in the meanwhile, though doing that which is fit, yet knowing neither what they do, nor why: it followeth that all which they do in this sort proceedeth originally from some such agent, as knoweth, appointeth, holdeth up, and even actually frameth the same.

The manner of this divine efficiency being far above us, we are no more able to conceive by our reason than creatures unreasonable by their sense are able to apprehend after what manner we dispose and order the course of our affairs. Only thus much is discerned, that the natural generation and process of all things receiveth order of proceeding from the settled stability of divine understanding. This appointeth unto them their kinds of working; the disposition whereof in the purity of God's own knowledge and will is rightly termed by the name of *Providence*. The same being referred unto the

<sup>c</sup> Acts xvii. 28.

<sup>d</sup> Form in other creatures is a thing proportionable unto the soul in living creatures. Sensible it is not, nor otherwise discernible than only by effects. According to the diversity of inward forms, things of the world are distinguished into their kinds.

things themselves here disposed by it, was wont by the ancient to be called *natural destiny*. That law, the performance whereof we behold in things natural, is as it were an authentional or an original draught written in the bosom of God himself; whose spirit being to execute the same, useth every particular nature, every mere natural agent, only as an instrument created at the beginning, and ever since the beginning used, to work his own will and pleasure withal. Nature therefore is nothing else but God's instrument<sup>o</sup>: in the course whereof Dionysius perceiving some sudden disturbance is said to have cried out, *Aut Deus naturæ patitur, aut mundi machina dissolvetur*: either God doth suffer impediment, and is by a greater than himself hindered; or if that be impossible, then hath he determined to make a present dissolution of the world; the execution of that law beginning now to stand still, without which the world cannot stand.

This workman, whose servitor nature is, being in truth but only one, the heathens imagining to be moe, gave him in the sky the name of *Jupiter*, in the air the name of *Juno*, in the water the name of *Neptune*, in the earth the name of *Vesta* and sometimes of *Ceres*, the name of *Apollo* in the Sun, in the Moon the name of *Diana*, the name of *Æolus* and divers other in the winds; and to conclude, even so many guides of nature they dreamed of, as they saw there were kinds of things natural in the world. These they honoured, as having power to work or cease accordingly as men deserved of them. But unto us there is one only guide of all agents natural, and he

• Vide Thom. in Compend. Theol. cap. 3: 'Omne quod movetur ab aliquo est quasi instrumentum quoddam primi moventis. Ridiculum est autem, etiam apud indoctos, ponere, instrumentum moveri non ab aliquo principali agente.' [tom. xvii. fol. 10.]



both the creator and the worker of all in all, alone to be blessed, adored and honoured by all for ever.

[5] That which hitherto hath been spoken concerneth natural agents considered in themselves. But we must further remember also, (which thing to touch in a word shall suffice,) that as in this respect they have their law, which law directeth them in the means whereby they tend to their own perfection: so likewise another law there is, which toucheth them as they are sociable parts united into one body; a law which bindeth them each to serve unto other's good, and all to prefer the good of the whole before whatsoever their own particular; as we plainly see they do, when things natural in that regard forget their ordinary natural wont; that which is heavy mounting sometime upwards of its own accord, and forsaking the centre of the earth which to itself is most natural, even as if it did hear itself commanded to let go the good it privately wisheth, and to relieve the present distress of nature in common.

IV. But now that we may lift up our eyes (as it were) from the footstool to the throne of God, and The law which angels do work by. leaving these natural, consider a little the state of heavenly and divine creatures: touching Angels, which are spirits immaterial<sup>f</sup> and intellectual, the glorious inhabitants of those sacred palaces, where nothing but light and blessed immortality, no shadow of matter for tears, discontentments, griefs, and uncomfortable passions to work upon, but all joy, tranquillity, and peace, even for ever and ever doth dwell: as in number and order they are huge, mighty; and royal armies<sup>g</sup>, so likewise in perfection of obedience unto that law,

<sup>f</sup> Psalm civ. 4; Heb. i. 7; Ephes. iii. 10.

<sup>g</sup> Dan. vii. 10; Matt. xxvi. 53; Heb. xii. 22; Luke ii. 13.

which the Highest, whom they adore, love, and imitate, hath imposed upon them, such observants they are thereof, that our Saviour himself being to set down the perfect *idea* of that which we are to pray and wish for on earth, did not teach to pray or wish for more than only that here it might be with us, as with them it is in heaven<sup>h</sup>. God which moveth mere natural agents as an efficient only, doth otherwise move intellectual creatures, and espe- <sup>by their reason.</sup> cially his holy angels: for beholding the face of God<sup>i</sup>, in admiration of so great excellency they all adore him; and being rapt with the love of his beauty, they cleave inseparably for ever unto him. Desire to resemble him in goodness maketh them unweariable and even unsatiable in their longing to do by all means all manner good unto all the creatures of God, but especially unto the children of men<sup>k</sup>: in the countenance of whose nature, looking downward, they behold themselves beneath themselves; even as upward, in God, beneath whom themselves are, they see that character which is nowhere but in themselves and us resembled. Thus far even the Painims have approached; thus far they have seen into the doings of the Angels of God; Orpheus confessing, that *the fiery throne of God is attended on by those most industrious Angels, careful how all things are performed amongst men<sup>l</sup>*; and the Mirror of human wisdom plainly teaching, that God moveth Angels, even as that thing doth stir man's heart, which is thereunto presented amiable<sup>m</sup>. Angelical actions may therefore be reduced unto these three general

<sup>h</sup> Matt. vi. 10.<sup>i</sup> Matt. xviii. 10.<sup>k</sup> Psalm xci. 11, 12; Luke xv. 7; Heb. i. 14; Acts x. 3; Dan. ix. 23; Matt. xviii. 10; Dan. iv. 13.<sup>l</sup> Σὺ δὲ θρόνον πυρόεντι παρεστᾶσιν πολυμόχοι

Ἄγγελοι, οἷσι μέμλε βροτοῖς ὡς πάντα τελεῖται.

[Fragm. iii. ex Clem. Alex. Strom. V. pp. 824, 8.]

<sup>m</sup> Arist. Metaph. lib. xii. cap. 7.

kinds: first, most delectable love arising from the visible apprehension of the purity, glory, and beauty of God, invisible saving only unto spirits that are pure<sup>n</sup>: secondly, adoration grounded upon the evidence of the greatness of God, on whom they see how all things depend<sup>o</sup>; thirdly, imitation<sup>p</sup>, bred by the presence of his exemplary goodness, who ceaseth not before them daily to fill heaven and earth with the rich treasures of most free and undeserved grace.

[2] Of Angels, we are not to consider only what they are and do in regard of their own being, but that also which concerneth them as they are linked into a kind of corporation amongst themselves, and of society or fellowship with men. Consider Angels each of them severally in himself, and their law is that which the Prophet David mentioneth, *All ye his Angels praise him*<sup>q</sup>. Consider the Angels of God associated, and their law is that which disposeth them as an *army*, one in order and degree above another<sup>r</sup>. Consider finally the Angels as having with us that communion which the Apostle to the Hebrews noteth, and in regard whereof angels have not disdained to profess themselves our *fellow-servants*; from hence there springeth up a third law, which bindeth them to works of ministerial employment<sup>s</sup>. Every of which their several functions are by them performed with joy.

[3] A part of the Angels of God notwithstanding (we know) have fallen<sup>t</sup>, and that their fall hath been through the voluntary breach of that law, which did require at

<sup>n</sup> Job xxxviii. 7; Matt. xviii. 10.

<sup>o</sup> Psalm cxlviii. 2; Heb. i. 6; Isa. vi. 3.

<sup>p</sup> This is intimated wheresoever we find them termed 'the sons of God,' as Job i. 36, and xxxviii. 7.

<sup>q</sup> Ps. cxlviii. 2.

<sup>r</sup> Luke ii. 13; Matt. xxvi. 52.

<sup>s</sup> Heb. xii. 22; Apoc. xxii. 9.

<sup>t</sup> 2 Pet. ii. 4; Jude 6.

their hands continuance in the exercise of their high and admirable virtue. Impossible, it was that ever their will should change or incline to remit any part of their duty, without some object having force to avert their conceit from God, and to draw it another way; and that, before they attained that high perfection of bliss, wherein now the elect ~~Angels~~ are without possibility of falling. Of any thing more than of God they could not by any means like, as long as whatsoever they knew besides God they apprehended it not in itself without dependency upon God; because so long God must needs seem infinitely better than any thing which they so could apprehend. Things beneath them could not in such sort be presented unto their eyes, but that therein they must needs see always how those things did depend on God. It seemeth therefore that there was no other way for angels to sin, but by reflex of their understanding upon themselves; when being held with admiration of their own sublimity and honour, the memory of their subordination unto God and their dependency on him was drowned in this conceit; whereupon their adoration, love, and imitation of God could not choose but be also interrupted. The fall of Angels therefore was pride. Since their fall, their practices have been the clean contrary unto those before mentioned<sup>u</sup>. For being dispersed, some in the air, some on the earth, some in the water, some amongst the minerals, dens, and caves, that are under the earth; they have by all means laboured to effect a universal rebellion against the laws, and as far as in them lieth utter destruction of the works of God. These wicked spirits the Heathens honoured instead of Gods, both generally under the name

<sup>u</sup> John viii. 44; 1 Peter v. 8; Apoc. ix. 11; Gen. iii. 15; 1 Chron. xxi. 1; Job i. 7, and ii. 2; John xiii. 27; Acts v. 3; Apoc. xx. 8.

of *Dii inferi*, Gods infernal; and particularly, some in Oracles, some in Idols, some as household Gods, some as Nymphs: in a word, no foul and wicked spirit which was not one way or other honoured of men as God, till such time as light appeared in the world and dissolved the works of the devil. Thus much therefore may suffice for Angels, the next unto whom in degree are men.

V. God alone excepted, who actually and everlastingly is whatsoever he may be, and which cannot hereafter be that which now he is not; all other things besides are somewhat in possibility, which as yet they are not in act. And for this cause there is in all things an appetite or desire, whereby they incline to something which they may be; and when they are it, they shall be perfecter than now they are. All which perfections are contained under the general name of *Goodness*. And because there is not in the world any thing whereby another may not some way be made the perfecter, therefore all things that are, are good. Again, sith there can be no goodness desired which proceedeth not from God himself, as from the supreme cause of all things; and every effect doth after a sort contain, at least wise resemble, the cause from which it proceedeth: all things in the world are said in some sort to seek the highest, and to covet more or less the participation of God himself\*. Yet this doth nowhere so much appear as it doth in man; because there are so many kinds of perfections which man seeketh.

[2] The first degree of goodness is that general perfection which all things do seek, in desiring the continuance of their being. All things therefore coveting as much as may be to be like unto God in being ever, that which

\* Πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὁρεύεται. Arist. de An. lib. ii, cap. 4.

cannot hereunto attain personally doth seek to continue itself another way, that is by offspring and propagation. The next degree of goodness is that which each thing coveteth by affecting resemblance with God, in the constancy and excellency of those operations which belong unto their kind. The immutability of God they strive unto, by working either always or for the most part after one and the same manner; his absolute exactness they imitate, by tending unto that which is most exquisite in every particular. Hence have risen a number of axioms in philosophy<sup>y</sup>, showing how *The works of nature do always aim at that which cannot be bettered.*

[3] These two kinds of goodness rehearsed are so nearly united to the things themselves which desire them, that we scarcely perceive the appetite to stir in reaching forth her hand towards them. But the desire of those perfections which grow externally is more apparent; especially of such as are not expressly desired unless they be first known, or such as are not for any other cause than for knowledge itself desired. Concerning perfections in this kind; that by proceeding in the knowledge of truth, and by growing in the exercise of virtue, man amongst the creatures of this inferior world aspireth to the greatest conformity with God, this is not only known unto us, whom he himself hath so instructed<sup>z</sup>, but even they do acknowledge, who amongst men are not judged the nearest unto him. With Plato what one thing more usual, than to excite men unto the love of wisdom, by showing how much wise men are thereby exalted above men; how knowledge doth raise them up into heaven; how it maketh them, though

<sup>y</sup> Ἐν τοῖς φύσει δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἢ φύσις αἰεὶ ποιεῖ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τὸ βέλτιστον. Arist. 2. de cæl. cap. 5.

<sup>z</sup> Matt. v. 48; Sap. vii. 27.

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not Gods, yet as Gods, high, admirable, and divine? And Mercurius Trismegistus speaking of the virtues of a righteous soul<sup>b</sup>, *Such spirits* (saith he) *are never cloyed with praising and speaking well of all men, with doing good unto every one by word and deed, because they study to frame themselves according to THE PATTERN of the father of spirits.*

VI. In the matter of knowledge, there is between the Angels of God and the children of men this difference. Angels already have full and complete knowledge in the highest degree that can be imparted unto them; men, if we view them in their spring, are at the first without understanding or knowledge at all<sup>c</sup>. Nevertheless from this utter vacuity they grow by degrees, till they come at length to be even as the Angels themselves are. That which agreeth to the one now, the other shall attain unto in the end; they are not so far disjoined and severed, but that they come at length to meet. The soul of man being therefore at the first as a book, wherein nothing is and yet all things may be imprinted; we are to search by what steps and degrees it riseth unto perfection of knowledge.

[2] Unto that which hath been already set down concerning natural agents this we must add, that albeit therein we have comprised as well creatures living as void of life, if they be in degree of nature beneath men; nevertheless a difference we must observe between those natural agents that work altogether unwittingly, and those which have though weak yet some understanding what they do, as fishes, fowls, and beasts have. Beasts are in sensible capacity as ripe even as men themselves, perhaps more

<sup>b</sup> Ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ κῆρον οὐδέποτε ἔχει ὑμνούσα εὐφημούσα τε πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καὶ λόγοις καὶ ἔργοις πάντας [πάντας] εὐποιούσα, μιμουμένη αὐτῆς τὸν πατέρα. [cap. 10. § 21.] lib. iv. fol. 12.

<sup>c</sup> Vide Isa. vii. 16.

ripe. For as stones, though in dignity of nature inferior unto plants, yet exceed them in firmness of strength or durability of being; and plants, though beneath the excellency of creatures endued with sense, yet exceed them in the faculty of vegetation and of fertility: so beasts, though otherwise behind men, may notwithstanding in actions of sense and fancy go beyond them; because the endeavours of nature, when it hath a higher perfection to seek, are in lower the more remiss, not esteeming thereof so much as those things do, which have no better proposed unto them.

[3] The soul of man therefore being capable of a more divine perfection, hath (besides the faculties of growing unto sensible knowledge which is common unto us with beasts) a further ability, whereof in them there is no shew at all, the ability of reaching higher than unto sensible things<sup>d</sup>. Till we grow to some ripeness of years, the soul of man doth only store itself with conceits of things of inferior and more open quality, which afterwards do serve as instruments unto that which is greater; in the meanwhile above the reach of meaner creatures it ascendeth not. When once it comprehendeth any thing above this, as the differences of time, affirmations, negations, and contradictions in speech, we then count it to have some use of natural reason. Whereunto if afterwards there might be added the right helps of true art and learning (which helps, I must plainly confess, this age of the world, carrying the name of a learned age, doth neither much know nor greatly regard), there would undoubtedly be almost as great difference in maturity of

<sup>d</sup> Ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναβαίνει, καὶ μετρεῖ αὐτὸν, καὶ οἶδε ποῖα μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῷ [*leg.* αὐτοῦ] ὑψηλὰ, ποῖα δὲ ταπεινὰ, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἀκριβῶς μαθάνει. Καὶ τὸ πάντων μείζον, οὐδὲ τὴν γῆν καταλιπὼν ἄνω γίνεται. Merc. Tris. [cap. 10, fin.] lib. iv. fol. 12.



judgment between men therewith inured, and that which now men are, as between men that are now and innocents. Which speech if any condemn, as being hyperbolical, let them consider but this one thing. No art is at the first finding out so perfect as industry may after make it. Yet the very first man that to any purpose knew the way we speak of<sup>e</sup> and followed it, hath alone thereby performed more very near in all parts of natural knowledge, than sithence in any one part thereof the whole world besides hath done.

[4] In the poverty of that other new devised aid<sup>f</sup> two things there are notwithstanding singular. Of marvellous quick despatch it is, and doth show them that have it as much almost in three days, as if it dwell threescore years with them. Again, because the curiosity of man's wit doth many times with peril wade farther in the search of things than were convenient; the same is thereby restrained unto such generalities as every where offering themselves are apparent unto men of the weakest conceit that need be. So as following the rules and precepts thereof, we may define it to be, an art which teacheth the way of speedy discourse, and restraineth the mind of man that it may not wax over-wise.

[5] Education and instruction are the means, the one by use, the other by precept, to make our natural faculty of reason both the better and the sooner able to judge rightly between truth and error, good and evil. But at what time a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws, whereby he is then bound to guide his actions; this is a great deal more easy for common sense to discern, than for any man by skill and learning to

<sup>e</sup> Aristotelical Demonstration.

<sup>f</sup> Ramistry.

determine; even as it is not in philosophers, who best know the nature both of fire and of gold, to teach what degree of one will serve to purify the other, so well as the artisan, who doth this by fire, discerneth by sense when the fire hath that degree of heat which sufficeth for his purpose.

VII. By reason man attaineth unto the knowledge of things that are and are not sensible. It

resteth therefore that we search how man attaineth unto the knowledge of such things unsensible as are to be known that they may be done.

Of man's will, which is the thing that laws of action are made to guide.

Seeing then that nothing can move unless there be some end, the desire whereof provoketh unto motion; how should that divine power of the soul, that *spirit of our mind*<sup>e</sup>, as the Apostle termeth it, ever stir itself unto action, unless it have also the like spur? The end for which we are moved to work, is sometimes the goodness which we conceive of the very working itself, without any further respect at all; and the cause that procureth action is the mere desire of action, no other good besides being thereby intended. Of certain turbulent wits it is said, *Illis quieta movere magna merces videbatur*<sup>h</sup>, They thought the very disturbance of things established an hire sufficient to set them on work. Sometimes that which we do is referred to a further end, without the desire whereof we would leave the same undone, as in their actions that gave alms to purchase thereby the praise of men<sup>i</sup>.

[2] Man in perfection of nature being made according to the likeness of his maker resembleth him also in the manner of working: so that whatsoever we work as men, the same we do wittingly work and freely; neither are we according to the manner of natural agents any way so

How Calvinist pres

<sup>e</sup> Eph. iv. 23.

<sup>h</sup> Sallust. [Cat. 21.]

<sup>i</sup> Matt. vi. 2.

tied, but that it is in our power to leave the things we do undone. The good which either is gotten by doing, or which consisteth in the very doing itself, causeth not action, unless apprehending it as good we so like and desire it: that we do unto any such end, the same we choose and prefer before the leaving of it undone. [Choice there is not, unless the thing which we take be so in our power that we might have refused and left it. If fire consume the stubble, it chooseth not so to do, because the nature thereof is such that it can do no other. To choose is to will one thing before another. And, to will is to bend our souls to the having or doing of that which they see to be good. Goodness is seen with the eye of the understanding.] And the light of that eye, is reason. So that two principal fountains there are of human action, *Knowledge and Will*; which will, in things tending towards any end, is termed *Choice*. Concerning knowledge, *Behold*, (saith Moses <sup>k</sup>,) *I have set before you this day good and evil, life and death*. Concerning will, he addeth immediately, *Choose life*; that is to say, the things that tend unto life, them choose.

[3] But of one thing we must have special care, as being a matter of no small moment; and that is, how the will, properly and strictly taken, as it is of things which are referred unto the end that man desireth, differeth greatly from that inferior natural desire which we call appetite. The object of appetite is whatsoever sensible good may be wished for; the object of will is that good which reason doth lead us to seek. Affections, as joy, and grief, and fear, and anger, with such like, being as it were the sundry fashions and forms of appetite, can neither rise at the conceit of a thing indifferent, nor yet

<sup>k</sup> Deut. xxx. 19.

choose but rise at the sight of some things. Wherefore it is not altogether in our power, whether we will be stirred with affections or no: whereas actions which issue from the disposition of the will are in the power thereof to be performed or stayed. Finally, appetite is the will's solicitor, and the will is appetite's controller; what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject; neither is any other desire termed properly will, but that where reason and understanding, or the shew of reason, prescribeth the thing desired.

It may be therefore a question, whether those operations of men are to be counted voluntary, wherein that good which is sensible provoketh appetite, and appetite causeth action, reason being never called to counsel; as when we eat or drink, and betake ourselves unto rest, and such like. The truth is, that such actions in men having attained to the use of reason are voluntary. For as the authority of higher powers hath force even in those things, which are done without their privity, and are of so mean reckoning that to acquaint them therewith it needeth not; in like sort, voluntarily we are said to do that also, which the will if it listed might hinder from being done, although about the doing thereof we do not expressly use our reason or understanding, and so immediately apply our wills thereunto. In cases therefore of such facility, the will doth yield her assent as it were with a kind of silence, by not dissenting; in which respect her force is not so apparent as in express mandates or prohibitions, especially upon advice and consultation going before.

[4] Where understanding therefore needeth, in those things reason is the director of man's will by discovering in action what is good. For the laws of well-doing are

the dictates of right reason. Children, which are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may have ; again, innocents, which are excluded by natural defect from ever having ; thirdly, madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right reason to guide themselves, have for their guide the reason that guideth other men, which are tutors over them to seek and to procure their good for them. In the rest there is that light of reason, whereby good may be known from evil, and which discovering the same rightly is termed right.

[5] The will notwithstanding doth not incline to have or do that which reason teacheth to be good, unless the same do also teach it to be possible. For albeit the appetite, being more general, may wish any thing which seemeth good, be it never so impossible<sup>1</sup>; yet for such things the reasonable will of man doth never seek. Let reason teach impossibility in any thing, and the will of man doth let it go ; a thing impossible it doth not affect, the impossibility thereof being manifest.

[6] There is in the will of man naturally that freedom, whereby it is apt to take or refuse any particular object whatsoever being presented unto it. Whereupon it followeth, that there is no particular object so good, but it may have the show of some difficulty or unpleasant quality annexed to it, in respect whereof the will may shrink and decline it ; contrariwise (for so things are blended) there is no particular evil which hath not some appearance of goodness whereby to insinuate itself. For evil as evil cannot be desired<sup>m</sup> : if that be desired which is evil

<sup>1</sup> 'O mihi praeteritos referat si Jupiter annos!' [Virg. *Æn.* viii. 560.]

<sup>m</sup> Εἰ δέ τις ἐπὶ κακίαν ὀρμά, πρῶτον μὲν οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ κακίαν αὐτὴν ὀρμήσει, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθόν. Paulo post: 'Αδύνατον γὰρ ὀρμῆν ἐπὶ κακὰ βουλλόμενον ἔχειν αὐτὰ, οὔτε ἐλπίδι ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε φόβῳ μείζονος κακοῦ. Alcibiades de Dog. Plat. [cap. 38. ed. Oxon. 1667.]

the cause is the goodness which is or seemeth to be joined with it. Goodness doth not move by being, but by being apparent; and therefore many things are neglected which are most precious, only because the value of them lieth hid. Sensible goodness is most apparent, near, and present; which causeth the appetite to be therewith strongly provoked. Now pursuit and refusal in the will do follow, the one the affirmation the other the negation of goodness, which the understanding apprehendeth, grounding itself upon sense, unless some higher reason do chance to teach the contrary. And if reason have taught it rightly to be good, yet not so apparently that the mind receiveth it with utter impossibility of being otherwise, still there is place left for the will to take or leave. Whereas therefore amongst so many things as are to be done, there are so few, the goodness whereof reason in such sort doth or easily can discover, we are not to marvel at the choice of evil even then when the contrary is probably known. Hereby it cometh to pass that custom inuring the mind by long practice, and so leaving there a sensible impression, prevaleth more than reasonable persuasion what way soever. Reason therefore may rightly discern the thing which is good, and yet the will of man not incline itself thereunto, as oft as the prejudice of sensible experience doth oversway.

[7] Nor let any man think that this doth make any thing for the just excuse of iniquity. For there was never sin committed, wherein a less good was not preferred before a greater, and that wilfully; which cannot be done without the singular disgrace of nature, and the utter disturbance of that divine order, whereby the pre-eminence of chiefest acceptation is by the best things worthily challenged. There is not that good which concerneth us,

but it hath evidence enough for itself, if reason were diligent to search it out. Through neglect thereof, abused we are with the shew of that which is not; sometimes the subtilty of Satan inveigling us as it did Eve<sup>n</sup>; sometimes the hastiness of our wills preventing the more considerate advice of sound reason, as in the Apostles<sup>o</sup>, when they no sooner saw what they liked not, but they forthwith were desirous of fire from heaven; sometimes the very custom of evil making the heart obdurate against whatsoever instructions to the contrary, as in them over whom our Saviour spake weeping<sup>p</sup>, *O Jerusalem, how often, and thou wouldest not!* (Still therefore that wherewith we stand blameable, and can no way excuse it, is, In doing evil, we prefer a less good before a greater, the greatness whereof is by reason investigable and may be known.)

The search of knowledge is a thing painful, and the painfulness of knowledge is that which maketh the will so hardly inclinable thereunto. The root hereof, divine malediction; whereby the instruments<sup>q</sup> being weakened wherewithal the soul (especially in reasoning) doth work, it preferreth rest in ignorance before wearisome labour to know. For a spur of diligence therefore we have a natural thirst after knowledge ingrafted in us. But by reason of that original weakness in the instruments, without which the understanding part is not able in this world by discourse to work, the very conceit of painfulness is as a bridle to stay us. For which cause the Apostle, who knew right well that the weariness of the flesh is an heavy

<sup>n</sup> 2 Cor. xi. 3.

<sup>o</sup> Luke ix. 54.

<sup>p</sup> Matt. xxiii. 37.

<sup>q</sup> 'A corruptible body is heavy unto the soul, and the earthly mansion keepeth down the mind that is full of cares. And hardly can we discern the things that are upon earth, and with great labour find we out the things which are before us. Who can then seek out the things that are in heaven!' Sap. ix. 15, 16.

clog to the will, striketh mightily upon this key, *Awake thou that sleepest; Cast off all which presseth down; Watch; Labour; strive to go forward, and to grow in knowledge*<sup>r</sup>.

VIII. Wherefore to return to our former intent of discovering the natural way, whereby rules have been found out concerning that goodness wherewith the will of man ought to be moved in human actions: as everything naturally and necessarily doth desire the utmost good and greatest perfection whereof nature hath made it capable, even so man. Our felicity therefore being the object and accomplishment of our desire, we cannot choose but wish and covet it. All particular things which are subject unto action, the will doth so far forth incline unto, as reason judgeth them the better for us, and consequently the more available to our bliss. If reason err, we fall into evil, and are so far forth deprived of the general perfection we seek. Seeing therefore that for the framing of men's actions the knowledge of good from evil is necessary, it only resteth that we search how this may be had. Neither must we suppose that there needeth one rule to know the good and another the evil by<sup>s</sup>. For he that knoweth what is straight doth even thereby discern what is crooked, because the absence of straightness in bodies capable thereof is crookedness. Goodness in actions is like unto straightness; wherefore that which is done well we term *right*. For as the straight way 'is most acceptable to him that travelleth, because by it he cometh soonest to his journey's end; so

Of the natural way of finding out laws by reason to guide the will unto that which is good.

<sup>r</sup> Eph. v. 14; Heb. xii. 1, 12; 1 Cor. xvi. 13; Prov. ii. 4; Luke xiii. 24.

<sup>s</sup> Τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον γινώσκμεν· κριτὴς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανὼν. Arist. de An. lib. i. [cap. 3.]



in action, that which doth lie the evenest between us and the end we desire must needs be the fittest for our use. Besides which fitness for use, there is also in rectitude, beauty; as contrariwise in obliquity, deformity. And that which is good in the actions of men, doth not only delight as profitable, but as amiable also. In which consideration the Grecians most divinely have given to the active perfection of men a name expressing both beauty and goodness<sup>t</sup>, because goodness in ordinary speech is for the most part applied only to that which is beneficial. But we in the name of goodness do here imply both.

[2] And of discerning goodness there are but these two ways; the one the knowledge of the causes whereby it is made such; the other the observation of those signs and tokens, which being annexed always unto goodness, argue that where they are found, there also goodness is, although we know not the cause by force whereof it is there. The former of these is the most sure and infallible way, but so hard that all shun it, and had rather walk as men do in the dark by haphazard, than tread so long and intricate mazes for knowledge' sake. As therefore physicians are many times forced to leave such methods of curing as themselves know to be the fittest, and being overruled by their patients' impatience are fain to try the best they can, in taking that way of cure which the cured will yield unto; in like sort, considering how the case doth stand with this present age full of tongue and weak of brain, behold we yield to the stream thereof; into the causes of goodness we will not make any curious or deep inquiry; to touch them now and then it shall be sufficient, when they are so near at hand that easily they may

<sup>t</sup> Καλοκαγαθία.

be conceived without any far-removed discourse: that way we are contented to prove, which being the worse in itself, is notwithstanding now by reason of common imbecility the fitter and likelier to be brooked.

[3] Signs and tokens to know good by are of sundry kinds; some more certain and some less. The most certain token of evident goodness is, if the general persuasion of all men do so account it. And therefore a common received error is never utterly overthrown, till such time as we go from signs unto causes, and show some manifest root or fountain thereof common unto all, whereby it may clearly appear how it hath come to pass that so many have been overseen. In which case surmises and slight probabilities will not serve, because the universal consent of men is the perfectest and strongest in this kind, which comprehendeth only the signs and tokens of goodness. Things casual do vary, and that which a man doth but chance to think well of cannot still have the like hap. Wherefore although we know not the cause, yet thus much we may know; that some necessary cause there is, whensoever the judgments of all men generally or for the most part run one and the same way, especially in matters of natural discourse. For of things necessarily and naturally done there is no more affirmed but this, *They keep either always or for the most part one tenure* <sup>u</sup>. The general and perpetual voice of men is as the sentence of God himself. For that which all men have at all times learned, nature herself must needs have taught <sup>x</sup>; and God being the author of nature, her voice

<sup>u</sup> Ἡ αἰεὶ ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁσαύτως ἀποβαίνει. Arist. Rhet. I. i. [c. 10.]

<sup>x</sup> 'Non potest error contingere ubi omnes idem [ita] opinantur.' Montecat. in I. Polit. [p. 3.] 'Quicquid in omnibus individuīs unius speciei communiter inest, id causam communem habeat oportet, quae

is but his instrument. By her from him we receive whatsoever in such sort we learn. Infinite duties there are, the goodness whereof is by this rule sufficiently manifested, although we had no other warrant besides to approve them. The Apostle St. Paul having speech concerning the Heathen saith of them<sup>y</sup>, *They are a law unto themselves.* His meaning is, that by force of the light of reason, wherewith God illuminateth every one which cometh into the world, men being enabled to know truth from falsehood, and good from evil, do thereby learn in many things what the will of God is; which will himself not revealing by any extraordinary means unto them, but they by natural discourse attaining the knowledge thereof, seem the makers of those laws which indeed are his, and they but only the finders of them out.

[4] A law therefore generally taken, is a directive rule unto goodness of operation. The rule of divine operations outward, is the definitive appointment of God's own wisdom set down within himself. The rule of natural agents that work by simple necessity, is the determination of the wisdom of God, known to God himself the principal director of them, but not unto them that are directed to execute the same. The rule of natural agents which work after a sort of their own accord, as the beasts do, is the judgment of common sense or fancy concerning the sensible goodness of those objects wherewith they are

est eorum individuorum species et natura.' Idem. 'Quod a tota aliqua specie fit, universalis particularisque naturae fit instinctu.' Ficin. de Christ. Rel. [cap. 1.] 'Si proficere cupis, primo firme id verum puta, quod sana mens omnium hominum attestatur.' Cusa in Compend. cap. 1. 'Non licet naturale universaleque hominum judicium falsum vanumque existimare.' Teles. "Ο γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτο εἶναι φάμεν. "Ο δὲ ἀνθρώπων ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἔρει. Arist. Eth. lib. x. cap. 2.

<sup>y</sup> Rom. ii. 14.

moved. The rule of ghostly or immaterial natures, as spirits and Angels, is their intuitive intellectual judgment concerning the amiable beauty and high goodness of that object, which with unspeakable joy and delight doth set them on work. The rule of voluntary agents on earth is the sentence that reason giveth concerning the goodness of those things which they are to do. And the sentences which reason giveth are some more some less general, before it come to define in particular actions what is good.

[5] The main principles of reason are in themselves apparent. For to make nothing evident of itself unto man's understanding were to take away all possibility of knowing anything. And herein that of Theophrastus is true, They that seek a reason of all things do utterly overthrow reason<sup>2</sup>. In every kind of knowledge some such grounds there are, as that being proposed the mind doth presently embrace them as free from all possibility of error, clear and manifest without proof. In which kind, axioms or principles more general are such as this, *That the greater good is to be chosen before the less.* If therefore it should be demanded what reason there is, why the will of man, which doth necessarily shun harm and covet whatsoever is pleasant and sweet, should be commanded to count the pleasures of sin gall, and notwithstanding the bitter accidents wherewith virtuous actions are compassed, yet still to rejoice and delight in them: surely this could never stand with reason, but that wisdom thus prescribing groundeth her laws upon an infallible rule of comparison; which is, that small difficulties, when exceeding great good is sure to ensue, and on the other side

<sup>2</sup> Ἀπάντων ζητούντες λόγον, ἀναιροῦσι λόγον. Theoph. in Metaph. [p. 270. 23.]

momentary benefits, when the hurt which they draw after them is unspeakable, are not at all to be respected. This rule is the ground whereupon the wisdom of the Apostle buildeth a law, enjoining patience unto himself<sup>a</sup>; *The present lightness of our affliction worketh unto us even with abundance upon abundance an eternal weight of glory, while we look not on the things which are seen, but on the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.* Therefore Christianity to be embraced, whatsoever calamities in those times it was accompanied withal. Upon the same ground our Saviour proveth the law most reasonable, that doth forbid those crimes which men for gain's sake fall into. For a man to win the world if it be with the loss of his soul, what benefit or good is it<sup>b</sup>? Axioms less general, yet so manifest that they need no further proof, are such as these, *God to be worshipped; Parents to be honoured; Others to be used by us as we ourselves would by them.* Such things, as soon as they are alleged, all men acknowledge to be good; they require no proof or further discourse to be assured of their goodness.

Notwithstanding whatsoever such principle there is, it was at the first found out by discourse, and drawn from out of the very bowels of heaven and earth. For we are to note, that things in the world are to us discernible, not only so far forth as serveth for our vital preservation, but further also in a twofold higher respect. For first, if all other uses were utterly taken away, yet the mind of man being by nature speculative and delighted with contemplation in itself, they were to be known even for mere knowledge and understanding's sake. Yea further besides

<sup>a</sup> 2 Cor. iv. 17.

<sup>b</sup> Matt. xvi. 26.

this, the knowledge of every the least thing<sup>1</sup> in the whole world hath in it a second peculiar benefit unto us, inas-much as it serveth to minister rules, canons, and laws, for men to direct those actions by, which we properly term human. This did the very Heathens themselves obscurely insinuate, by making *Themis*, which we call *Jus*, or Right, to be the daughter of heaven and earth.

[6] We know things either as they are in themselves, or as they are in mutual relation one to another. The knowledge of that which man is in reference unto him-self, and other things in relation unto man, I may justly term the mother of all those principles, which are as it were edicts, statutes, and decrees, in that law of nature, whereby human actions are framed. First therefore having observed that the best things, where they are not hindered, do still produce the best operations, (for which cause, where many things are to concur unto one effect, the best is in all congruity of reason to guide the residue, that it prevailing most, the work principally done by it may have greatest perfection :) when hereupon we come to observe in ourselves, of what excellency our souls are in comparison of our bodies, and the diviner part in relation unto the baser of our souls; seeing that all these concur in producing human actions, it cannot be well unless the chiefest do command and direct the rest<sup>c</sup>. The soul then ought to conduct the body, and the spirit of our minds the soul. This is therefore the first law, whereby the highest power of the mind requireth general obedience at the hands of all the rest concurring with it unto action.

[7] Touching the several grand mandates, which being imposed by the understanding faculty of the mind must be obeyed by the will of man, they are by the same method

found out, whether they import our duty towards God or towards man.

Touching the one, I may not here stand to open, by what degrees of discourse the minds even of mere natural men have attained to know, not only that there is a God, but also what power, force, wisdom, and other properties that God hath, and how all things depend on him. This being therefore presupposed, from that known relation which God hath unto us as unto children<sup>d</sup>, and unto all good things as unto effects whereof himself is the principal cause<sup>e</sup>, these axioms and laws natural concerning our duty have arisen, *That in all things we go about, his aid is by prayer to be craved<sup>f</sup>; That he cannot have sufficient honour done unto him, but the utmost of that we can do to honour him we must<sup>g</sup>; which is in effect the same that we read<sup>h</sup>, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; which Law our Saviour doth term<sup>i</sup> the *First and the great commandment*.*

Touching the next, which as our Saviour addeth is like unto this, (he meaneth in amplitude and largeness, inasmuch as it is the root out of which all laws of duty to menward have grown, as out of the former all offices of religion towards God,) the like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is their duty no less to love others than themselves. For seeing those things which are equal must needs all have one measure; if I cannot

<sup>d</sup> Οὐδεὶς Θεὸς δύνουσι ἀνθρώποις. Plat. in Theaet. [t. i. 151, ed. Serrani.]

<sup>e</sup> "Ὁ τε γὰρ Θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχὴ τις. Arist. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2.

<sup>f</sup> Ἄλλ', ὃ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε δὴ πάντες, ὅσοι καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν, ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὁρμῇ καὶ σμικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου πράγματος Θεὸν αἰεὶ πον καλοῦσι. Plat. in Tim. [t. iii. 27.]

<sup>g</sup> Arist. Ethic. lib. iii. cap. ult.

<sup>h</sup> Deut. vi. 5.

<sup>i</sup> Matt. xxii. 38.

but wish to receive all good, even as much at every man's hand as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men, we all being of one and the same nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to this desire must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me: so that if I do harm I must look to suffer; there being no reason that others should shew greater measure of love to me than they have by me shewed unto them. My desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant; as, namely, *That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That sith we would not be in any thing extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain*<sup>k</sup>; with such like; which further to wade in would be tedious, and to our present purpose not altogether so necessary, seeing that on these two general heads already mentioned all other specialties are dependent<sup>l</sup>.

[8] Wherefore the natural measure whereby to judge our doings, is the sentence of reason, determining and \*

\* 'Quod quis in se approbat, in alio reprobare non posse.' L. in arenam, C. de inof. test. [Cod. Just. p. 254. ed. Lugd. 1553.] 'Quod quisque juris in alium statueret, ipsum quoque eodem uti debere.' L. quod quisque. [Digest. lib. ii. tit. 2. tom. 1. p. 60. Lugd. 1552.] 'Ab omni penitus injuria atque vi abstinendum.' L. i. sect. 1. Quod vi, aut clam. [Ibid. lib. xliii. tit. 23. tom. 3. p. 335.]

<sup>l</sup> Matt. xxii. 40. On these two commandments hangeth the whole law.



setting down what is good to be done. Which sentence is either mandatory, showing what must be done; or else permissive, declaring only what may be done; or thirdly admonitory, opening what is the most convenient for us to do. The first taketh place, where the comparison doth stand altogether between doing and not doing of one thing which in itself is absolutely good or evil; as it had been for Joseph<sup>m</sup> to yield or not to yield to the impotent desire of his lewd mistress, the one evil the other good simply. The second is, when of divers things evil, all being not evitable, we are permitted to take one; which one, saving only in case of so great urgency, were not otherwise to be taken; as in the matter of divorce amongst the Jews<sup>n</sup>. The last, when of divers things good, one is principal and most evident; as in their act who sold their possessions ~~to~~ laid the price at the Apostles' feet<sup>o</sup>; which possessions they might have retained unto themselves without sin: again, in the Apostle St. Paul's own choice<sup>p</sup> to maintain himself by his own labour; whereas in living by the Church's maintenance, as others did, there had been no offence committed. In goodness therefore there is a latitude or extent, whereby it cometh to pass that even of good actions some are better than other some; whereas otherwise one man could not excel another, but all should be either absolutely good, as hitting jump that indivisible point or centre wherein goodness consisteth; or else missing it they should be excluded out of the number of well-doers. Degrees of well-doing there could be none, except perhaps in the seldomness and oftenness of doing well. But the nature of goodness being thus ample, a

<sup>m</sup> Gen. xxxix. 9.<sup>o</sup> Acts iv. 37; v. 4.<sup>n</sup> Mark x. 4.<sup>p</sup> 2 Thess. iii. 8.

law is properly that which reason in such sort defineth to be good that it must be done. And the law of reason or human nature is that which men by discourse of natural reason have rightly found out themselves to be all for ever bound unto in their actions.

[9] Laws of reason have these marks to be known by. Such as keep them resemble most lively in their voluntary actions that very manner of working which nature herself doth necessarily observe in the course of the whole world. The works of nature are all behoveful, beautiful, without superfluity or defect; even so theirs, if they be framed according to that which the law of reason teacheth. Secondly, those laws are investigable by reason, without the help of revelation supernatural and divine. Finally, in such sort they are investigable, that the knowledge of them is general, the world hath always been acquainted with them; according to that which one in Sophocles observeth concerning a branch of this law, *It is no child of to-day's or yesterday's birth, but hath been no man knoweth how long sithence*<sup>a</sup>. It is not agreed upon by one, or two, or few, but by all: which we may not so understand, as if every particular man in the whole world did know and confess whatsoever the law of reason doth contain; but this law is such that being proposed no man can reject it as being unreasonable and unjust. Again, there is nothing in it but any man (having natural perfection of wit and ripeness of judgment) may by labour and travail find out. And to conclude, the general principles thereof are such, as it is not easy to find men ignorant of them. Law rational therefore, which men commonly use to call the

<sup>a</sup> Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε καχθὲς, ἀλλ' αἰεί ποτε  
Ζῇ ταῦτα, κούδεις οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη.

Soph. Antig. [v. 456.]

law of nature, meaning thereby the law which human nature knoweth itself in reason universally bound unto, which also for that cause may be termed most fitly the law of reason: this law, I say, comprehendeth all those things which men by the light of their natural understanding evidently know, or at leastwise may know, to be be seeming or unbeseeing, virtuous or vicious, good or evil for them to do.

[10] Now although it be true, which some have said<sup>r</sup>, that whatsoever is done amiss, the law of nature and reason thereby is transgressed, because even those offences which are by their special qualities breaches of supernatural laws, do also, for that they are generally evil, violate in general that principle of reason, which willeth universally to fly from evil: yet do we not therefore so far extend the law of reason, as to contain in it all manner laws whereunto reasonable creatures are bound, but (as hath been showed), we restrain it to those only duties, which all men by force of natural wit either do or might understand to be such duties as concern all men. *Certain half-waking men there are* (as Saint Augustine noteth<sup>s</sup>), *who neither altogether asleep in folly, nor yet thoroughly awake in the light of true understanding, have thought that there is not at all any thing just and righteous in itself; but look, wherewith nations are inured, the same they take to be right and just. Whereupon their conclusion is, that seeing each sort of people hath a different kind of right from other, and that which is right of its own nature must be everywhere one and the same, therefore in itself there*

<sup>r</sup> Th. [Aquin.] 1. 2. q. 94. art. 3. 'Omnia peccata sunt in universum contra rationem et naturae legem.' Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. xii. cap. 1. 'Omne vitium naturae nocet, ac per hoc contra naturam est.'

<sup>s</sup> De Doct. Christ. l. iii. c. 14.

*is nothing right. These good folk, saith he, (that I may not trouble their wits with rehearsal of too many things,) have not looked so far into the world as to perceive that 'Do as thou wouldest be done unto,' is a sentence which all nations under heaven are agreed upon. Refer this sentence to the love of God, and it extinguisheth all heinous crimes; refer it to the love of thy neighbour, and all grievous wrongs it banisheth out of the world.* Wherefore as touching the law of reason, this was (it seemeth) Saint Augustine's judgment: namely, that there are in it some things which stand as principles universally agreed upon; and that out of those principles, which are in themselves evident, the greatest moral duties we owe towards God or man may without any great difficulty be concluded.

[II] If then it be here demanded, by what means it should come to pass (the greatest part of the law moral being so easy for all men to know) that so many thousands of men notwithstanding have been ignorant even of principal moral duties, not imagining the breach of them to be sin: I deny not but lewd and wicked custom, beginning perhaps at the first amongst few, afterwards spreading into greater multitudes, and so continuing from time to time, may be of force even in plain things to smother the light of natural understanding; because men will not bend their wits to examine whether things where-with they have been accustomed be good or evil. For example's sake, that grosser kind of heathenish idolatry, whereby they worshipped the very works of their own hands, was an absurdity to reason so palpable, that the Prophet David comparing idols and idolaters together maketh almost no odds between them, but the one in a manner as much without wit and sense as the other; *They that make them are like unto them, and so are all that*

*trust in them*<sup>t</sup>. That wherein an idolater doth seem so absurd and foolish is by the Wiseman thus exprest<sup>u</sup>. *He is not ashamed to speak unto that which hath no life, he calleth on him that is weak for health, he prayeth for life unto him which is dead, of him which hath no experience he requireth help, for his journey he sueth to him which is not able to go, for gain and work and success in his affairs he seeketh furtherance of him that hath no manner of power.* The cause of which senseless stupidity is afterwards imputed to custom<sup>x</sup>. *When a father mourned grievously for his son that was taken away suddenly, he made an image for him that was once dead, whom now he worshippeth as a god, ordaining to his servants ceremonies and sacrifices. Thus by process of time this wicked custom prevailed, and was kept as a law;* the authority of rulers, the ambition of craftsmen, and such like means thrusting forward the ignorant, and increasing their superstition.

Unto this which the Wiseman hath spoken somewhat besides may be added. For whatsoever we have hitherto taught, or shall hereafter, concerning the force of man's natural understanding, this we always desire withal to be understood; that there is no kind of faculty or power in man or any other creature, which can rightly perform the functions allotted to it, without perpetual aid and concurrence of that supreme cause of all things. The benefit whereof as oft as we cause God in his justice to withdraw, there can no other thing follow than that which the Apostle noteth, even men endued with the light of reason to walk notwithstanding<sup>y</sup> *in the vanity of their mind, having their cogitations darkened, and being strangers from the life of God through the ignorance which is in them,*

<sup>t</sup> Psal. cxxxv. 18.

<sup>x</sup> Wisd. xiv. 15, 16.

<sup>u</sup> Wisd. xiii. 17.

<sup>y</sup> Ephes. iv. 17, 18.

*because of the hardness of their hearts.* And this cause is mentioned by the prophet Esay<sup>z</sup>, speaking of the ignorance of idolaters, who see not how the manifest law of reason condemneth their gross iniquity and sin. *They have not in them, saith he, so much wit as to think, 'Shall I bow to the stock of a tree?' All knowledge and understanding is taken from them. For God hath shut their eyes that they cannot see.*

That which we say in this case of idolatry serveth for all other things, wherein the like kind of general blindness hath prevailed against the manifest laws of reason. Within the compass of which laws we do not only comprehend whatsoever may be easily known to belong to the duty of all men, but even whatsoever may possibly be known to be of that quality, so that the same be by *necessary* consequence deduced out of clear and manifest principles. For if once we descend unto probable collections what is convenient for men, we are then in the territory where free and arbitrary determinations, the territory where human laws take place; which laws are after to be considered.

IX. Now the due observation of this law which reason teacheth us cannot but be effectual unto their great good that observe the same.

The benefit of keeping that law which reason teacheth.

For we see the whole world and each part thereof so compacted, that as long as each thing performeth only that work which is natural unto it, it thereby preserveth both other things and also itself. Contrariwise, let any principal thing, as the sun, the moon, any one of the heavens or elements, but once cease or fail, or swerve, and who doth not easily conceive that the sequel thereof would be ruin both to itself and whatsoever dependeth on

it? And is it possible, that man being not only the noblest creature in the world, but even a very world in himself, his transgressing the law of his nature should draw no manner of harm after it? Yes<sup>b</sup>, *tribulation and anguish unto every soul that doeth evil.* Good doth follow unto all things by observing the course of their nature, and on the contrary side evil by not observing it; but not unto natural agents that good which we call *Reward*, not that evil which we properly term *Punishment*. The reason whereof is, because amongst creatures in this world, only man's observation of the law of his nature is *Righteousness*, only man's transgression *Sin*. And the reason of this is the difference in his manner of observing or transgressing the law of his nature. He doth not otherwise than voluntarily the one or ~~the other~~. What we do against our wills, or constrainedly, we are not properly said to do it, because the motive cause of doing it is not in ourselves, but carrieth us, as if the wind should drive a feather in the air, we no whit furthering that whereby we are driven. In such cases therefore the evil which is done moveth compassion; men are pitied for it, as being rather miserable in such respect than culpable. Some things are likewise done by man, though not through outward force and impulsion, though not against, yet without their wills; as in alienation of mind, or any the like inevitable utter absence of wit and judgment. For which cause, no man did ever think the hurtful actions of furious men and innocents to be punishable. Again, some things we do neither against nor without, and yet not simply and merely with our wills, but with our wills in such sort moved, that albeit there be no impossibility but that we might, nevertheless we are

<sup>b</sup> Rom. ii. 9.

not so easily able to do otherwise. In this consideration one evil deed is made more pardonable than another. Finally, that which we do being evil, is notwithstanding by so much more pardonable, by how much the exigence of so doing or the difficulty of doing otherwise is greater; unless this necessity or difficulty have originally risen from ourselves. It is no excuse therefore unto him, who being drunk committeth incest, and allegeth that his wits were not his own; inasmuch as himself might have chosen whether his wits should by that mean have been taken from him. Now rewards and punishments do always presuppose something willingly done well or ill; without which respect though we may sometimes receive good or harm, yet then the one is only a benefit and not a reward, the other simply an hurt not a punishment. From the sundry dispositions of man's will, which is the root of all his actions, there groweth variety in the sequel of rewards and punishments, which are by these and the like rules measured: *Take away the will, and all acts are equal: That which we do not, and would do, is commonly accepted as done*<sup>c</sup>. By these and the like rules men's actions are determined of and judged, whether they be in their own nature rewardable or punishable.

[2] Rewards and punishments are not received, but at the hands of such as being above us have power to examine and judge our deeds. How men come to have this authority one over another in external actions, we shall more diligently examine in that which followeth. But for this present, so much all do acknowledge, that sith every man's heart and conscience doth in good or evil,

<sup>c</sup> 'Voluntate sublata, omnem actum parem esse.' L: *foedissimam, c. deadult.* [Cod. Justin. 968.] 'Bonam voluntatem plerumque pro facto reputari.' L: *si quis in testament.* [Ibid. 732.]



even secretly committed and known to none but itself, either like or disallow itself, and accordingly either rejoice, very nature exulting as it were in certain hope of reward, or else grieve as it were in a sense of future punishment; neither of which can in this case be looked for from any other, saving only from him who discerneth and judgeth the very secrets of all hearts: therefore he is the only rewarder and revenger of all such actions; although not of such actions only, but of all whereby the law of nature is broken, whereof himself is author. For which cause, the Roman laws, called the laws of the twelve tables, requiring offices of inward affection which the eye of man cannot reach unto, threaten the neglecters of them with none but divine punishment<sup>d</sup>.

X. That which hitherto we have set down is (I hope)

How reason  
doth lead men  
unto the making  
of human laws  
whereby politic  
societies are go-  
vern'd; and to  
agreement about  
laws whereby the  
fellowship or  
communion of  
independent so-  
cieties standeth.

sufficient to shew their brutishness, which imagine that religion and virtue are only as men will account of them; that we might make as much account, if we would, of the contrary, without any harm unto ourselves, and that in nature they are as indifferent one as the other. We see then how nature itself teacheth laws and statutes to live by.

The laws which have been hitherto mentioned do bind men absolutely even as they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do or not to do<sup>e</sup>. But forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things needful for such

<sup>d</sup> 'Divos caste adeunto, pietatem adhibento: qui secus faxit, Deus ipse vindex erit.' [Cic. de Leg. II. 8.]

<sup>e</sup> "Ἔστι γὰρ, ὃ μαντεύονται τι πάντες φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, καὶ μὴδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἢ μὴδὲ συνθήκη. Arist. Rhet. i. [c. 13.]

a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us living single and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others. This was the cause of men's uniting themselves at the first in politic societies; which societies could not be without government, nor government without a distinct kind of law from that which hath been already declared. Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one, a natural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other, an order expressly or secretly agreed upon touching the manner of their union in living together. The latter is that which we call the law of a commonweal, the very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and set on work in such actions as the common good requireth. Laws politic, ordained for external order and regiment amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience unto the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man to be in regard of his depraved mind little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide notwithstanding so to frame his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common good for which societies are instituted: unless they do this, they are not perfect. It resteth therefore that we consider how nature findeth out such laws of government as serve to direct even nature depraved to a right end.

[2] All men desire to lead in this world a happy life. That life is led most happily, wherein all virtue is exercised without impediment or let. The Apostle<sup>f</sup>, in

<sup>f</sup> 1 Tim. vi. 8.

exhorting men to contentment although they have in this world no more than very bare food and raiment, giveth us thereby to understand that those are even the lowest of things necessary; that if we should be stripped of all those things without which we might possibly be, yet these must be left; that destitution in these is such an impediment, as till it be removed suffereth not the mind of man to admit any other care. For this cause, first God assigned Adam maintenance of life, and then appointed him a law to observe<sup>g</sup>. For this cause, after men began to grow to a number, the first thing we read they gave themselves unto was the tilling of the earth and the feeding of cattle. Having by this mean whereon to live, the principal actions of their life afterward are noted by the exercise of their religion<sup>h</sup>. True it is, that the kingdom of God must be the first thing in our purposes and desires<sup>i</sup>. But inasmuch as righteous life presupposeth life; inasmuch as to live virtuously it is impossible except we live; therefore the first impediment, which naturally we endeavour to remove, is penury and want of things without which we cannot live. Unto life many implements are necessary; moe, if we seek (as all men naturally do) such a life as hath in it joy, comfort, delight, and pleasure. To this end we see how quickly sundry arts mechanical were found out, in the very prime of the world<sup>j</sup>. As things of greatest necessity are always first provided for, so things of greatest dignity are most accounted of by all such as judge rightly. Although therefore riches be a thing which every man wisheth, yet no man of judgment can esteem it better to be rich, than wise, virtuous, and religious. If we be both or either of

<sup>g</sup> Gen. i. 29; ii. 17.

<sup>i</sup> Matt. vi. 33.

<sup>h</sup> Gen. iv. 2, 26.

<sup>j</sup> Gen. iv. 20, 21, 22.

these, it is not because we are so born. For into the world we come as empty of the one as of the other, as naked in mind as we are in body. Both which necessities of man had at the first no other helps and supplies than only domestical; such as that which the Prophet implieth, saying, *Can a mother forget her child<sup>k</sup>?* such as that which the Apostle mentioneth, saying, *He that careth not for his own is worse than an Infidel<sup>l</sup>*; such as that concerning Abraham, *Abraham will command his sons and his household after him, that they keep the way of the Lord<sup>m</sup>*.

[3] But neither that which we learn of ourselves nor that which others teach us can prevail, where wickedness and malice have taken deep root. If therefore when there was but as yet one only family in the world, no means of instruction human or divine could prevent effusion of blood<sup>n</sup>; how could it be chosen but that when families were multiplied and increased upon earth, after separation each providing for itself, envy, strife, contention, and violence must grow amongst them? For hath not nature furnished man with wit and valour, as it were with armour, which may be used as well unto extreme evil as good? Yea, were they not used by the rest of the world unto evil; unto the contrary only by Seth, Enoch, and those few the rest in that line<sup>o</sup>? We all make complaint of the iniquity of our times: not unjustly; for the days are evil. But compare them with those times wherein there were no civil societies, with those times wherein there was as yet no manner of public regiment established, with those times wherein there were not above eight persons righteous living upon the face of the earth<sup>p</sup>; and we have surely good cause to think that God hath blessed

<sup>k</sup> Isa. xlix. 15.<sup>n</sup> Gen. iv. 8.<sup>l</sup> 1 Tim. v. 8.<sup>o</sup> Gen. vi. 5; Gen. v.<sup>m</sup> Gen. xviii. 19.<sup>p</sup> 2 Pet. ii. 5.

us exceedingly, and hath made us behold most happy days.

[4] To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries, and wrongs, there was no way but only by growing unto composition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind of government public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto; that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govern, by them the peace, tranquillity, and happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men always knew that when force and injury was offered they might be defenders of themselves; they knew that howsoever men may seek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others it was not to be suffered, but by all men and by all good means to be withstood; finally they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, inasmuch as every man is towards himself and them whom he greatly affecteth partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common consent all to be ordered by some whom they should agree upon: without which consent there was no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another; because, although there be according to the opinion of some very great and judicious men a kind of natural right in the noble, wise, and virtuous, to govern them which are of servile disposition<sup>a</sup>; nevertheless for manifestation of this their right, and men's more peaceable contentment on both sides, the assent of them who are to be governed seemeth necessary.

To fathers within their private families nature hath given

<sup>a</sup> Arist. Polit. lib. iii. et iv.

a supreme power; for which cause we see throughout the world even from the foundation thereof, all men have ever been taken as lords and lawful kings in their own houses. Howbeit over a whole grand multitude having no such dependency upon any one, and consisting of so many families as every politic society in the world doth, impossible it is that any should have complete lawful power, but by consent of men, or immediate appointment of God; because not having the natural superiority of fathers, their power must needs be either usurped, and then unlawful; or, if lawful, then either granted or consented unto by them over whom they exercise the same, or else given extraordinarily from God, unto whom all the world is subject. It is no improbable opinion therefore which the Arch-philosopher was of, that as the chiefest person in every household was always as it were a king, so when numbers of households joined themselves in civil society together, kings were the first kind of governors amongst them<sup>r</sup>. Which is also (as it seemeth) the reason why the name of *Father* continued still in them, who of fathers were made rulers; as also the ancient custom of governors to do as Melchisedec, and being kings to exercise the office of priests, which fathers did at the first, grew perhaps by the same occasion.

(104)  
this passage  
doth

Howbeit not this the only kind of regiment that hath been received in the world. The inconveniences of one kind have caused sundry other to be devised. So that in a word all public regiment of what kind soever seemeth evidently to have risen from deliberate advice, consultation, and composition between men, judging it convenient and behoveful; there being no impossibility in nature

<sup>r</sup> Arist. Polit. lib. i. cap. 2. Vide et Platonem in 3. de Legibus. [t. ii. 680.]

considered by itself, but that men might have lived without any public regiment. Howbeit, the corruption of our nature being presupposed, we may not deny but that the law of nature doth now require of necessity some kind of regiment; so that to bring things unto the first course they were in, and utterly to take away all kind of public government in the world, were apparently to overturn the whole world.

[5] The case of man's nature standing therefore as it doth, some kind of regiment the law of nature doth require; yet the kinds thereof being many, nature tieth not to any one, but leaveth the choice as a thing arbitrary. At the first when some certain kind of regiment was once approved, it may be that nothing was then further thought upon for the manner of governing, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion which were to rule<sup>a</sup>; till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy did indeed but increase the sore which it should have cured. They saw that to live by one man's will became the cause of all men's misery. This constrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might see their duties beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. If things be simply good or evil, and withal universally so acknowledged, there needs no new law to be made for such things<sup>t</sup>. The first kind therefore of things appointed by

<sup>a</sup> 'Cum premeretur initio multitudo ab iis qui majores opes habebant, ad unum aliquem confugiebant virtute praestantem, qui cum prohiberet injuria tenuiores, aequitate constituenda summos cum infimis pari jure retinebat. Cum id minus contingeret, leges sunt inventae.' Cic. Offic. lib. ii. [c. 12.]

<sup>t</sup> Τὸ γονέας τιμῶν καὶ φίλους εὐποιεῖν καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις χάριν ἀποδίδοναι, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοῦτοις ὅμοια οὐ προστάττουσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οἱ γεγραμμένοι νόμοι ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἀγράφῳ καὶ κοινῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται. Arist. Rhet. ad Alex. [c. 2.]

laws human containeth whatsoever being in itself naturally <sup>st laws</sup>  
good or evil, is notwithstanding more secret than that it <sup>was only</sup>  
 can be discerned by every man's present conceit, without <sup>any evident</sup>  
 some deeper discourse and judgment. In which discourse <sup>truths</sup>  
 because there is difficulty and possibility many ways to  
 err, unless such things were set down by laws, many would  
 be ignorant of their duties which now are not, and many  
 that know what they should do would nevertheless dis-  
 semble it, and to excuse themselves pretend ignorance  
 and simplicity, which now they cannot<sup>u</sup>.

[6] And because the greatest part of men are such as  
 prefer their own private good before all things, even that  
 good which is sensual before whatsoever is most divine;  
 and for that the labour of doing good, together with the  
 pleasure arising from the contrary, doth make men for the  
 most part slower to the one and proner to the other, than  
 that duty prescribed them by law can prevail sufficiently  
 with them: therefore unto laws that men do make for the  
 benefit of men it hath seemed always needful to add  
rewards, which may more allure unto good than any  
 hardness deterreth from it, and punishments, which may  
 more deter from evil than any sweetness thereto allureth.  
 Wherein as the generality is natural, *Virtue rewardable*  
*and vice punishable*; so the particular determination of  
 the reward or punishment belongeth unto them by whom  
 laws are made. Theft is naturally punishable, but the  
 kind of punishment is positive, and such lawful as men  
 shall think with discretion convenient by law to appoint.

[7] In laws, that which is natural bindeth universally,  
that which is positive not so. To let go those kind of

<sup>u</sup> 'Tanta est enim vis voluptatum, ut et ignorantiam protelet in occa-  
 sionem, et conscientiam corrumpat in dissimulationem.' Tertull. lib. de  
 Spectacul. [c. 1.]



positive laws which men impose upon themselves, as by vow unto God, contract with men, or such like; somewhat it will make unto our purpose, a little more fully to consider what things are incident into the making of the positive laws for the government of them that live united in public society. Laws do not only teach what is good, but they enjoin it, they have in them a certain constraining force. And to constrain men unto any thing inconvenient doth seem unreasonable. Most requisite therefore it is that to devise laws which all men shall be forced to obey none but wise men be admitted. Laws are matters of principal consequence; men of common capacity and but ordinary judgment are not able (for how should they?) to discern what things are fittest for each kind and state of regiment. We cannot be ignorant how much our obedience unto laws dependeth upon this point. Let a man though never so justly oppose himself unto them that are disordered in their ways, and what one amongst them commonly doth not stomach at such contradiction, storm at reproof, and hate such as would reform them? Notwithstanding even they which brook it worst that men should tell them of their duties, when they are told the same by a law, think very well and reasonably of it. For why? They presume that the law doth speak with all indifferency; that the law hath no side-respect to their persons; that the law is as it were an oracle proceeded from wisdom and understanding.

[8] Howbeit laws do not take their constraining force from the quality of such as devise them, but from that power which doth give them the strength of laws. That which we spake before concerning the power of government must here be applied unto the power of making laws whereby to govern; which power God hath over all:

and by the natural law, whereunto he hath made all subject, the lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men belongeth so properly unto the same entire societies, that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth to exercise the same of himself, and not either by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their consent upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere tyranny.

Laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not made so. But approbation not only they give who personally declare their assent by voice, sign, or act, but also when others do it in their names by right originally at the least derived from them. As in parliaments, councils, and the like assemblies, although we be not personally ourselves present, notwithstanding our assent is, by reason of others, agents there in our behalf. And what we do by others, no reason but that it should stand as our deed, no less effectually to bind us than if ourselves had done it in person. In many things assent is given, they that give it not imagining they do so, because the manner of their assenting is not apparent. As for example, when an absolute monarch commandeth his subjects that which seemeth good in his own discretion, hath not his edict the force of a law whether they approve or dislike it? Again, that which hath been received long sithence and is by custom now established, we keep as a law which we may not transgress; yet what consent was ever thereunto sought or required at our hands?

Of this point therefore we are to note, that sith men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without

our consent we could in such sort be at no man's commandment living. And to be commanded we do consent, when that society whereof we are part hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement. Wherefore as any man's deed past is good as long as himself continueth; so the act of a public society of men done five hundred years sithence standeth as theirs who presently are of the same societies, because corporations are immortal; we were then alive in our predecessors, and they in their successors do live still. Laws therefore human, of what kind soever, are available by consent.

[9] If here it be demanded how it cometh to pass that this being common unto all laws which are made, there should be found even in good laws so great variety as there is; we must note the reason hereof to be the sundry particular ends, whereunto the different disposition of that subject or matter, for which laws are provided, causeth them to have especial respect in making laws. A law there is mentioned amongst the Grecians whereof Pittacus is reported to have been author; and by that law it was agreed, that he which being overcome with drink did then strike any man, should suffer punishment double as much as if he had done the same being sober<sup>†</sup>. No man could ever have thought this reasonable, that had intended thereby only to punish the injury committed according to the gravity of the fact: for who knoweth not that harm advisedly done is naturally less pardonable, and therefore worthy of the sharper punishment? But forasmuch as none did so usually this way offend as men in that case, which they wittingly fell into, even because they would be so much the more freely outrageous; it was for their

<sup>†</sup> Arist. Polit. lib. ii. cap. ult.

public good, where such disorder was grown, to frame a positive law for remedy thereof accordingly. To this appertain those known laws of making laws; as that law-makers must have an eye to the place where, and to the men amongst whom: that one kind of laws cannot serve for all kinds of regiment: that where the multitude beareth sway, laws that shall tend unto preservation of that state must make common smaller offices to go by lot, for fear of strife and division likely to arise, by reason that ordinary qualities sufficing for discharge of such offices, they could not but by many be desired, and so with danger contended for, and not missed without grudge and discontentment, whereas at an uncertain lot none can find themselves grieved, on whomsoever it lighteth; contrariwise the greatest, whereof but few are capable, to pass by popular election, that neither the people may envy such as have those honours, inasmuch as themselves bestow them, and that the chiefest may be kindled with desire to exercise all parts of rare and beneficial virtue, knowing they shall not lose their labour by growing in fame and estimation amongst the people: if the helm of chief government be in the hands of a few of the wealthiest, that then laws providing for continuance thereof must make the punishment of contumely and wrong offered unto any of the common sort sharp and grievous, that so the evil may be prevented whereby the rich are most likely to bring themselves into hatred with the people, who are not wont to take so great an offence when they are excluded from honours and offices, as when their persons are contumeliously trodden upon. In other kinds of regiment the like is observed concerning the difference of positive laws, which to be every where the same is impossible and against their nature.

[10] Now as the learned in the laws<sup>x</sup> of this land observe, that our statutes sometimes are only the affirmation or ratification of that which by common law was held before; so here it is not to be omitted that generally all laws human, which are made for the ordering of politic societies, be either such as establish some duty whereunto all men by the law of reason did before stand bound; or else such as make that a duty now which before was none. The one sort we may for distinction's sake call *mixedly*, and the other *merely* human. That which plain or necessary reason bindeth men unto may be in sundry considerations expedient to be ratified by human law. For example, if confusion of blood in marriage, the liberty of having many wives at once, or any other the like corrupt and unreasonable custom doth happen to have prevailed far, and to have gotten the upper hand of right reason with the greatest part, so that no way is left to rectify such foul disorder without prescribing by law the same things which reason necessarily *doth* enforce but is not *perceived* that so it doth; or if many be grown unto that which the Apostle did lament in some, concerning whom he writeth, saying, that *Even what things they naturally know, in those very things as beasts void of reason they corrupted themselves*<sup>y</sup>; or if there be no such special accident, yet forasmuch as the common sort are led by the sway of their sensual desires, and therefore do more shun sin for the sensible evils which follow it amongst men, than for any kind of sentence which reason doth pronounce against it<sup>z</sup>; this very thing is cause sufficient why duties belonging unto each kind of virtue, albeit the law of

<sup>x</sup> Staundf. Preface to the Pleas of the Crown.

<sup>y</sup> Jude 10.

<sup>z</sup> οἱ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ.  
Arist. Eth. x. 10.

reason teach them, should notwithstanding be prescribed even by human law. Which law in this case we term *mixed*, because the matter whereunto it bindeth is the same which reason necessarily doth require at our hands, and from the law of reason it differeth in the manner of binding only. For whereas men before stood bound in conscience to do as the law of reason teacheth, they are now by virtue of human law become constrainable, and if they outwardly transgress, punishable. As for laws which are *merely* human, the matter of them is any thing which reason doth but probably teach to be fit and convenient ; so that till such time as law hath passed amongst men about it, of itself it bindeth no man. One example whereof may be this. Lands are by human law in some places after the owner's decease divided unto all his children, in some all descendeth to the eldest son. If the law of reason did necessarily require but the one of these two to be done, they which by law have received the other should be subject to that heavy sentence, which denounceth against all that decree wicked, unjust, and unreasonable things, *woe*<sup>a</sup>. Whereas now whichsoever be received there is no law of reason transgressed ; because there is probable reason why either of them may be expedient, and for either of them more than probable reason there is not to be found.

[11] Laws whether *mixedly* or *merely* human are made by politic societies : some, only as those societies are civilly united ; some, as they are spiritually joined and make such a body as we call the Church. Of laws human in this later kind we are to speak in the third book following. Let it therefore suffice thus far to have touched the force wherewith almighty God hath graciously endued

<sup>a</sup> Isaiah x. 1.

our nature, and thereby enabled the same to find out both those laws which all men generally are for ever bound to observe, and also such as are most fit for their behoof, who lead their lives in any ordered state of government.

[12] Now besides that law which simply concerneth men as men, and that which belongeth unto them as they are men linked with others in some form of politic society, there is a third kind of law which toucheth all such several bodies politic, so far forth as one of them hath public commerce with another. And this third is the *law of nations*. Between men and beasts there is no possibility of sociable communion; because the well-spring of that communion is a natural delight which man hath to transfuse from himself into others, and to receive from others into himself, especially those things wherein the excellency of his kind doth most consist. The chiefest instrument of human communion therefore is speech, because thereby we impart mutually one to another the conceits of our reasonable understanding<sup>a</sup>. And for that cause seeing beasts are not hereof capable, forasmuch as with them we can use no such conference, they being in degree, although above other creatures on earth to whom nature hath denied sense, yet lower than to be sociable companions of man to whom nature hath given reason; it is of Adam said that amongst the beasts *He found not for himself any meet companion*<sup>b</sup>. Civil society doth more content the nature of man than any private kind of solitary living, because in society this good of mutual participation is so much larger than otherwise. Herewith notwithstanding we are not satisfied, but we covet (if it might be) to have a kind of society and fellowship even with all mankind.

<sup>a</sup> Arist. Polit. i. cap. 2.

<sup>b</sup> Gen. ii. 20.

Which thing Socrates intending to signify professed himself a citizen, not of this or that commonwealth, but of the world<sup>c</sup>. And an effect of that very natural desire in us, (a manifest token that we wish after a sort an universal fellowship with all men,) appeareth by the wonderful delight men have, some to visit foreign countries, some to discover nations not heard of in former ages, we all to know the affairs and dealings of other people, yea to be in league of amity with them: and this not only for traffic's sake, or to the end that when many are confederated each may make other the more strong, but for such cause also as moved the Queen of Saba to visit Salomon<sup>d</sup>; and in a word, because nature doth presume that how many men there are in the world, so many Gods as it were there are, or at leastwise such they should be towards men.

[13] Touching laws which are to serve men in this behalf; even as those laws of reason, which (man retaining his original integrity) had been sufficient to direct each particular person in all his affairs and duties, are not sufficient but require the access of other laws, now that man and his offspring are grown thus corrupt and sinful; again, as those laws of polity and regiment, which would have served men living in public society together with that harmless disposition which then they should have had, are not able now to serve, when men's iniquity is so hardly restrained within any tolerable bounds: in like manner, the national laws of mutual commerce between societies of that former and better quality might have been other than now, when nations are so prone to offer violence, injury, and wrong. Hereupon hath grown in every of these three kinds that distinction between *Primary* and

<sup>c</sup> Cic. Tusc. v. [c. 37.] et i. de Legib. [c. 12.]

<sup>d</sup> 1 Kings x. 1; 2 Chron. ix. 1; Matt. xii. 42; Luke xi. 31.



*Secondary* laws ; the one grounded upon sincere, the other built upon depraved nature. Primary laws of nations are such as concern embassage, such as belong to the courteous entertainment of foreigners and strangers, such as serve for commodious traffic, and the like. Secondary laws in the same kind are such as this present unquiet world is most familiarly acquainted with ; I mean laws of arms, which yet are much better known than kept. But what matter the law of nations doth contain I omit to search.

The strength and virtue of that law is such that no particular nation can lawfully prejudice the same by any their several laws and ordinances, more than a man by his private resolutions the law of the whole commonwealth or state wherein he liveth. For as civil law, being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore overrule each several part of the same body ; so there is no reason that any one commonwealth of itself should to the prejudice of another annihilate that whereupon the whole world hath agreed. For which cause, the Lacedemonians forbidding all access of strangers into their coasts are in that respect both by Josephus and Theodoret deservedly blamed<sup>e</sup>, as being enemies to that hospitality which for common humanity's sake all the nations on earth should embrace.

[14] Now as there is great cause of communion, and consequently of laws for the maintenance of communion, amongst nations ; so amongst nations Christian the like in regard even of Christianity hath been always judged needful.

And in this kind of correspondence amongst nations

\* Joseph. lib. ii. contra Apion. [c. 36.] Theod. lib. ix. de sanand. Graec. aff. [p. 611, t. iv. ed. Par. 1642.]

the force of general councils doth stand. For as one and the same law divine, whereof in the next place we are to speak, is unto all Christian churches a rule for the chiefest things, by means whereof they all in that respect make one Church, as having all but *One Lord, one faith, and one baptism*<sup>f</sup>: so the urgent necessity of mutual communion for preservation of our unity in these things, as also for order in some other things convenient to be everywhere uniformly kept, maketh it requisite that the Church of God here on earth have her laws of spiritual commerce between Christian nations; laws by virtue whereof all churches may enjoy freely the use of those reverend, religious, and sacred consultations, which are termed councils general. A thing whereof God's own blessed Spirit was the author g; a thing practised by the holy Apostles themselves; a thing always afterwards kept and observed throughout the world; a thing never otherwise than most highly esteemed of, till pride, ambition, and tyranny began by factious and vile endeavours to abuse that divine invention unto the furtherance of wicked purposes. But as the just authority of civil courts and parliaments is not therefore to be abolished, because sometime there is cunning used to frame them according to the private intents of men over-potent in the commonwealth; so the grievous abuse which hath been of councils should rather cause men to study how so gracious a thing may again be reduced to that first perfection, than in regard of stains and blemishes sithence growing be held for ever in extreme disgrace.

To speak of this matter as the cause requireth would require very long discourse. All I will presently say is this. Whether it be for the finding out of any thing whereunto divine law bindeth us, but yet in such sort that men

<sup>f</sup> Ephes. iv. 5.

<sup>g</sup> Acts xv. 28.

are not thereof on all sides resolved ; or for the setting down of some uniform judgment to stand touching such things, as being neither way matters of necessity, are notwithstanding offensive and scandalous when there is open opposition about them ; be it for the ending of strifes touching matters of Christian belief, wherein the one part may seem to have probable cause of dissenting from the other ; or be it concerning matters of polity, order, and regiment in the church ; I nothing doubt but that Christian men should much better frame themselves to those heavenly precepts, which our Lord and Saviour with so great instancy gave<sup>h</sup> as concerning peace and unity, if we did all concur in desire to have the use of ancient councils again renewed, rather than these proceedings continued, which either make all contentions endless, or bring them to one only determination, and that of all other the worst, which is by sword.

[15] It followeth therefore that a new foundation being laid, we now adjoin hereunto that which cometh in the next place to be spoken of ; namely, wherefore God hath himself by scripture made known such laws as serve for direction of men.

XI. All things, (God only excepted,) besides the nature which they have in themselves, receive externally some perfection from other things, as hath been shewed. Insomuch as there is in the whole world no one thing great or small, but either in respect of knowledge or of use it may unto our perfection add somewhat. And whatsoever such perfection there is which our nature may acquire, the same we properly term our good ; our sovereign good or *blessedness*, that wherein the highest degree

Wherefore God hath by scripture further made known such supernatural laws, as do serve for men's direction.

<sup>h</sup> John xiv. 27.

of all our perfection consisteth, that which being once attained unto, there can rest nothing further to be desired; and therefore with it our souls are fully content and satisfied, in that they have they rejoice, and thirst for no more. Wherefore of good things desired, some are such that for themselves we covet them not, but only because they serve as instruments unto that for which we are to seek; of this sort are riches. Another kind there is, which although we desire for itself, as health, and virtue, and knowledge, nevertheless they are not the last mark whereat we aim, but have their further end whereunto they are referred; so as in them we are not satisfied as having attained the utmost we may, but our desires do still proceed. These things are linked and as it were chained one to another; we labour to eat, and we eat to live, and we live to do good, and the good which we do is as seed sown with reference unto a future harvest<sup>1</sup>. But we must come at the length to some pause. For if every thing were to be desired for some other without any stint, there could be no certain end proposed unto our actions, we should go on we know not whither; yea, whatsoever we do were in vain, or rather nothing at all were possible to be done. For as to take away the first efficient of our being were to annihilate utterly our persons, so we cannot remove the last final cause of our working, but we shall cause whatsoever we work to cease. (Therefore something there must be desired for itself simply and for no other.) That is simply for itself desirable, unto the nature whereof it is opposite and repugnant to be desired with relation unto any other. The ox and the ass desire their food, neither propose they unto themselves any end wherefore; so that

<sup>1</sup> Gal. vi. 8. 'He that soweth to the spirit shall of the spirit reap life everlasting.'

of them this is desired for itself; but why? By reason of their imperfection which cannot otherwise desire it; whereas that which is desired simply for itself, the excellency thereof is such as permitteth it not in any sort to be referred to a further end.

[2] Now that which man doth desire with reference to a further end, the same he desireth in such measure as is unto that end convenient; but what he coveteth as good in itself, towards that his desire is ever infinite. So that unless the last good of all, which is desired altogether for itself, be also infinite, we do evil in making it our end; even as they who placed their felicity in wealth or honour or pleasure or any thing here attained; because in desiring any thing as our final perfection which is not so, we do amiss<sup>k</sup>. Nothing may be infinitely desired but that good which is indeed infinite. For the better, the more desirable; that therefore most desirable wherein there is infinity of goodness; so that if any thing desirable may be infinite, that must needs be the highest of all things that are desired. No good is infinite but only God; therefore he our felicity and bliss. Moreover, desire tendeth unto union with that it desireth. If then in him we be blessed, it is by force of participation and conjunction with him. Again, it is not the possession of any good thing can make them happy which have it, unless they enjoy the thing wherewith they are possessed. Then are we happy therefore when fully we enjoy God, as an object wherein the powers of our souls are satisfied even with everlasting delight; so that although we be men, yet by being unto God united we live as it were the life of God.

[3] Happiness therefore is that estate whereby we

<sup>k</sup> Vide Arist. Ethic. lib. x. c. 10. [c. 7.] et Metaph. l. xii. c. 6. et c. 4. et c. 30.

attain, so far as possibly may be attained, the full possession of that which simply for itself is to be desired, and containeth in it after an eminent sort the contentation of our desires, the highest degree of all our perfection. Of such perfection capable we are not in this life. For while we are in the world, subject we are unto sundry imperfections<sup>1</sup>, griefs of body, defects of mind; yea the best things we do are painful, and the exercise of them grievous, being continued without intermission; so as in those very actions whereby we are especially perfected in this life we are not able to persist; forced we are with very weariness, and that often, to interrupt them: which tediousness cannot fall into those operations that are in the state of bliss, when our union with God is complete. Complete union with him must be according unto every power and faculty of our minds apt to receive so glorious an object. Capable we are of God both by understanding and will: by understanding, as he is that sovereign truth which comprehendeth the rich treasures of all wisdom; by will, as he is that sea of goodness whereof whoso tasteth shall thirst no more. As the will doth now work upon that object by desire, which is as it were a motion towards the end as yet unobtained; so likewise upon the same hereafter received it shall work also by love. *Appetitus inhiantis fit amor fruientis*, saith St. Augustine; *The longing disposition of them that thirst is changed into the sweet affection of them that taste and are replenished*<sup>m</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Μόνον, ὡ' Ασκληπίε, τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐν ἀνθρώποις, τὸ δὲ ἔργον οὐδαμοῦ. . . . Τὸ μὴ λίαν κακόν, ἐνθάδε τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι. Τὸ δὲ ἐνθάδε ἀγαθόν, μῦριον τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ ἐλάχιστον. Ἀδύνατον οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐνθάδε καθαρεῦειν τῆς κακίας. . . . Καὶ γὰρ δὲ χάριν ἔχω τῷ Θεῷ τῷ εἰς νοῦν μοι βαλόντι περὶ τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ κόσμος πλήρωμά ἐστι τῆς κακίας, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ. Merc. Tris. [lib. vi. f. 14.]

<sup>m</sup> Aug. de Trin. lib. ix. c. ult.

Whereas we now love the thing that is good, but good especially in respect of benefit unto us; we shall then love the thing that is good, only or principally for the goodness of beauty in itself. The soul being in this sort, as it is active, perfected by love of that infinite good, shall, as it is receptive, be also perfected with those supernatural passions of joy, peace, and delight. All this endless and everlasting<sup>n</sup>. Which perpetuity, in regard whereof our blessedness is termed *a crown which withereth not*<sup>o</sup>, doth neither depend upon the nature of the thing itself, nor proceed from any natural necessity that our souls should so exercise themselves for ever in beholding and loving God, but from the will of God, which doth both freely perfect our nature in so high a degree, and continue it so perfected. Under man, no creature in the world is capable of felicity and bliss; first, because their chiefest perfection consisteth in that which is best for them, but not in that which is simply best, as ours doth; secondly, because whatsoever external perfection they tend unto, it is not better than themselves, as ours is. How just occasion have we therefore even in this respect with the Prophet to admire the goodness of God; Lord, what is man, that thou shouldst exalt him above the works of thy hands<sup>p</sup>, so far as to make thyself the inheritance of his rest, and the substance of his felicity?

[4] Now if men had not naturally this desire to be happy, how were it possible that all men should have it? All men have. Therefore this desire in man is natural. It is not in our power not to do the same; how should it then be in our power to do it coldly or remissly? So

<sup>n</sup> Matt. xxv. 'The just shall go into life everlasting.' Matt. xxii. 'They shall be as the Angels of God.'

<sup>o</sup> 2 Tim. iv. 8; 1 Pet. v. 4.

<sup>p</sup> Psalm viii. 4.

that our desire, being natural, is also in that degree of earnestness whereunto nothing can be added. And is it probable that God should frame the hearts of all men so desirous of that which no man may obtain? (It is an axiom of nature that natural desire cannot utterly be frustrate<sup>a</sup>. This desire of ours being natural should be frustrate, if that which may satisfy the same were a thing impossible for man to aspire unto. Man doth seek a triple perfection<sup>r</sup>: first a sensual, consisting in those things which very life itself requirēth, either as necessary supplements, or as beauties and ornaments thereof; then an intellectual, consisting in those things which none underneath man is either capable of or acquainted with; lastly a spiritual and divine, consisting in those things whereunto we tend by supernatural means here, but cannot here attain unto them. They that make the first of these three the scope of their whole life, are said by the Apostle<sup>s</sup> to have no god but only their belly, to be earthly-minded men. Unto the second they bend themselves, who seek especially to excel in all such knowledge and virtue as doth most commend men. To this branch belongeth the law of moral and civil perfection. That there is somewhat higher than either of these two, no other proof doth need than the very process of man's desire, which being natural should be frustrate, if there were not some farther thing wherein it might rest at the length contented, which in the former it cannot do. For man doth not seem to rest satisfied, either with fruition of that wherewith his life is preserved, or with performance of such actions as advance him most deservedly in

<sup>a</sup> [Aquin.] Comment. in Prooem. ii. Metaph. [tom. viii. p. 14. ed. Venet. 1552.]

<sup>r</sup> [Arist. Eth. Nic. I. v. 2.]

<sup>s</sup> Phil. iii. 19.



estimation; but doth further covet, yea oftentimes manifestly pursue with great sedulity and earnestness, that which cannot stand him in any stead for vital use; that which exceedeth the reach of sense; yea somewhat above capacity of reason, somewhat divine and heavenly, which with hidden exultation it rather surmiseth than conceiveth; somewhat it seeketh, and what that is directly it knoweth not, yet very intentive desire thereof doth so incite it, that all other known delights and pleasures are laid aside, they give place to the search of this but only suspected desire. If the soul of man did serve only to give him being in this life, then things appertaining unto this life would content him, as we see they do other creatures; which creatures enjoying what they live by seek no further, but in this contentation do shew a kind of acknowledgment that there is no higher good which doth any way belong unto them. With us it is otherwise. For although the beauties, riches, honours, sciences, virtues, and perfections of all men living, were in the present possession of one; yet somewhat beyond and above all this there would still be sought and earnestly thirsted for. So that nature even in this life doth plainly claim and call for a more divine perfection than either of these two that have been mentioned.

[5] This last and highest estate of perfection whereof we speak is received of men in the nature of a reward †. Rewards do always presuppose such duties performed as are rewardable. Our natural means therefore unto blessedness are our works; nor is it possible that nature should ever find any other way to salvation than only this. But examine the works which we do, and since the first

† Matt. v. 12. 'Rejoice and be glad, for great is your reward in heaven.' Aug. de Doct. Christ. cap. 6. 'Summa merces est ut ipso perfruamur.'

foundation of the world what one can say, My ways are pure? Seeing then all flesh is guilty of that for which God hath threatened eternally to punish, what possibility is there this way to be saved? There resteth therefore either no way unto salvation, or if any, then surely a way which is supernatural, a way which could never have entered into the heart of man as much as once to conceive or imagine, if God himself had not revealed it extraordinarily. For which cause we term it the mystery or secret way of salvation. And therefore St. Ambrose in this matter appealeth justly from man to God <sup>u</sup>, *Coeli mysterium doceat me Deus qui condidit, non homo qui seipsum ignoravit; Let God himself that made me, let not man that knows not himself, be my instructor concerning the mystical way to heaven.* When men of excellent wit, saith Lactantius, had wholly betaken themselves unto study, after farewell bidden unto all kind as well of private as public action, they spared no labour that might be spent in the search of truth; holding it a thing of much more price to seek and to find out the reason of all affairs as well divine as human, than to stick fast in the toil of piling up riches and gathering together heaps of honours. Howbeit, they both did fail of their purpose, and got not as much as to quite their charges; because truth which is the secret of the most high God, whose proper handy-work all things are, cannot be compassed with that wit and those senses which are our own. For God and man should be very near neighbours, if man's cogitations were able to take a survey of the counsels and appointments of that majesty everlasting. Which being utterly impossible, that the eye of man by itself should look into the bosom of divine reason, God did not suffer him being desirous of the light of wisdom to stray any longer up and down, and with

<sup>u</sup> Ambros. contra Sym. [Ep. 18, § 7, t. ii. 835.]

*bootless expense of travel to wander in darkness that had no passage to get out by. His eyes at the length God did open, and bestow upon him the knowledge of the truth by way of Donative, to the end that man might both be clearly convicted of folly, and being through error out of the way, have the path that leadeth unto immortality laid plain before him* <sup>x</sup>. Thus far Lactantius Firmianus, to shew that God himself is the teacher of the truth, whereby is made known the supernatural way of salvation and law for them to live in that shall be saved. <sup>v</sup> In the natural path of everlasting life the first beginning is that ability of doing good, which God in the day of man's creation endued him with ; from hence obedience unto the will of his creator, absolute righteousness and integrity in all his actions ; and last of all the justice of God rewarding the worthiness of his deserts with the crown of eternal glory. Had Adam continued in his first estate, this had been the way of life unto him and all his posterity. Wherein I confess notwithstanding with the wittiest of the School-divines <sup>v</sup>, *That if we*

<sup>x</sup> ' Magno et excellenti ingenio viri, cum se doctrinae penitus dedidissent, quicquid laboris poterat impendi (contemptis omnibus et privatis et publicis actionibus) ad inquirendae veritatis studium contulerunt, existimantes multo esse praeclarius humanarum divinarumque rerum investigare ac scire rationem, quam struendis opibus aut cumulandis honoribus inhærere. Sed neque adepti sunt id quod volebant, et operam simul atque industriam perdiderunt : quia veritas, id est arcanum summi Dei qui fecit omnia, ingenio ac propriis sensibus non potest comprehendi. Alioqui nihil inter Deum hominemque distaret, si consilia et dispositiones illius majestatis aeternae cogitatio assequeretur humana. Quod quia fieri non potuit ut homini per seipsum ratio divina notesceret, non est passus hominem Deus lumen sapientiae requirentem diutius aberrare, ac sine ullo laboris effectu vagari per tenebras inextricabiles. Aperuit oculos ejus aliquando, et notionem veritatis munus suum fecit, ut et humanam sapientiam nullam esse monstraret, et erranti ac vago viam consequendae immortalitatis ostenderet.' Lactant. lib. i. cap. i.

<sup>v</sup> Scot. lib. iv. Sent. dist. 49, 6. ' Loquendo de stricta justitia, Deus nulli nostrum propter quaecunque merita est debitor perfectionis reddendae tam intensae, propter immoderatum excessum illius perfectionis ultra illa merita. Sed esto quod ex liberalitate sua determinasset meritis conferre

*speak of strict justice. God could no way have been bound to requite man's labours in so large and ample a manner as human felicity doth import ; inasmuch as the dignity of this exceedeth so far the other's value. But be it that God of his great liberality had determined in lieu of man's endeavours to bestow the same, by the rule of that justice which best beseemeth him, namely, the justice of one that requiteth nothing mincingly, but all with pressed and heaped and even over-enlarged measure ; yet could it never hereupon necessarily be gathered, that such justice should add to the nature of that reward the property of everlasting continuance ; sith possession of bliss, though it should be but for a moment, were an abundant retribution. But we are not now to enter into this consideration, how gracious and bountiful our good God might still appear in so rewarding the sons of men, albeit they should exactly perform whatsoever duty their nature bindeth them unto. Howsoever God did propose this reward, we that were to be rewarded must have done that which is required at our hands ; we failing in the one, it were in nature an impossibility that the other should be looked for. The light of nature is never able to find out any way of obtaining the reward of bliss, but by performing exactly the duties and works of righteousness.*

[6] From salvation therefore and life all flesh being excluded this way, behold how the wisdom of God hath revealed a way mystical and supernatural, a way directing unto the same end of life by a course which groundeth itself upon the guiltiness of sin, and through sin desert of

actum tam perfectum tanquam præmium, tali quidem justitia qualis decet eum, scilicet supererogantis in præmiis : tamen non sequitur ex hoc necessario, quod per illam justitiam sit reddenda perfectio perennis tanquam præmium, imo abundans fieret retributio in beatitudine unius momenti.' [p. 168. Venet. 1598.]

condemnation and death. For in this way the first thing is the tender compassion of God respecting us drowned and swallowed up in misery; the next is redemption out of the same by the precious death and merit of a mighty Saviour, which hath witnessed of himself, saying<sup>z</sup>, *I am the way*, the way that leadeth us from misery into bliss. This supernatural way had God in himself prepared before all worlds. The way of supernatural duty which to us he hath prescribed, our Saviour in the Gospel of St. John doth note, terming it by an excellency, the work of God<sup>a</sup>; *This is the work of God, that ye believe in him whom he hath sent*. Not that God doth require nothing unto happiness at the hands of men saving only a naked belief, for hope and charity we may not exclude; but that without belief all other things are as nothing, and it the ground of those other divine virtues.

Concerning faith, the principal object whereof is that eternal verity which hath discovered the treasures of hidden wisdom in Christ; concerning hope, the highest object whereof is that everlasting goodness which in Christ doth quicken the dead; concerning charity, the final object whereof is that incomprehensible beauty which shineth in the countenance of Christ the Son of the living God: concerning these virtues, the first of which beginning here with a weak apprehension of things not seen, endeth with the intuitive vision of God in the world to come; the second beginning here with a trembling expectation of things far removed and as yet but only heard of, endeth with real and actual fruition of that which no tongue can express; the third beginning here with a weak inclination of heart towards him unto whom we are not able to approach, endeth with endless union, the mystery whereof

<sup>a</sup> John xiv. 6.

<sup>a</sup> John vi. 29.

is higher than the reach of the thoughts of men ; concerning that faith, hope, and charity, without which there can be no salvation, was there ever any mention made saving only in that law which God himself hath from heaven revealed? There is not in the world a syllable muttered with certain truth concerning any of these three, more than hath been supernaturally received from the mouth of the eternal God.

Laws therefore concerning these things are supernatural, both in respect of the manner of delivering them, which is divine ; and also in regard of the things delivered, which are such as have not in nature any cause from which they flow, but were by the voluntary appointment of God ordained besides the course of nature, to rectify nature's obliquity withal.

XII. When supernatural duties are necessarily exacted, natural are not rejected as needless. The law of God therefore is, though principally delivered for instruction in the one, yet fraught with precepts of the other also. The scripture is fraught even with laws of nature ; insomuch that Gratian<sup>b</sup> defining natural right, (whereby is meant the right which exacteth those general duties that concern men naturally even as they are men,) termeth natural right that which the books of the Law and the Gospel do contain. Neither is it vain that the scripture aboundeth with so great store of laws in this kind. For they are either such as we of ourselves could not easily have found out, and then the benefit is not small to have them readily set down to our hands ; or if they be so clear and manifest that no man endued with reason can lightly be ignorant of them, yet the Spirit

<sup>b</sup> 'Jus naturale est quod in Lege et Evangelio continetur.' p. 1, d. 1. [Corp. Jur. Can. p. 2. Lugd. 1584.]

as it were borrowing them from the school of nature, as serving to prove things less manifest, and to induce a persuasion of somewhat which were in itself more hard and dark, unless it should in such sort be cleared, the very applying of them unto cases particular is not without most singular use and profit many ways for men's instruction. Besides, be they plain of themselves or obscure, the evidence of God's own testimony added to the natural assent of reason concerning the certainty of them, doth not a little comfort and confirm the same.

[2] Wherefore inasmuch as our actions are conversant about things beset with many circumstances, which cause men of sundry wits to be also of sundry judgments concerning that which ought to be done; requisite it cannot but, seem the rule of divine law should herein help our imbecility, that we might the more infallibly understand what is good and what evil. The first principles of the law of nature are easy; hard it were to find men ignorant of them. But concerning the duty which nature's law doth require at the hands of men in a number of things particular, so far hath the natural understanding even of sundry whole nations been darkened, that they have not discerned, no, not gross iniquity, to be sin<sup>c</sup>. Again, being so prone as we are to fawn upon ourselves, and to be ignorant as much as may be of our own

\* Joseph. lib. secundo contra Apion. [c. 37.] 'Lacedaemonii quomodo non sunt ob inhospitalitatem reprehendendi, foedumque neglectum nuptiarum? Elienses vero et Thebani ob flagitiosum morem plane impudentem et contra naturam, quem recte et utiliter exercere putabant? Cumque haec omnino perpetrarunt, etiam suis legibus miscuere.' Vid. Th. 1, 2, q. 94. 4, 5, 6. 'Lex naturae sic corrupta fuit apud Germanos, ut latrocinium non reputarent peccatum.' August, aut quis auctor est lib. de quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test. 'Quis nesciat quid bonae vitae conveniat, aut ignoret quia quod sibi fieri non vult aliis minime debeat facere? At vero ubi naturalis lex evanuit oppressa consuetudine delinquendi, tunc oportuit manifestari scriptis, ut Dei iudicium

deformities, without the feeling sense whereof we are most wretched; even so much the more, because not knowing them we cannot so much as desire to have them taken away; how should our festered sores be cured, but that God hath delivered a law as sharp as the two-edged sword, piercing the very closest and most unsearchable corners of the heart<sup>d</sup>, which the law of nature can hardly, human laws by no means possible, reach unto? Hereby we know even secret concupiscence to be sin, and are made fearful to offend though it be but in a wandering cogitation. Finally, of those things which are for direction of all parts of our life needful, and not impossible to be discerned by the light of nature itself; are there not many which few men's natural capacity, and some which no man's, hath been able to find out? They are, saith St. Augustine<sup>e</sup>, but a few, and they endued with great ripeness of wit and judgment, free from all such affairs as might trouble their meditations, instructed in the sharpest and the subtlest points of learning, who have, and that very hardly, been able to find out but only the immortality of the soul. The resurrection of the flesh what man did ever at any time dream of, having not heard it otherwise than from the school of nature? Whereby it appeareth how much we are bound to yield unto our creator, the father of all mercy, eternal thanks, for that he hath delivered his law unto the world, a law wherein so many things are laid open, clear and manifest, as a light which otherwise would have been

omnes audirent [legem manifestari, ut in Judaeis omnes homines audirent:] non quod penitus oblitterata est, sed quia maxima ejus auctoritate carebant, idololatriae studebatur, timor Dei in terris non erat, fornicatio operabatur, circa rem proximi avida erat concupiscentia. Data [danda] ergo lex erat, ut et quae sciebantur auctoritatem haberent, et quae latere coeperant manifestarentur. Quæst. iv. [t. iii. App. 44.]

<sup>d</sup> Heb. iv. 12.

<sup>e</sup> [De Trin, lib. xiii. c. 12.]



buried in darkness, not without the hazard, or rather not with the hazard but with the certain loss, of infinite thousands of souls most undoubtedly now saved.

[3] We see, therefore, that our sovereign good is desired naturally; that God the author of that natural desire had appointed natural means whereby to fulfil it; that man having utterly disabled his nature unto these means hath had other revealed from God, and hath received from heaven a law to teach him how that which is desired naturally must now supernaturally be attained: finally, we see that because those later exclude not the former quite and clean as unnecessary, therefore together with such supernatural duties as could not possibly have been otherwise known to the world, the same law that teacheth them, teacheth also with them such natural duties as could not by light of nature easily have been known.

XIII. In the first age of the world God gave laws unto our fathers, and by reason of the number of their days their memories served instead of books; whereof the manifold imperfections and defects being known to God, he mercifully relieved the same by often putting them in mind of that whereof it behoved them to be specially mindful. In which respect we see how many times one thing hath been iterated unto sundry even of the best and wisest amongst them. After that the lives of men were shortened, means more durable to preserve the laws of God from oblivion and corruption grew in use, not without precise direction from God himself. First therefore of Moyses it is said, that he *wrote all the works of God*<sup>f</sup>; not by his own private motion and device: for God taketh this act to himself<sup>g</sup>, *I have written*. Furthermore, were not the Prophets

The benefit of  
having divine  
laws written.

<sup>f</sup> Exod. xxiv. 4.

<sup>g</sup> Hos. viii. 12.

following commanded also to do the like? Unto the holy Evangelist St. John, how often express charge is given, *Scribe, Write these things*<sup>h</sup>. Concerning the rest of our Lord's disciples, the words of St. Augustine are<sup>i</sup>, *Quicquid ille de suis factis et dictis nos legere voluit, hoc scribendum illis tanquam suis manibus imperavit.*

[2] Now, although we do not deny it to be a matter merely accidental unto the law of God to be written; although writing be not that which addeth authority and strength thereunto; finally, though his laws do require at our hands the same obedience howsoever they be delivered; his providence, notwithstanding, which hath made principal choice of this way to deliver them, who seeth not what cause we have to admire and magnify? The singular benefit that hath grown unto the world, by receiving the laws of God even by his own appointment committed unto writing, we are not able to esteem as the value thereof deserveth. When the question therefore is, whether we be now to seek for any revealed law of God elsewhere than only in the sacred scripture; whether we do now stand bound in the sight of God to yield to traditions urged by the Church of Rome the same obedience and reverence we do to his written law, honouring equally and adoring both as divine: our answer is, no. They that so earnestly plead for the authority of tradition, as if nothing were more safely conveyed than that which spreadeth itself by report, and descendeth by relation of former generations unto the ages that succeed, are not all of them, (surely a miracle it were if they should be,) so simple as thus to persuade themselves; howsoever, if the simple were so persuaded, they could be content perhaps very well to enjoy the benefit, as they account it, of that

<sup>h</sup> Apoc. i. 11; xiv. 13.

<sup>i</sup> Aug. lib. i. de Cons. Evang. cap. ult.

common error. What hazard the truth is in when it passeth through the hands of report, how maimed and deformed it becometh, they are not, they cannot possibly be ignorant. Let them that are indeed of this mind consider but only that little of things divine, which the Heathen<sup>k</sup> have in such sort received. How miserable had the state of the Church of God been long ere this, if wanting the sacred scripture we had no record of his laws, but only the memory of men receiving the same by report and relation from his predecessors?

[3] By scripture it hath in the wisdom of God seemed meet to deliver unto the world much but personally expedient to be practised of certain men ; many deep and profound points of doctrine, as being the main original ground whereupon the precepts of duty depend ; many prophecies, the clear performance whereof might confirm the world in belief of things unseen ; many histories to serve as looking-glasses to behold the mercy, the truth, the righteousness of God towards all that faithfully serve, obey, and honour him ; yea many entire meditations of piety, to be as patterns and precedents in cases of like nature ; many things needful for explication, many for application unto particular occasions, such as the providence of God from time to time hath taken to have the several books of his holy ordinance written. Be it then that together with the principal necessary laws of God there are sundry other things written, whereof we might haply be ignorant and yet be saved : what ? shall we

<sup>k</sup> I mean those historical matters concerning the ancient state of the first world, the deluge, the sons of Noah, the children of Israel's deliverance out of Egypt, the life and doings of Moses their captain, with such like : the certain truth whereof delivered in holy scripture is of the heathen, which had them only by report, so intermingled with fabulous vanities, that the most which remaineth in them to be seen is the show of dark and obscure steps, where some part of the truth hath gone.

hereupon think them needless? shall we esteem them as riotous branches wherewith we sometimes behold most pleasant vines overgrown? Surely no more than we judge our hands or our eyes superfluous, or what part soever, which if our bodies did want, we might notwithstanding any such defect retain still the complete being of men. As therefore a complete man is neither destitute of any part necessary, and hath some parts whereof though the want could not deprive him of his essence, yet to have them standeth him in singular stead in respect of the special uses for which they serve; in like sort all those writings which contain in them the law of God, all those venerable books of scripture, all those sacred tomes and volumes of holy writ, they are with such absolute perfection framed, that in them there neither wanteth any thing the lack whereof might deprive us of life, nor any thing in such wise aboundeth, that as being superfluous, unfruitful, and altogether needless, we should think it no loss or danger at all if we did want it.

XIV. Although the scripture of God therefore be stored with infinite variety of matter in all kinds, although it abound with all sorts of laws, yet the principal intent of scripture is to deliver the laws of duties supernatural. Oftentimes it hath been in very solemn manner disputed, whether all things necessary unto salvation be necessarily set down in the holy scriptures or no<sup>1</sup>. If we define that necessary unto salvation, whereby the way to salvation is in any sort made more plain, apparent, and easy to be known; then is there no part of true philosophy, no art of account, no

The sufficiency  
of scripture unto  
the end for which  
it was instituted.

<sup>1</sup> 'Utrum cognitio supernaturalis necessaria viatori sit sufficienter tradita in sacra scriptura?' This question proposed by Scotus is affirmatively concluded. [In Sent. lib. i. p. 10, D. et Resp. p. 2, K.]

kind of science rightly so called, but the scripture must contain it. If only those things be necessary, as surely none else are, without the knowledge and practice whereof it is not the will and pleasure of God to make any ordinary grant of salvation; it may be notwithstanding and oftentimes hath been demanded, how the books of holy scripture contain in them all necessary things, (when of things necessary the very chiefest is to know what books we are bound to esteem holy; which point is confessed impossible for the scripture itself to teach.) Whereunto we may answer with truth, that there is not in the world any art or science, which proposing unto itself an end, (as every one doth some end or other,) hath been therefore thought defective, if it have not delivered simply whatsoever is needful to the same end; but all kinds of knowledge have their certain bounds and limits; each of them presupposeth many necessary things learned in other sciences and known beforehand. He that should take upon him to teach men how to be eloquent in pleading causes, must needs deliver unto them whatsoever precepts are requisite unto that end; otherwise he doth not the thing which he taketh upon him. Seeing then no man can plead eloquently unless he be able first to speak; it followeth that ability of speech is in this case a thing most necessary. Notwithstanding every man would think it ridiculous, that he which undertaketh by writing to instruct an orator should therefore deliver all the precepts of grammar; because his profession is to deliver precepts necessary unto eloquent speech, yet so that they which are to receive them be taught beforehand so much of that which is thereunto necessary, as comprehendeth the skill of speaking. In like sort, albeit scripture do profess to contain in it all things that are necessary unto salvation;

2. i. - 24  
incote  
3. i. - 11  
indeed

yet the meaning cannot be simply of all things which are necessary, but all things that are necessary in some certain kind or form; as all things which are necessary, and either could not at all or could not easily be known by the light of natural discourse; all things which are necessary to be known that we may be saved, but known with presupposal of knowledge concerning certain principles whereof it receiveth us already persuaded, and then instructeth us in all the residue that are necessary. In the number of these principles one is the sacred authority of scripture. Being therefore persuaded by other means that these scriptures are the oracles of God, themselves do then teach us the rest, and lay before us all the duties which God requireth at our hands as necessary unto salvation.

[2] Further, there hath been some doubt likewise, whether *containing in scripture* do import express setting down in plain terms, or else *comprehending* in such sort that by reason we may from thence conclude all things which are necessary. Against the former of these two constructions instance hath sundry ways been given. For our belief in the Trinity, the co-eternity of the Son of God with his Father, the proceeding of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, the duty of baptizing infants: these with such other principal points, the necessity whereof is by none denied, are notwithstanding in scripture nowhere to be found by express literal mention, only deduced they are out of scripture by collection. This kind of comprehension in scripture being therefore received, still there is doubt how far we are to proceed by collection, before the full and complete measure of things necessary be made up. For let us not think that as long as the world doth endure the wit of man shall be able to sound

the bottom of that which may be concluded out of the scripture; especially if *things contained by collection* do so far extend, as to draw in whatsoever may be at any time out of scripture but probably and conjecturally surmised. But let *necessary* collection be made requisite, and we may boldly deny, that of all those things which at this day are with so great necessity urged upon this church under the name of reformed church-discipline, there is any one which their books hitherto have made manifest to be contained in the scripture. Let them, if they can, allege but one properly belonging to their cause, and not common to them and us, and shew the deduction thereof out of scripture to be necessary.

Of the  
Problem  
where to  
stop in the  
New  
Covenant

[3] It hath been already shewed how all things necessary unto salvation in such sort as before we have maintained (must needs be possible for men to know) and that many things are in such sort necessary, the knowledge whereof is by the light of nature impossible to be attained. Whereupon it followeth that either all flesh is excluded from possibility of salvation, which to think were most barbarous; or else that God hath by supernatural means revealed the way of life so far forth as doth suffice. For this cause God hath so many times and ways spoken to the sons of men. Neither hath he by speech only, but by writing also, instructed and taught his Church. The cause of writing hath been to the end that things by him revealed unto the world might have the longer continuance, and the greater certainty of assurance, by how much that which standeth on record hath in both those respects pre-eminence above that which passeth from hand to hand, and hath no pens but the tongues, no books but the ears of men to record it. The several books of scripture having had each some several occasion and particular purpose

which caused them to be written, the contents thereof are according to the exigence of that special end whereunto they are intended. Hereupon it groweth that every book of holy scripture doth take out of all kinds of truth, natural <sup>m</sup>, historical <sup>n</sup>, foreign <sup>o</sup>, supernatural <sup>p</sup>, so much as the matter handled requireth.

Now forasmuch as there hath been reason alleged sufficient to conclude, that all things necessary unto salvation must be made known, and that God himself hath therefore revealed his will, because otherwise men could not have known so much as is necessary; his surceasing to speak to the world, since the publishing of the Gospel of Jesus Christ and the delivery of the same in writing, is unto us a manifest token that the way of salvation is now sufficiently opened, and that we need no other means for our full instruction than God hath already furnished us withal.

[4] The main drift of the whole New Testament is that which St. John setteth down as the purpose of his own history; <sup>q</sup> *These things are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is Christ the Son of God, and that in believing ye might have life through his name.* The drift of the Old that which the Apostle mentioneth to Timothy, <sup>r</sup> *The holy scriptures are able to make thee wise unto salvation.* So that the general end both of Old and New is one; the difference between them consisting in this, that the Old did make wise by teaching salvation through Christ that should come, the New by teaching that Christ the Saviour is come, and that Jesus whom the Jews did crucify, and whom God did raise again from the dead, is he. When

<sup>m</sup> Eph. v. 29.

<sup>o</sup> Tit. i. 12.

<sup>q</sup> John xx. 31.

<sup>n</sup> 2 Tim. iii. 8.

<sup>p</sup> 2 Pet. ii. 4.

<sup>r</sup> 2 Tim. iii. 15.



the Apostle therefore affirmeth unto Timothy, that the Old was able to make him wise to salvation, it was not his meaning that the Old alone can do this unto us which live sithence the publication of the New. For he speaketh with presupposal of the doctrine of Christ known also unto Timothy; and therefore first it is said, *Continue thou in those things which thou hast learned and art persuaded, knowing of whom thou hast been taught them.* Again, those scriptures he granteth were able to make him wise to salvation; but he addeth, *through the faith which is in Christ.* Wherefore without the doctrine of the New Testament teaching that Christ hath wrought the redemption of the world, which redemption the Old did foreshew he should work, it is not the former alone which can on our behalf perform so much as the Apostle doth avouch, who presupposeth this when he magnifieth that so highly. And as his words concerning the books of ancient scripture do not take place but with presupposal of the Gospel of Christ embraced; so our own words also, when we extol the complete sufficiency of the whole entire body of the scripture, must in like sort be understood with this caution, that the benefit of nature's light be not thought excluded as unnecessary, because the necessity of a diviner light is magnified.

[5] There is in scripture therefore no defect, but that any man, what place or calling soever he hold in the Church of God, may have thereby the light of his natural understanding so perfected, that the one being relieved by the other, there can want no part of needful instruction unto any good work which God himself requireth, be it natural or supernatural, belonging simply unto men as men, or unto men as they are united in whatsoever kind

of society. It sufficeth therefore that nature and scripture do serve in such full sort, that they both jointly, and not severally either of them, be so complete, that unto everlasting felicity we need not the knowledge of any thing more than these two may easily furnish our minds with on all sides; and therefore they which add traditions, as a part of supernatural necessary truth, have not the truth, but are in error. For they only plead, that whatsoever God revealeth as necessary for all Christian men to do or believe, the same we ought to embrace, whether we have received it by writing or otherwise; which no man denieth: when that which they should confirm, who claim so great reverence unto traditions, is, that the same traditions are necessarily to be acknowledged divine and holy. For we do not reject them only because they are not in the scripture, but because they are neither in scripture, nor can otherwise sufficiently by any reason be proved to be of God. That which is of God, and may be evidently proved to be so, we deny not but it hath in his kind, although unwritten, yet the selfsame force and authority with the written laws of God. It is by ours acknowledged, 'that the Apostles did in every church institute and ordain some rites and customs serving for the seemliness of church-regiment, which rites and customs they have not committed unto writing<sup>a</sup>.' Those rites and customs being known to be apostolical, and having the nature of things changeable, were no less to be accounted of in the Church than other things of the like degree; that is to say, capable in like sort of alteration, although set down in the Apostles' writings. For both being known to be apostolical, it is not the manner of delivering them

Reason  
now?

<sup>a</sup> Whitakerus adversus Bellarmin. quaest. 6, cap. 6.

unto the Church, but the author from whom they proceed, which doth give them their force and credit.

XV. Laws being imposed either by each man upon himself, or by a public society upon the particulars thereof, or by all nations of men upon every several society, or by the Lord himself upon any or every of these, there is not

Of laws positive contained in scripture; the mutability of certain of them, and the general use of scripture.

amongst these four kinds any one but containeth sundry both natural and positive laws. Impossible it is but that they should fall into a number of gross errors, who only take such laws for positive as have been made or invented of men, and holding this position hold also, that all positive and none but positive laws are mutable. Laws natural do always bind; laws positive not so, but only after they have been expressly and wittingly imposed. Laws positive there are in every of those kinds before mentioned. As in the first kind the promises which we have passed unto men, and the vows we have made unto God; for these are laws which we tie ourselves unto, and till we have so tied ourselves they bind us not. Laws positive in the second kind are such as the civil constitutions peculiar unto each particular commonweal. In the third kind the law of Heraldry in war is positive: and in the last all the judicials which God gave unto the people of Israel to observe. And although no laws but positive be mutable, yet all are not mutable which be positive. Positive laws are either permanent or else changeable, according as the matter itself is concerning which they were first made. Whether God or man be the maker of them, alteration they so far forth admit, as the matter doth exact.

[2] Laws that concern supernatural duties are all positive, and either concern men supernaturally as men, or

else as parts of a supernatural society, which society we call the Church. To concern men as men supernaturally is to concern them as duties which belong of necessity to all, and yet could not have been known by any to belong unto them, unless God had opened them himself, inasmuch as they do not depend upon any natural ground at all out of which they may be deduced, but are appointed of God to supply the defect of those natural ways of salvation, by which we are not now able to attain thereunto. The Church being a supernatural society doth differ from natural societies in this, that the persons unto whom we associate ourselves, in the one are men simply considered as men, but they to whom we be joined in the other, are God, Angels, and holy men. Again the Church being both a society and a society supernatural, although as it is a society it have the selfsame original grounds which other politic societies have, namely, the natural inclination, which all men have unto sociable life, and consent to some certain bond of association, which bond is the law that appointeth what kind of order they shall be associated in: yet unto the Church as it is a society supernatural, this is peculiar, that part of the bond of their association which belong to the Church of God must be a law supernatural, which God himself hath revealed concerning that kind of worship which his people shall do unto him. The substance of the service of God therefore, so far forth as it hath in it any thing more than the law of reason doth teach, may not be invented of men, as it is amongst the Heathens<sup>x</sup>, but must be received from God himself, as always it hath been in the Church, saving only when the Church hath been forgetful of her duty.

<sup>x</sup> Isa. xxix. 13. 'Their fear towards me was taught by the precept of men.'

[3] Wherefore to end with a general rule concerning all the laws which God hath tied men unto: those laws divine that belong, whether naturally or supernaturally, either to men as men, or to men as they live in politic society, or to men as they are of that politic society which is the Church, without any further respect had unto any such variable accident as the state of men and of societies of men and of the Church itself in this world is subject unto; all laws that so belong unto men, they belong for ever, yea, although they be positive laws, unless, being positive God himself which made them alter them. The reason is, because the subject or matter of laws in general is thus far forth constant: which matter is that for the ordering whereof laws were instituted, and being instituted are not changeable without cause, neither can they have cause of change, when that which gave them their first institution remaineth for ever one and the same. On the other side, laws that were made for men or societies or churches, in regard of their being such as they do not always continue, but may perhaps be clean otherwise a while after, and so may require to be otherwise ordered than before; the laws of God himself which are of this nature, no man endued with common sense will ever deny to be of a different constitution from the former, in respect of the one's constancy and the mutability of the other. And this doth seem to have been the very cause why St. John doth so peculiarly term the doctrine that teacheth salvation by Jesus Christ, *Evangelium aeternum, an eternal Gospel*; because there can be no reason wherefore the publishing thereof should be taken away, and any other instead of it proclaimed, as long as the world doth continue: whereas the whole law of rites and ceremonies,

although delivered with so great solemnity, is notwithstanding clean abrogated, inasmuch as it had but temporary cause of God's ordaining it.

[4] But that we may at the length conclude this first general introduction unto the nature and original birth, as of all other laws, so likewise of those which the sacred scripture containeth, concerning the author whereof even infidels have confessed that he can neither err nor deceive\*: albeit about things easy and manifest unto all men by common sense there needeth no higher consultation; because as a man whose wisdom is in weighty affairs admired would take it in some disdain to have his counsel solemnly asked about a toy, so the meanness of some things is such, that to search the scripture of God for the ordering of them were to derogate from the reverend authority and dignity of the scripture, no less than they do by whom scriptures are in ordinary talk very idly applied unto vain and childish trifles; yet better it were to be superstitious than profane; to take from thence our direction even in all things great and small, than to wade through matters of principal weight and moment, without ever caring what the law of God hath either for or against our designs. Concerning the custom of the very Painims, thus much Strabo witnesseth: *Men that are civil do lead their lives after one common law appointing them what to do. For that otherwise a multitude should with harmony amongst themselves concur in the doing of one thing, (for this is civilly to live,) or that they should in any sort manage community of life, it is not possible. Now laws or statutes are of two sorts. For they are either received*

\* Κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐν τε ἔργῳ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὐθ' ὕπαρ οὐτ' ὄναρ. Plat. in fine 2 Polit. p. 382, E.

*from gods, or else from men. And our ancient predecessors did surely most honour and reverence that which was from the gods; for which cause consultation with oracles was a thing very usual and frequent in their times<sup>a</sup>. Did they make so much account of the voice of their gods, which in truth were no gods; and shall we neglect the precious benefit of conference with those oracles of the true and living God, whereof so great store is left to the Church, and whereunto there is so free, so plain, and so easy access for all men? By thy commandments<sup>b</sup>, (this was David's confession unto God,) thou hast made me wiser than mine enemies. Again, I have had more understanding than all my teachers, because thy testimonies are my meditations.* What pains would not they have bestowed in the study of these books, who travelled sea and land to gain the treasure of some few days' talk with men whose wisdom the world did make any reckoning of? That little which some of the Heathens did chance to hear, concerning such matter as the sacred scripture plentifully containeth, they did in wonderful sort affect; their speeches<sup>c</sup> as oft as they make mention thereof are strange, and such as themselves could not utter as they did other things, but still acknowledged that their wits, which did every where else conquer hardness, were with profoundness here over-matched. Wherefore seeing that God hath endued us with sense, to the end that we might perceive such things as this present life doth need; and with

<sup>a</sup> Πολιτικοὶ ὄντες ἀπὸ προστάγματος κοινού ζῶσιν. "Ἄλλως γὰρ οὐκ οἶόν τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τι κατὰ ταῦτ' ποιεῖν ἡρμοσμένους ἀλλήλοις (δπερ ἦν τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι), καὶ ἄλλως πως νέμειν βίον κοινόν. Τὸ δὲ πρόσταγμα διττόν. ἡ γὰρ παρὰ θεῶν, ἡ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων. Καὶ οἱ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐπρέσβενον μᾶλλον καὶ ἐσέμνυνον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ χρηστηριαζόμενος ἦν τότε πολὺς. Strab. Geogr. lib. xvi. [c. 38. t. vi. p. 361. Lips. 1811.]

<sup>b</sup> Psalm cxix. 98.

<sup>c</sup> Vide Orphei Carmina.

reason, lest that which sense cannot reach unto, being both now and also in regard of a future estate hereafter necessary to be known, should lie obscure ; finally, with the heavenly support of prophetic revelation, which doth open those hidden mysteries that reason could never have been able to find out<sup>d</sup>, or to have known the necessity of them unto our everlasting good : use we the precious gifts of God unto his glory and honour that gave them, seeking by all means to know what the will of our God is, what righteous before him, in his sight what holy, perfect, and good, that we may truly and faithfully do it.

XVI. Thus far therefore we have endeavoured in part to open, of what nature and force laws are, according unto their several kinds, the law which God with himself hath eternally set down to follow in his own works, the law which he hath made for his creatures to keep, the law of natural and necessary agents, the law which Angels in heaven obey ; the law whereunto by the light of reason men find themselves bound in that they are men, the law which they make by composition for multitudes and politic societies of men to be guided by, the law which belongeth unto each nation, the law that concerneth the fellowship of all, and lastly the law which God himself hath supernaturally revealed. It might peradventure have been more popular and more plausible to vulgar ears, if this first discourse had been spent in extolling the force of laws, in shewing the great necessity of them when they are good, and in aggravating their offence by whom public laws are injuriously traduced. But forasmuch as with such kind of matter the passions of men are rather stirred

A conclusion  
shewing how all  
this belongeth  
to the cause in  
question.

<sup>d</sup> Ὡν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἀπολείπεται, πρὸς ταῦθ' ἡ προφητεία φθάνει. Philo de Mos. [lib. ii. in init. p. 655. Paris, 1640.]



one way or other, than their knowledge any way set forward unto the trial of that whereof there is doubt made; I have therefore turned aside from that beaten path, and chosen though a less easy yet a more profitable way in regard of the end we propose. Lest therefore any man should marvel whereunto all these things tend, the drift and purpose of all is this, even to shew in what manner, as every good and perfect gift, so this very gift of good and perfect laws is derived from the Father of lights<sup>e</sup>; to teach men a reason why just and reasonable laws are of so great force, of so great use in the world; and to inform their minds with some method of reducing the laws whereof there is present controversy unto their first original causes, that so it may be in every particular ordinance thereby the better discerned, whether the same be reasonable, just, and righteous, or no. Is there any thing which can either be thoroughly understood or soundly judged of, till the very first causes and principles from which originally it springeth be made manifest? If all parts of knowledge have been thought by wise men to be then most orderly delivered and proceeded in, when they are drawn to their first original<sup>f</sup>; seeing that our whole question concerneth the quality of ecclesiastical laws, let it not seem a labour superfluous that in the entrance thereunto all these several kinds of laws have been considered, inasmuch as they all concur as principles, they all have their forcible operations therein, although not all in like apparent and manifest manner. By means whereof it cometh to pass that the force which they have is not observed of many.

[2] Easier a great deal it is for men by law to be taught what they ought to do, than instructed how to judge as they should do of law: the one being a thing which

<sup>e</sup> James i. 17.

<sup>f</sup> Arist. Phys. lib. i. cap. i.

belongeth generally unto all, the other such as none but the wiser and more judicious sort can perform. Yea, the wisest are always touching this point the readiest to acknowledge, that soundly to judge of a law is the weightiest thing which any man can take upon him<sup>s</sup>. But if we will give judgment of the laws under which we live, first let that law eternal be always before our eyes, as being of principal force and moment to breed in religious minds a dutiful estimation of all laws, the use and benefit whereof we see; because there can be no doubt but that laws apparently good are (as it were) things copied out of the very tables of that high everlasting law; even as the book of that law hath said concerning itself, *By me Kings reign,* and by me *Princes decree justice*<sup>b</sup>. Not as if men did behold that book and accordingly frame their laws; but because it worketh in them, because it discovereth and (as it were) readeth itself to the world by them, when the laws which they make are righteous. Furthermore, although we perceive not the goodness of laws made, nevertheless sith things in themselves may have that which we peradventure discern not, should not this breed a fear in our hearts, how we speak or judge in the worse part concerning that, the unadvised disgrace whereof may be no mean dishonour to Him, towards whom we profess all submission and awe? Surely there must be very manifest iniquity in laws, against which we shall be able to justify our contumelious invectives. The chiefest root whereof, when we use them without cause, is ignorance how laws inferior are derived from that supreme or highest law.

[3] The first that receive impression from thence are

<sup>a</sup> Arist. Ethic. x. [c. 10.] Τὸ κρίναι ὁρθῶς μέγιστον. Intelligit de legum qualitate iudicium.

<sup>b</sup> Prov. viii. 15.

natural agents. The law of whose operations might be haply thought less pertinent, when the question is about laws for human actions, but that in those very actions which most spiritually and supernaturally concern men, the rules and axioms of natural operations have their force. What can be more immediate to our salvation than our persuasion concerning the law of Christ towards his Church? What greater assurance of love towards his Church, than the knowledge of that mystical union, whereby the Church is become as near unto Christ, as any one part of his flesh is unto other? That the Church being in such sort his he must needs protect it, what proof more strong than if a manifest law so require, which law it is not possible for Christ to violate? And what other law doth the Apostle for this allege, but such as is both common unto Christ with us, and unto us with other things natural; *No man hateth his own flesh, but doth love and cherish it*<sup>i</sup>? The axioms of that law therefore, whereby natural agents are guided, have their use in the moral, yea, even in the spiritual actions of men, and consequently in all laws belonging unto men howsoever.

[4] Neither are the Angels themselves so far severed from us in their kind and manner of working, but that between the law of their heavenly operations and the actions of men in this our state of mortality such correspondence there is, as maketh it expedient to know in some sort the one for the other's more perfect direction. Would Angels acknowledge themselves fellow-servants<sup>k</sup> with the sons of men, but that both having one Lord, there must be some kind of law which is one and the same to both, whereunto their obedience being perfecter is to our weaker both a pattern and a spur? Or would

<sup>i</sup> Ephes. v. 29.

<sup>k</sup> Apoc. xix. 10.

the Apostles, speaking of that which belongeth unto saints as they are linked together in the bond of spiritual society<sup>1</sup>, so often make mention how Angels therewith are delighted, if in things publicly done by the Church we are not somewhat to respect what the Angels of heaven do? Yea, so far hath the Apostle Saint Paul proceeded, as to signify<sup>m</sup> that even about the outward orders of the Church which serve but for comeliness, some regard is to be had of Angels; who best like us when we are most like unto them in all parts of decent demeanour. So that the law of Angels we cannot judge altogether impertinent unto the affairs of the Church of God.

[5] Our largeness of speech how men do find out what things reason bindeth them of necessity to observe, and what it guideth them to choose in things which are left as arbitrary; the care we have had to declare the different nature of laws which severally concern all men, from such as belong unto men either civilly or spiritually associated, such as pertain to the fellowship which nations, or which Christian nations have amongst themselves, and in the last place such as concerning every or any of these God himself hath revealed by his holy word: all serveth but to make manifest, that as the actions of men are of sundry distinct kinds, so the laws thereof must accordingly be distinguished. There are in men operations, some natural, some rational, some supernatural, some politic, some finally ecclesiastical: which if we measure not each by his own proper law, whereas the things themselves are so different, there will be in our understanding and judgment of them confusion.

As that first error sheweth, whereon our opposites in this cause have grounded themselves. For as they rightly

<sup>1</sup> 1 Pet. i. 12; Ephes. iii. 10; 1 Tim. v. 21.

<sup>m</sup> 1 Cor. xi. 10.

maintain that God must be glorified in all things, and that the actions of men cannot tend unto his glory unless they be framed after his law ; so it is their error to think that the only law which God hath appointed unto men in that behalf is the sacred scripture. By that which we work naturally, as when we breathe, sleep, move, we set forth the glory of God as natural agents do<sup>n</sup>, albeit we have no express purpose to make that our end, nor any advised determination therein to follow a law, but do that we do (for the most part) not as much as thinking thereon. In reasonable and moral actions another law taketh place ; law by the observation whereof<sup>o</sup> we glorify God in such sort, as no creature else under man is able to do ; because other creatures have not judgment to examine the quality of that which is done by them, and therefore in that they do they neither can accuse nor approve themselves. Men do both, as the Apostle teacheth ; yea, those men which have no written law of God to shew what is good or evil, carry written in their hearts the universal law of mankind, the law of reason, whereby they judge as by a rule which God hath given unto all men for that purpose<sup>p</sup>. The law of reason doth somewhat direct men how to honour God as their creator ; but how to glorify God in such sort as is required, to the end he may be an everlasting saviour, this we are taught by divine law, which law both ascertaineth the truth and supplieth unto us the want of that other law. So that in moral actions, divine law helpeth exceedingly the law of reason to guide man's life ; but in supernatural it alone guideth.

Proceed we further ; let us place man in some public society with others, whether civil or spiritual ; and in this case there is no remedy but we must add yet a further

<sup>n</sup> Psalm cxlviii. 7, 8, 9.

<sup>o</sup> Rom. i. 21.

<sup>p</sup> Rom. ii. 15.

law. For although even here likewise the laws of nature and reason be of necessary use, yet somewhat over and besides them is necessary, namely, human and positive law, together with that law which is of commerce between grand societies, the law of nations, and of nations Christian. For which cause the law of God hath likewise said, *Let every soul be subject to the higher powers*<sup>a</sup>. The public power of all societies is above every soul contained in the same societies. And the principal use of that power is to give laws unto all that are under it; which laws in such case we must obey, unless there be reason shewed which may necessarily enforce that the law of reason or of God doth enjoin the contrary. Because except our own private and but probable resolutions be by the law of public determinations overruled, we take away all possibility of sociable life in the world. A plainer example whereof than ourselves we cannot have. How cometh it to pass that we are at this present day so rent with mutual contentions, and that the Church is so much troubled about the polity of the Church? No doubt if men had been willing to learn how many laws their actions in this life are subject unto, and what the true force of each law is, all these controversies might have died the very day they were first brought forth.

[6] It is both commonly said, and truly, that the best men otherwise are not always the best in regard of society. The reason whereof is, for that the law of men's actions is one, if they be respected only as men; and another, when they are considered as parts of a politic body. Many men there are, than whom nothing is more commendable when they are singled; and yet in society with others none less fit to answer the duties which are looked for at

their hands<sup>r</sup>. Yea, I am persuaded, that of them with whom in this cause we strive, there are whose betters amongst men would be hardly found, if they did not live amongst men, but in some wilderness by themselves. The cause of which their disposition, so unframable unto societies wherein they live, is, for that they discern not aright what place and force these several kinds of laws ought to have in all their actions. Is their question either concerning the regiment of the Church in general, or about conformity between one church and another, or of ceremonies, offices, powers, jurisdictions in our own church? Of all these things they judge by that rule which they frame to themselves with some shew of probability, and what seemeth in that sort convenient, the same they think themselves bound to practise; the same by all means they labour mightily to uphold; whatsoever any law of man to the contrary hath determined they weigh it not. Thus by following the law of private reason, where the law of public should take place, they breed disturbance.

[7] For the better inuring therefore of men's minds with the true distinction of laws, and of their several force according to the different kind and quality of our actions, it shall not peradventure be amiss to shew in some one example how they all take place. To seek no further, let but that be considered, than which there is not any thing more familiar unto us, our food.

What things are food and what are not we judge naturally by sense<sup>s</sup>; neither need we any other law to be our director in that behalf than the selfsame which is common unto us with beasts.

But when we come to consider of food, as of a benefit

<sup>r</sup> Πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οικείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσι. Arist. Ethic. lib. v. cap. 3.

<sup>s</sup> Job xxxiv. 3.

which God of his bounteous goodness hath provided for all things living<sup>t</sup>; the law of reason doth here require the duty of thankfulness at our hands, towards him at whose hands we have it. And lest appetite in the use of food should lead us beyond that which is meet, we owe in this case obedience to that law of reason, which teacheth mediocrity in meats and drinks. The same things divine law teacheth also, as at large we have shewed it doth all parts of moral duty, whereunto we all of necessity stand bound, in regard of the life to come.

But of certain kinds of food the Jews sometime had, and we ourselves likewise have, a mystical, religious, and supernatural use, they of their Paschal lamb and oblations, we of our bread and wine in the Eucharist; which use none but divine law could institute.

Now as we live in civil society, the state of the commonwealth wherein we live both may and doth require certain laws concerning food<sup>u</sup>; which laws, saving only that we are members of the commonwealth where they are of force, we should not need to respect as rules of action, whereas now in their place and kind they must be respected and obeyed.

Yea, the selfsame matter is also a subject wherein sometime ecclesiastical laws have place; so that unless we will be authors of confusion in the Church, our private discretion, which otherwise might guide us a contrary way, must here submit itself to be that way guided, which the public judgment of the Church hath thought better. In which case that of Zonaras concerning fasts may be remembered. *Fastings are good, but let good things be done in good and convenient manner. He that transgresseth in his fasting the orders of the holy fathers,* the positive laws

<sup>t</sup> Psalm cxlv. 15, 16.

<sup>u</sup> [See 5 Eliz. c. 5. § 14, 15; 27 Eliz. c. 11; 35 Eliz. c. 7. § 22.]



of the Church of Christ, must be plainly told, *that good things do lose the grace of their goodness, when in good sort they are not performed*<sup>x</sup>.

And as here men's private fancies must give place to the higher judgment of that church which is in authority a mother over them; so the very actions of whole churches have, in regard of commerce and fellowship with other churches, been subject to laws concerning food, the contrary unto which laws had else been thought more convenient for them to observe; as by that order of abstinence from strangled and bloody may appear; an order grounded upon that fellowship which the churches of the Gentiles had with the Jews.

Thus we see how even one and the selfsame thing is under divers considerations conveyed through many laws; and that to measure by any one kind of law all the actions of men were to confound the admirable order, wherein God hath disposed all laws, each as in nature, so in degree, distinct from other.

[8] Wherefore that here we may briefly end: of Law there can be no less acknowledged, than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power; both Angels and men and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy.

<sup>x</sup> ὅτι οὐ καλὸν τὸ καλὸν, ὅταν μὴ καλῶς γίνηται. Zonar. in Can. Apost. 66. [Beverig. Synod. t. i. p. 43.]

<sup>y</sup> Acts xv. 20.

## NOTES.

- I. Introduction.—General difficulties of defending things established.—Reasons for going to the bottom of the subject and treating it methodically.—Subject of the Treatise; the grounds and rationale of existing Laws and Government of the Church of England.—Subject of the First Book: the Nature of *Law* in general, under the Heads of, (1) the Law of God; (2) the Law of Nature; (3) the Law of Scripture.

[2] With this compare Sermon iii. one of the Temple series, 1586, connected with the controversy with Travers, and in which the germs of much of this First Book may be traced (p. 597, ed. 1845):—

‘The nature of man, being much more delighted to be led than drawn, doth many times stubbornly resist authority, when to persuasion it easily yieldeth. Whereupon the wisest law-makers have endeavoured always, that those laws might seem most reasonable, which they would have most inviolably kept. A law simply commanding or forbidding, is but dead in comparison of that which expresseth the reason wherefore it doth the one and the other. And, surely, even in the laws of God, although that he hath given commandment be in itself a reason sufficient to exact all obedience at the hands of men, yet a forcible inducement it is to obey with greater alacrity and cheerfulness of mind, when we see plainly that nothing is imposed more than we must needs yield unto, except we will be unreasonable. In a word, whatsoever we be taught, be it precept for direction of our manners, or article for instruction of our faith, or document any way for information of our minds, it then taketh root and abideth, when we conceive not only what God doth speak, but why.’

And again, p. 601:—

‘The want of exact distinguishing between these two ways [the way of *nature*, and the way of *grace*], and observing what they have common, what peculiar, hath been the cause of the greatest part of that confusion whereof Christianity at this day laboureth. The lack of diligence in

searching, laying down, and inuring men's minds with those hidden grounds of reason, whereupon the least particulars in each of these are most firmly and strongly builded, is the only reason of all those scruples and uncertainties, wherewith we are in such sort entangled, that a number despair of ever discerning what is right or wrong in any thing.'

[3] *Hating to be reformed*;—This phrase, from Ps. 50. 17, is more than once quoted by Hooker.

*Sceptre of his discipline*;—'Christ's Holy Discipline,' was the recognized term for the proposed Puritan reforms.

*That law which giveth life unto the rest*;—I have quoted on the page following the title, what I suppose to be the earliest expression of this leading idea of Hooker, from Heraclitus (Ritter and Preller, *Histor. Phil.* § 41); which perhaps (for there is doubt about the readings) may be translated: 'To be wise is of public concern to all. It behoves men speaking with reason to stand stoutly for the public concern of all, as a city [stands] for the law, yea, more stoutly than a city. For all human laws are fed by one the divine law; for it bears sway so far forth as it chooses, and suffices for all, and yet goes beyond.' (Cp. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, p. 208; *Lay Sermons*, App. D. p. 289.) The same line of thought is followed in Cicero de Legibus (vide i. 6; ii. 4), with which Mr. Hallam compares Hooker's First Book (*Constit. Hist.* c. iv).

II. Of Law, in its idea and widest sense; a rule by which work is done for an end.—Of God's Law to himself; the Law which he has set to himself in his *external* working.—Why, and in what sense, we conceive God as setting a Law to himself.—Ends of God's working.—God's will not without reason.—This Eternal Law above all created intelligence; perfect; unchangeable; consistent with God's freedom.

[1] *Some operation not violent or casual*;—Their own proper and natural way of working, opposed to what they do, either by accident and at random, or by force and against their nature.

*Some fore-conceived end*;—All working implies an end. If we ascribe to God working, we cannot help ascribing to him ends; and the idea of Law, as that which adapts working to ends, follows on the idea of working. 'Omne agens agit propter finem; alioquin ex actione agentis non magis sequeretur hoc quam illud, nisi in casu.' S. Thom. Aq. Summ. Th. I. qu. 44, art. 4.

*That which doth assign, &c.*;—'Law,' the rule fixing (1) the kind, (2) the degree, (3) the special shape and form of any working. (Cp. Aquinas: 'Lex regula quaedam et mensura actuum, secundum quam

aliquis inducitur ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur.') Hooker observes later on (iii. 1) that he has 'enlarged' the usual sense of law, which includes in it 'being imposed with sanctions by a superior authority.' Here it is, in a wider sense, a rule imposed by reason or by the necessary conditions of the thing to be done.

[2] *Dangerous it were*;—This famous paragraph embodies the substance of a number of sayings current in Christian as in heathen learning: e. g. the story of Simonides in Cic. Nat. D. 1. 22; Aug. De Ordine 2. 16, 'Deus scitur melius nesciendo;' and 18, 'Cujus nulla scientia est in anima, nisi scire quomodo eum nesciat;' and Arnob. quoted by Keble, 'Qui ut intelligaris, tacendum est.' Cp. like passages in Minuc. Felix, c. 19; Tert. Apol. 1. 17, 'Sibi soli notus;' Aug. Confess. 1. 4, De Trin. 7. 6, 'Varius cogitatur Deus quam dicitur, et varius est quam cogitatur;' cont. Ep. Manich. 2. 22, 'Quem facilius eloqui audet anima quam videre, et quem tanto minus eloquitur, quanto sincerius videre potuerit;' Serm. 117. 7, 'Et quid facimus nos? Silebimus? Utinamliceret. Forsitan enim silendo aliquid dignum de re ineffabili cogitaretur;' cont. Adim. Manich. 11: 'Cui honorificum potius silentium, quam ulla vox humana competeret.' Cp. Jerome's tr. of Ps. 64. 1, 'Tibi silentium laus.'

*Our God is one, or rather very oneness or mere unity*;—The theological expression borrowed, first, perhaps, by Philo (vide Ritter and Preller, No. 504, 507) from the Greek philosophy, to denote the *simplicity* of God's nature. Summ. Th. 1. qu. 3, art. 7; qu. 14.

*They are in such sort of him being one, &c.*;—i. e. 'He being one, the works are yet of Him in such sort that,' &c.

[3] *The wise and learned*;—Only partially true, of certain schools and teachers. (Cp. Cic. de Leg. 1. 6, 7.) Hooker's statement is, after the manner of the time, a rhetorical appeal to the earliest wisdom of the world. Homer is quoted because he was to Greek philosophy, as Virgil to the middle ages, a kind of inspired authority or oracle on truths of a divine order; 'made a kind of Scripture by the later schools of the Grecians.' (Bacon, Adv. ii. 345; and of Virgil, ib. i. 310.) The criticism of the age was not equal to any exact account of the subject, as is seen by Hooker's reference to Orpheus and Hermes Trismegistus, late fictions of the Alexandrians, side by side with Anaxagoras, Plato, and the Stoics.

*Mercurius Trismegistus*;—Hermes, the 'thrice great,' a mythological name, invented probably by the new Platonists of Alexandria out of the Egyptian legends, and suggested by the early identification of the Greek Hermes with the Egyptian Theuth or Thoth (Plato, Phaedr. 274; Phil. 18; Cic. Nat. D. 3. 22), to represent a divine teacher of mankind in all wisdom: 'Qui veritatem paene universam nescio quo modo investigavit.' (Lact. iv. 9.) The name was given to a vast series of writings on theology,

philosophy and nature, which appears to have grown up in Egypt from the second century onwards, and which, embodying Jewish and Christian, as well as Eastern, Greek, and Egyptian ideas, were probably intended as a body of literature antagonistic to Christianity, giving to philosophy the attractions of a religious and inspired character. 'Hermes Termaximus' is named by Ammian. Marcell. 21. 14 with Apollonius of Tyana and Plotinus. These writings are appealed to without suspicion by the Fathers, as if they were genuine, the works of an Egyptian prophet-king, somewhat later than Moses. (Aug. de Civ. D. 8. 23-26; 18. 39; Lact. 1. 6.) Several of them were frequently republished in the sixteenth century, and our writers of the time, as Bacon and Raleigh, freely use them. Bacon, in the beginning of the Advancement speaks of James I as 'invested of that triplicity which in great veneration was ascribed to the ancient Hermes: the power and fortune of a King, the knowledge and illumination of a Priest, and the learning and universality of a Philosopher.' Hooker quotes, here and elsewhere, from the *Poemander* or 'Shepherd,' first published in Latin by Marsil. Ficinus, 1471, and often reprinted, and in Greek by Turnebus, 1554. Vide Dict. of Biog. and Myth. *Hermes*; and an article in Saturday Rev. March 30, 1862.

*Anaxagoras*;—of Clazomenae (500-428 B. C.), taught at Athens during the time of the Persian wars, and was the friend of Pericles and Euripides: charges of irreligion, and perhaps of Persian sympathies, drove him from Athens. Beyond the theories of the Ionian school (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes), which contented itself, for an explanation of the world, with hypotheses of elements and transformations of matter, he advanced the additional hypothesis of an arranging and constructive mind, *νóος*, independent of matter and commanding it. The criticism on this was (Plat. Phaed. 98 B; Arist. Metaph. 1. 4) that it was only applied where he could not bring in other causes. Vide Dict. of Biogr. and Mythol.; and Ritter and Preller, *Historia Philos. Anaxagoras*.

*Finally the Stoics*;—The Stoics were the parents of what is called Natural Theology and the argument from design. They expressed in various ways their characteristic doctrine of a First Intelligent Cause, working on and in matter, in a manner only to be represented by similitudes. One of these was of an intellectual animating fire, distinguished from the material fire from which the image was borrowed. The phrase quoted by Hooker is often cited, and is referred by Cicero (who translates it, Nat. D. 2. 22) to Zeno, † 263 B. C. The images of the *fire* and the *way* were probably borrowed from Heraclitus, 500 B. C. Vide Ritter and Preller, *Historia Philos. Gr. et Rom.* No. 404 and 35.

*My Father . . . so I*;—Not the words of the Geneva version, which,

according to Mr. Keble (vol. 2, p. 151 note), Hooker generally followed. But several versions were in use, and Hooker seems, as often as not, to have translated texts for himself.

[5] *They err therefore*;—Cp. Pet. Lomb. 1. dist. 45. 4: 'Si enim habet causam voluntas Dei, est aliquod quod antecedit voluntati Dei, quod nefas est credere . . . voluntatis Dei causa nulla est, et ideo non quaerenda est.' But Hooker was probably thinking of later theorists. Cp. Serm. iii. p. 624, where, meeting the objection 'How should there be any justice in God's doing that to which no superior authority or law can bind him?' he says, 'To this we could make no answer at all, if we did hold as they do who peremptorily avouch that there is no manner why to be rendered of any thing that God doth, but only this, It is his absolute will to do it;' and after quoting various texts, he adds, 'Let these alleged sentences be seen into; and by sifting them it will soon appear that they rather *exclude the rendering some one cause* which we are specially to beware of, than import an *impossibility of any reason at all* to be rendered of the works of God.' Cp. Th. Aquin. 1. 2. qu. 93, art. 4: 'Voluntas Dei dicitur *rationabilis*; alioquin ratione sui ipsius magis est dicenda *ratio*.' Leibnitz, Théodicée, p. ii. § 183 sqq.

*Tamen quoniam &c.*;—From Boethius (A. C. 470–524). See Gibbon, c. 39; Dict. Classical Biogr. He was one of the favourite authors of the middle ages: Dante places him in Paradise with the religious philosophers. c. 10.

[6] *This law therefore*;—Cp. definition of Aug. De Lib. Arb. 1. 6: 'Lex aeterna, summa ratio; . . . legis aeternae notio, quae impressa nobis est, . . . ea est qua justum est ut *omnia sint ordinatissima*.' Cont. Faust, 22. 26: 'Lex aeterna est ratio divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari jubens, perturbari vetans.' This is adopted and expanded by Aquinas into the definition: 'Lex aeterna, summa ratio in Deo existens; ratio divinae sapientiae, secundum quod est directiva omnium motuum et actionum.' Summ. Th. 1. 2, qu. 93, art. 1.

III. First division of the Book: of the Law of Nature, in its first sense: the Law of *the whole Creation*.—Distinction between the Law Eternal which God *sets to himself* (the '*First Law Eternal*') and the Law which *he imposes* on all his works (the '*Second Law Eternal*').—Branches of this 'Second Eternal Law': (1) Law of Natural Agents, (2) Law of Angels, (3) Law of Men; *α*. Of Reason, *β*. Of Divine Revelation, *γ*. Human Law.—Law of Nature in its *second* restricted sense; Law of the *Physical Universe* in two senses: (1) Over all created things, (2) Over inanimate and unintelligent nature (here in the second sense).—Why Nature conceived of as under a law.—How far the Law of Nature invariably kept: and on what it depends.—Working of Nature inconceivable without an

agent of which it is the instrument.—Various names and aspects of the Law of Nature.—Law of Nature (1) As regards things in themselves, (2) As regards their relations to a system.

[1] *I am not ignorant*;—Hooker makes two distinctions: (1) In his use of the word *Law*, which, properly meaning a rule *imposed by superior authority*, he ‘enlarges’ to mean ‘*any kind of rule or canon by which actions are framed*’—and in this latter sense, he applies it, as explained in the last chapter, to God; (2) In speaking of God’s eternal Law, he distinguishes between the Law which is identical with his own perfection and being, and is the rule of his working, and the Law which he appoints for his works to keep. The Law which he sets to himself Hooker speaks of as the *First Law Eternal*; that which he imposes on all his works, the *Second Law Eternal*.

Hooker’s distinctions, both between the more restricted and the larger sense of the term Law, and the Law Eternal, as regards God himself, and things outside him, may be traced in the writers whose doctrine he represents, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas: but they are not so definitely stated. Cp. Summ. Th. 1. 2, qu. 91, art. 1, where he speaks of it as ‘imposed’ on creation, and qu. 93, art. 4, where he distinguishes between that ‘*summa ratio*’ which is identical with God’s essence and will, and the will of God as relates to his works.

*According to the several condition*;—So the early editions; *conditions*, later edd. ‘Several’ is ‘distinct in each case,’ and is used with a singular noun; vide xiv. 3, p. 88, ‘The several Books of Scripture having had each some several occasion and particular purpose;’ xvi. 7, p. 104, ‘The true distinction of laws and their several force.’ ‘Several condition’ is ‘distinct constitution.’

[2] *The travail of wading herein*;—From Eccles. 3. 9, 10. Mr. Keble compares Bacon, *Advancement of Learning* (2. p. 356, ed. Spedding. Cp. also p. 265).

*Now if nature should intermit her course*;—Hooker, as Mr. Keble notes, paraphrases a passage of Arnobius, one of the Latin Christian apologists (Cont. Gentes. 1. 2).

[3] *Phidias*;—The refractoriness of the materials of nature was a current notion (see Dante Parad. 1. 134, and a passage from the *De Monarch.*, qu. by Cary: so Giordano Bruno (about this time) quoted in Hallam, Lit., Pt. ii. c. 3. 12): instanced as a philosophical mistake by Bacon, Nov. Org. i. 66.

*Theophrastus*;—of Eresus in Lesbos, the disciple, heir, and successor of Aristotle (322 B.C.), died about 287 B.C.; carried on his master’s methods, especially in logic and natural knowledge. His two important works on botany have come down to us, with his ‘*Characters*’ and some other fragments. Hooker here quotes from a fragmentary book, bearing

the same title as one of Aristotle's (*περὶ τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*). See Dict. Class. Biogr., and Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil. No. 353-355. He is quoted again, viii. 5. Comp. Dante, Parad. 8, end.

[4] *Although we are not of opinion therefore, &c.*;—Two points are adverted to: (1) A theory of Nature endowed with life and acting of itself; (2) The Platonic and Realist theory of *idéai*, 'exemplary draughts or patterns,' i.e. models to be copied, existing eternally apart from the actual world, reflected in it and its cause or ground. On the tendency in the sixteenth-century philosophers to speak of Nature in the language of life and sense, see Ellis, General Pref. to Bacon, vol. 1. 53; and, for a theory based on it, Hallam's curious account of Campanella (1568-1639), Lit. Pt. 3. ch. 3. 8-14. On Plato's doctrine as understood at this time, cp. Bacon, Adv. 2. 355, or De Augm. 3. p. 594. Hooker seems to have had in mind a passage from a writer he refers to below, Alcinous, de Dogm. Plat. c. 14; it is quoted in Mr. Jowett's art. on Alcinous in the Dict. of Class. Biogr. He employs below Plato's doctrine as an image to express the Law of Nature as conceived of in the mind of God.

*The Oracle of Hippocrates*;—The great Greek physician of Cos (B.C. 460-357), who was to ancient medicine what Homer was to poetry, and Pythagoras to philosophy. The name was borne by a series of physicians; and it passed, as representing the highest combination of philosophy with medical skill, from the Greek and Latin stories, into the fables of the Arabians, and of the middle ages, changed into *Bokrát*, and *Ypocras*. See Dr. Greenhill's art. in Smith's Dict. of Ancient Biogr. and Mythol.; Biogr. Univ. *Hippocrate*. Hooker quotes him more than once, obviously as being one of the great names held in reputation on physical subjects. So he quotes Galen, the 'Grand Physician,' for apt expressions of general truth, Pref. iii. and iv. The 'oracle' is contrasted with the theory of 'exemplary draughts,' by confining itself to the facts of universal and constant law. The quotation is from the book *περὶ διαίτης*, I. p. 342, ed. Foes. Genev. 1657, slightly altered.

• *Those forms which give them their being*;—'Form' is a technical word derived through the Schoolmen from the Greek *εἶδος* or *idéai*, and from Aristotle's fourfold division (Metaph. 1. 3; Bacon, Adv. 2. 354) of the *αἰτίαι*, 'causes' or 'accounts' of things. Besides (1) the *matter*, (2) the *efficient*, acting on the matter, (3) the *end* for which the thing exists, there was the *form*, that which the thing as a whole is, in its specific nature: 'forma, causa per quam unaquaeque res est id quod est, et a caeteris distinguitur rebus' (Ramus): so, Bk. V. lxxxviii, 'Things are distinguished one from another by those true essential forms which being really and actually in them do not only give them the very last and highest degree of their natural perfection, but are also the knot, foundation and root, whereupon all other inferior perfections depend.' See Mr. Ellis's note on Bacon De Augm. 3. 551, 'The efficient cause



is that which acts; the material cause, that which is acted on; . . . the formal cause is that which in the case of any object, determines it to be that which it is, and thus is the cause of its various properties: it is thus the "ratio essentiae, λόγος τῆς οὐσίας." *Formae which give them their being* is a translation of the Scholastic expression (S. Thom. Aq. Summ. Theol. 1. qu. 76, art. 4), '*Forma substantialis dat esse substantiale.*' So the note refers to the Scholastic conception (Summ. Theol. 1. qu. 76, art. 4), '*anima est forma substantialis hominis.*' The word is frequent in Hooker in its philosophical sense, and in most of the more learned writers of the time, e.g. Bacon ('*Forma, ipsissima res,*' Nov. Org. 2. 13; '*Formae, verae rerum differentiae,*' 1. 75); but in a sense of his own. See Mr. Ellis, General Pref. to Bacon, 1. § 8, 11. Cp. Dante, Parad. 1. 103; 2. 112. The word is one instance among many of the technical language of the Schools passing into common use. Coleridge said, 'the Schoolmen made the languages of Europe what they now are.' Table Talk, i. 104.

*Purity of God's own knowledge*;—God's knowledge viewed in itself. *Purus* was a technical word of philosophy: so Bacon calls *formae*, '*leges actus puri,*' Nov. Org. 1. 75; cp. 2. 2.

*Referred unto the things themselves . . . natural destiny*;—The Latin *fatum*, the result, regarded without reference to its cause, whatever it might be; perhaps beyond human knowledge. From S. Th. Aq. Summ. Th. 1. qu. 116, 1 and 2, quoting from Boethius, '*Fatum est, inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio, per quam Providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus,*' and commenting on it, '*Potest ordinatio effectuum dupliciter considerari; uno modo secundum quod est in ipso Deo; et sic ordinatio effectuum vocatur Providentia. Secundum vero quod praedicta ordinatio consideratur in mediis causis a Deo ordinatis ad aliquos effectus producendos, sic habet rationem fati. . . Sic ergo manifestum est quod fatum est in ipsis causis creatis, in quantum sunt ordinatae a Deo ad aliquos effectus producendos.*'

*Thomas Aquinas*;—Born at Aquino of a noble family connected with the Hohenstaufens in 1226, entered the Dominican order in 1243, studied theology under the Dominican doctor Albertus Magnus, at Cologne and Paris. He taught at Paris, and became the great theological master of the Dominicans, as Bonaventura, and still more John Duns Scotus, were of the rival order of Franciscans. Hooker, who calls the latter the 'wittiest,' calls Aquinas 'the greatest among the School-divines' (Bk. III. ix. 2.). He died 1274, and was canonized 1323. Dante, who died in 1321, introduces him in the Paradiso, c. 10; see also Purg. c. 20.

*Dionysius*;—Referring to the legend about Dionysius the Areopagite, at the darkness of the Passion. His exclamation is given in various forms: 'The Deity suffers, or sympathizes with the sufferer;' 'The unknown God is suffering in the flesh.' (See Keble's note.)

*Workman*;—Translation of Greek *δημιουργός*, Platonic and Stoic term. Cp. with this the Stoic notions about popular mythology, Diog. Laert. 7. 147 in Ritter and Preller, No. 418; Cic. de Nat. D. 2. 23–28; Dante, Parad. 4. 64.

[5] *So likewise another law there is*;—Cp. Bacon, Adv. 2. 420: 'There is formed in everything a double nature of good; the one, as everything is a total or substantive in itself; the other, as it is a part or member of a greater body: whereof the latter is in degree the greater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of the general form. Therefore we see the iron in particular sympathy moveth to the loadstone; but yet if it exceed a certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection to the loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth to the earth, which is the region and country of massy bodies: so we may go forward, and see that water and massy bodies move to the centre of the earth; but rather than suffer a divulsion in the continuance of nature, they will move upwards from the centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to the earth in regard to their duty to the world.' Cp. to the same effect, Bacon's Discourse touching the union of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland (1603), Spedding's Bacon, 3. 90, 91. Cp. also the end of c. 1 of Dante's Paradiso, with this and the preceding sections. We have so many translations of Dante, beginning with Cary's fine work, that the English student may be referred without apology to what in many respects furnishes a commentary on Hooker.

*That which is heavy mounting sometime upwards of its own accord*;—I have followed modern usage in writing *its own*: but of the early editions which I have seen, all read *it own*, the ancient possessive. (See Morris, Spec. Early Engl. p. xxxi). On *it*, and *its*, which was coming into use in Shakespeare's time, see notes in Cambridge ed. Tempest, note 8; Winter's Tale, note 7. I have not noticed in Hooker another example of either *it* (poss.) or *its*; he uses *his* or *her* or *thereof*, where we should use *its*.

IV. Of the Law of Angels; difference from that of Natural agents; a Law of perfect moral Natures.—Law of their Nature in *itself* (Love, Adoration, Imitation); and in *their relations* to other beings.—Breach of that Law by the fallen angels, and its cause.

[1] *The state of heavenly and divine creatures*;—So Bacon, Adv. 2. 350, De Augm. 3. 2: 'The nature of angels . . . an appendix of theology, both divine and natural.'

*For ever and ever doth dwell*;—The construction of several nominatives with a singular verb, sometimes merely careless, and sometimes owing to attraction, also arises from the conception in the mind being one, expressed in its different sides by a number of nominatives. The old

plural termination *-th* can hardly have slipped in, in literary use. Cp. iii. 4, 'Such her dexterity and skill appeareth'; p. 16, 'The generation and process of things receiveth'; ix. 2, 'Sith every man's heart and conscience doth . . . either like or disallow itself'; x. 4, 'When force and injury was offered.'

*Desire to resemble him, &c.*;—Mr. Keble compares The Faery Queene II. viii. 2; and reminds us that the first three Books had been published in 1590, while Hooker was writing.

*As an efficient only*;—Cp. ii. 1: God moves natural agents as a force without them; he moves intellectual agents 'otherwise,' i.e. as an *end* attracting and moving their own reason and their will.

*All manner good*;—On this idiom see Glossary, s. v. *Manner*.

*Orpheus*;—The verses quoted by Hooker under the name of Orpheus belong to that large class of writings composed at Alexandria in the first centuries after Christ, by writers acquainted with Platonism and Christianity, under the name of the most ancient Greek poets. These lines are from a fragment cited by Clement of Alexandria (d. 220), which is like a Greek imitation of Psalms such as the 104th. (Vide Dict. of Class. Biogr. *Orpheus*.)

*Mirror of human wisdom*;—See vi. 4. In Bk. VIII. ii. 12, Aristotle is called 'the most judicious philosopher, whose eye scarce anything did escape, which was to be found in the bosom of nature.' Cp. Dante's 'Il maestro di color che sanno' (Inf. 4). In Thomas Aquinas he is cited as 'Philosophus'; and so Hooker refers to 'the Philosopher' (Serm. ii. 32); 'the Grand Philosopher' (Ans. to Travers, 14); 'the Arch-philosopher' (below, x. 4). Of course Aristotle says nothing about angels: the reference is to a passage of his *Metaphysics*, made use of and argued from by Thomas Aquinas. (See Keble's note.)

[2] *An army, one in order and degree above another*;—The Angelic Hierarchy according to that 'learned and sublime conjecturer Dionysius' (Bull, Serm. 7. 182), was a received opinion in the middle ages, and later. (Dante, Parad. c. 28; Bacon, Adv. 1. 296; Milton, Par. Lost, 5. 583.) Cp. Walton's Life; 'Dr. Saravia visited Hooker on his death-bed, and found him deep in contemplation, and not inclinable to discourse; which gave the doctor occasion to inquire his present thoughts; to which he replied, "That he was meditating the number and nature of angels, and their blessed obedience and order, without which peace could not be in heaven; and oh that it might be so on earth."'

[3] *Of the fallen angels*;—Their temptation, as it could not be an object *beneath* themselves, nor higher than themselves, for that would be God, must have been *themselves*,—the 'reflex' of their mind and affection on themselves, interrupting their proper law of adoration. Their will could not be turned from God without an object; and except as separate from God, there was nothing to tempt them. But above them was only

God; beneath them things inferior to them, which they could only think of as dependent on God. Therefore the only object conceivable of the kind was *themselves*—‘contemplated by a reflex of their understanding on themselves.’

*Some among the minerals, &c.*;—i.e. mines. So J. Hales, an admirer of Hooker, p. 34, ‘*Spirits that converse [haunt] in minerals.*’ All this is according to the received doctrine of the Schools, which had taken hold on the popular mind. It had assumed prominence in the conflict between Christianity and New Platonism (see S. Aug. De Civ. D. bks. 8–10), and been turned to account in the physical writings of Paracelsus and Agrippa, so popular in this century. See Bacon, De Augm. 3. 2; and Mr. Ellis’s note; Hallam Lit. (3rd. ed. 1847) 1. 390, of Paracelsus (1493–1541), and Agrippa (1486–1535; and 2. 372, of Campanella (1568–1639). Cp. Milton, Hymn on the Nativity, 165–236.

*Dissolved the works of the devil*;—From 1 John 3. 8, where the version of 1611 translates λύση ‘destroy.’

V. Of the Law of Human Nature; in its widest sense, a Law of *continual progress to that Perfection* which is in God alone.

[1] All things short of God, who is unchangeably perfect, i.e. ‘cannot be bettered,’ (1) *may be* something which they are not yet, (2) *tend to be* something else, (3) which is *more perfect* than what they are.

*In possibility . . . in act*;—Technical terms of philosophy derived through the Schoolmen from Aristotle (ἐν δυνάμει, ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ). ‘In omni composito oportet esse potentiam et actum; quod in Deo non est.’ (Th. Aq. Summ. Th. 1. qu. 3, art. 7.) ‘In tantum est perfectum unumquodque in quantum est in actu.’ (Qu. 4, art. 1; qu. 5, art. 1.) Bacon (Nov. Org. 1. 63) speaks of the ‘frigida distinctio actus et potentiae.’

*Appetite or desire*;—Th. Aq. 1. qu. 5, art. 1: ‘Ratio boni in hoc constituit quod aliquid sit appetibile’ (from Arist. Eth. 1. 1); art. 4, ‘bonum proprie respicit appetitum.’ On this language about ‘appetite or desire’ see Mr. Ellis, General Preface to Bacon, 1. 53; and Hallam, Lit. 2. 373, about Campanella.

*Goodness*;—the general name for the perfection which things aim at.

*And because, &c.*;—Cp. xi. 1; and Serm. iii. 598, ‘All things are good, in regard to the use and benefit which each thing yieldeth unto other’; p. 617, ‘God created nothing simply for itself; but each thing in all things, and of every thing each part in other hath such interest, that in the whole world nothing is found whereunto any created thing can say “I need thee not.”’ Cp. the Stoical language, Ritter and Preller, No. 409. But as all perfection is in and from God, aiming at being perfect is aiming at the ‘participation of God.’—All things do so in a measure: eminently man.—All things aim, (1) in their *being*, at continuance;

(2) in their *working* at invariableness, and exactness.—This first degree of goodness; imitation of God's eternity, of his immutability and perfection of work. Cp. Bk. V. lxix. 1.

*Every effect*;—A maxim of the Schools: 'Perfectio et forma effectus est quaedam similitudo agentis.' (Summ. Th. I. qu. 6, art. 1, see qu. 4, art. 3.) Cp. Bk. V. lxxvii. 5; Serm. iii. 624: 'God himself being the supreme cause which giveth being unto all things that are, and every effect so resembling the cause whereof it cometh, that such as the one is, the other cannot choose but be, it followeth,' &c.

[2] *Hence have risen*;—So the early ed.; 'arisen,' Keble.

*Axioms in philosophy*;—Hooker uses the word *axiom* of a general principle which does not belong to any particular science, but is common to all. (See Ellis, Gen. Pref. to Bacon, I. 46-48, and 3. 520.) Cp. Bk. III. x. 5: 'God never ordained anything that could be bettered.'

[3] Man aims at good, not only unconsciously, as other things do, but consciously.—Man's perfection, (1) knowledge of truth, (2) exercise of virtue.

*With Plato what one thing*;—Cp. Phaed. cc. 10, 11, 27, 28; Theaet. p. 176; Tim. p. 90.

VI. Of the Law of Human Nature, in respect of the first kind of perfection, *knowledge*:—(1) A law, in contrast with that of *angels*, of gradual progress from nothing to unlimited growth; (2) In contrast with that of *brutes*, of a progress from mere sense, in which possibly brutes are above us, to perception of things beyond sense.

*Agreeth to*;—'belongs to'; translation of the Scholastic '*convénit*.'

*The soul of man*;—This illustration passed from Arist. (De Anim. 3. 4. 14) through the Latin translation quoted by the Schoolmen, into the common phrase '*tabula rasa*': '*intellectus humanus in principio est sicut tabula rasa (γραμματοεῖον), in qua nihil est scriptum, ut Philosophus dicit.*' (Aquin. Summ. Th. I. qu. 79. art. 2.)

[2] *Sensible capacity*;—faculties of sense.

*Fancy*;—usually written *phancie*; in the technical sense of the Greek term *φαντασία*, the power of inward mental representation, as distinguished from outward perception by sense. Plat. Theaet. 152 C; Ethic. Nic. 3. 7, and 7. 7. Cp. Bacon, Adv. p. 382, De Augm. 5. 1. 'Imagination' = 'Phantasia.' See Bk. V. lxxv. 7.

[3] *Right helps of true art and learning*;—one of the many indications of the eager hopefulness with which at this time men's thoughts were turned to the reform or invention of *methods*, as the key to the new world of knowledge within reach. Bacon was at work at this time (see his Discourse in Praise of Knowledge, 1590-92, Letters and Life,

ed. Spedding, vol. 1. 125). See Hallam, Lit. of Europe, Pt. 2. ch. 3. A passage in Hales' Golden Remains (p. 225, 1673) about *méthod* (that of Aconcio, Hallam, 2. 16) expresses the same feeling. This passage is quoted and commented on by Leibnitz, *Nouv. Essais*, l. iv. 17, § 7, who speaks of the '*judicieux Hooker dans son livre intitulé la Police Ecclesiastique.*'

*Which speech if any condemn;*—Compare with Hooker's argument from what Aristotle achieved, Bacon's, from the great inventions due to chance. *Nov. Org.* 1. 109, 129; *Adv.* 2, p. 385.

*In all parts of natural knowledge;*—Not merely *physical*, but all such as is possible by the light of nature. *Comp. Hales' Golden Remains*, p. 6. 'Our best natural master,' i.e. Aristotle.

[4] *In the poverty of that other new devised aid;*—('Ramistry,' note.) The method of Peter-Ramus (1515-1572), a teacher in the University of Paris, and one of the most energetic reformers of its studies; as Dante says of one of his predecessors (*Parad. c. 10*): '*Leggendo nel vico degli strami Sillogizzò invidiosi veri.*' After a troubled life he perished in the Massacre of S. Bartholomew. He was a man of ability and great public spirit, but violent and superficial; one of those precursors of Bacon and Descartes in the reform of learning and of philosophical methods, whom a reaction from the barren routine of the Schools drove into a hasty and plausible way of short cuts and expedients, and who substituted vicious and misleading schemes for old methods, of which they threw away the good with the bad. But his influence was considerable for some time in Germany and England. (Hallam, 2. 20; *Leibn. Théod.* § 12.) Bacon complains of the *perpetual dichotomies* which are the characteristic of his method (*De Augm. 6. 2*), and of his introducing *the canker of epitomes* (*Adv. p. 407*). He speaks respectfully of some of his logical changes (see 3. 204, *Ellis' ed.*); but his general judgment coincides with Hooker's:—'*Itaque inania compendia parit hoc genus methodi, solida scientiarum destruit.*' Milton late in life published a *Logic* on his plan. On Ramus, see Hallam, *Lit.* 1. 388, 2. 368, where he quotes a remarkable passage from Bacon, *De Interpr. Nat.* (3. 530, *Ellis and Spedding*). Compare his criticism on the method of Raymond Lullius, *Adv. p. 408*. It was a saying of Justus Lipsius, which marks the feeling of the time about Ramus among his opponents, '*κρίσιον δόγμα juventuti tradendum, nunquam illum magnum fore cui Ramus est magnus.*' (*Brucker*, 5. 564.)

*We may define it to be;*—so first ed.; changed in Spenser's 1604, and the following ones into *find*.

VII. Of the Law of Human action in respect to the second kind of perfection, in man's *will*.—All action implies an end; all human action has for its end, good.—Of human action, the two chief

fountains—*Knowledge, Will*; Reason showing what is good, Will choosing it.—Distinction between will and appetite;—between conscious and tacit will.—‘Laws of well-doing are the dictates of right reason;’ doing what reason shows to be good, and to be possible.—Why good is not always chosen:—from misapprehension, and the mixed appearances of good and evil; from custom; from negligent habits of mind, and the irksomeness of using reason.

[2] *Goodness is seen with the eye of the understanding*;—Cp. Bk. V. xlviii. 9: ‘The will . . hath two several kinds of operation, the one *natural and necessary*, whereby it desireth simply whatsoever is good in itself, and shunneth as generally those things which hurt; the other *deliberate*, when we therefore embrace things as good, because the eye of understanding judgeth them good to that end which we simply desire. . . And in this sort special reason oftentimes causeth the will by choice to prefer one good thing before another, to leave one for another’s sake, to forego meaner for higher desires.’ See the passage from S. Cyprian in the note in Keble’s ed., and Vico in Coleridge (*Aids*, p. viii.): ‘*Omnia divinae atque humanae eruditionis elementa tria, Nosse, Velle, Posse; quorum principium uhum, Mens, sive Spiritus, cujus oculus Ratio, cui lumen præbet Deus.*’

[3] *Reason and understanding*;—‘Reason’ the ‘*intelligendi ratio et norma*,’ objectively; ‘understanding,’ the faculty in the mind or subject.

[6] *As oft as the prejudice of sensible experience doth oversway*;—*Prejudice*, in its legal sense, a forestalling judgment, i.e. of the senses, before reason has had time to decide.

Alcinous, from whom Hooker quotes, was a late Platonic reconciler of Plato and Aristotle (*De Dogmatibus Platonis*); vide Mr. Jowett’s art. in Dict. of Biogr. and Myth. The book seems to have been in vogue at this time, and was lectured on in Paris in the sixteenth century. (Crévier, *Hist. de l’Univ.* 6. 200.)

[7] *As in the Apostles*;—Here and in some other places, the first edition has *thapostles*; or *th’ effects*, *th’ affaires*: but the form is generally dropped in the succeeding reprints.

*mightily*;—*mightily* (1594); so above, *worthely*.

VIII. Of the Law of human action, how known by *nature*.—*Natural* rule of the will of man depends on the natural knowledge of *goodness*.—Moral goodness, known, (1) By *causes*; (2) By *signs*.—Why the last only here treated of.—Chief *natural test or sign* of goodness, *universal agreement*; and why.—*Natural means of discovering it*, ‘*discourse of Reason*.’—Summary of results so far.—Outlines of the Law of Natural Morality, or of Reason: starting from self-evident principles, its more or less general and certain rules worked out by

discourse or reflection from all the materials of human knowledge. Uses of knowledge, for (1) Life; (2) Pure speculation; (3) Moral action.—Natural morality growing out of known relations of man: (1) Of the *higher* part in him to the *lower*; (2) Of man to God; (3) Of man to other men.—Marks of the moral Rules or Laws of Reason; they are like natural laws; are discoverable by reason; are general and permanent.—Why natural Laws of Reason not universally kept: case of Idolatry.

[1] Well-doing, tending towards the great end, is (1) *Right*, because the straight way to the end; (2) *Good*, because profitable, and most fit for the end; (3) *Beautiful*, because apart from utility, it moves love and delight.

*Neither must we suppose, &c.*;—Bacon (in De Augm. v. 4) quotes the same saying of Aristotle, of logical rules: '*rectum, ut dicitur, et sui index est, et obliqui.*'

*Goodness in actions is like unto straightness*;—The sensible image, either of *straightness* or *uprightness*, has furnished the expression for the moral conception: but the coincidence between the two is less familiar in our *right* than in the Latin *rectus*. The doubtful explanation of the *shortest and easiest way* is a favourite one with Hooker. See Serm. iii. 598: 'Let us examine what this rectitude or *straightness* . . . importeth. All things which God did create, he made them at the first, *true, good* and *right*: *true*, in respect of correspondence unto that pattern of their being, which was eternally drawn in the council of God's foreknowledge; *good*, in regard of the use and benefit which each thing yieldeth unto other; *right*, by an apt conformity of all parts with that end which is outwardly proposed for each thing to ~~lead~~ unto. . . . They which travel from city to city, inquire ever for the straightest way, because the straightest is that which soonest bringeth them to their journey's end; so we . . . in travel towards that place of joy, immortality and rest, cannot but in every of our deeds, words and thoughts, think that *best*, which with most expedition leadeth us thereunto, and is for that very cause termed *right*. . . . The difference between right and crooked minds is in the means, which the one or the other do eschew or follow . . . All particular things naturally desired in this world . . . are subordinated in such wise unto that future good which we look for in the world to come, *that even in them there lieth a direct way leading unto this* . . . Where then is the obliquity of the mind of man? His mind is perverse, kam, and crooked, not when it bindeth itself to any of these things, but when it bindeth so, that it swerveth either to the right hand or the left, from that exact rule whereby human actions are guided.'

*Most divinely*;—By happy inspiration; giving the full quality and combined features of well-doing.



*Καλοκαγαθία*;—The quality of the *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός*, the man whose nature is fair and good; then, the man of noble and refined manners; then, the class *supposed* to be such. Aristotle uses it of the ideally perfect man. The orators contrast it generally with *κακία*.

[2] Two ways of discerning goodness; by knowing its *causes*; or its *signs*. The former way refers to the School speculations (Summ. Th. 1. qu. 5. 1. 2, qu. 18-24) as well as to the discussions in Greek philosophy.

[3] Signs of goodness vary in *kinds* and in *certainty*. The most certain, *universal or general persuasion*: for a judgment which is universal or general, must be natural, and therefore from God.

Note.—The writers cited in this note are:—(1) *Antonio Montecatini* of Ferrara, Professor there of Civil Law 1568-1597, published Commentaries on Aristotle's Politics (Ferrara, 1587). He had been Alfonso II's minister, and aided the Papal annexation of Ferrara under Clement VIII, 1597. (Ranke, Popes, Bk. 6, § 7, 8. Tiraboschi.) He died in 1599. (2) *Marsilius Ficinus*, of Florence (1433-1499), translator of Plato and Plotinus. He wrote *De Religione Christiana*, addressed to Lorenzo de Medici, 1474, often reprinted in the sixteenth century. (See Hallam, Lit. 1. 138.) (3) *Nicolas Cusa*, born near Treves, 1401-1464; at the council of Basle, 1431; cardinal under Nicolas V and Pius II; a bold and remarkable speculator in science and mathematics, and on the aspects of theology, just before the Reformation. His works were published at Basle, 1565. (4) *Bernardino Telesio* of Cosenza (1509-1588), one of the early reformers of the methods of natural philosophy (Hallam, 2. 7; Biogr. Univ.). His theories are frequently criticised by Bacon.

Mr. Keble (Pref. i. 9) sees in this 'array of quotations in support of what at first sight seems a truism,' Hooker's wish to exhibit the agreement on the point in question of opposite schools. Here he cites an Italian jurist, a renaissance Platonist, a pre-reformation Cardinal, a 'novellist' in Natural Science, all repeating Aristotle's axiom. Perhaps it is to be remembered that this axiom was beginning to be vehemently called in question; but the selection of authorities is singular. The note shows the extent of Hooker's reading; and also that foreign works, such as *Montecatini*, published 1587, and *Telesio*, 1565, 1570, 1586, soon made their way to England.

*The general and perpetual voice*;—Every one knows the 'vox populi vox Dei;' but I do not know the source. It occurs in Eadmer (circ. 1100) Hist. Nov. 1. p. 42, who quotes it 'as Scripture,' *secundum scripturam*,—for the first time, says Sir Francis Palgrave; who adds that the source remains untraced, and suggests some apocryphal writing current in the middle ages (Hist. England and Normandy, 4. 195). In 1327 Archbp. Reynolds preached on it (Stanley's Westminster Abbey, p. 67):

it was quoted in the Commons' Apology to James I, 1604 (Gardiner, i. 207). In the same connection as Hooker, Aristotle (Eth. Nicom. 7. 14) refers to Hesiod (Works and Days, 763):

φήμη δ' οὐτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἤντινα πολλοὶ  
λαοὶ φημέωσι· θεὸς νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτῇ.

Cp. Pope, Imit. of Horace, 11. Ep. 1. 89:

'All this may be; the Peoples' Voice is odd.

It is, and it is not, the Voice of God.'

*Light and reason wherewith God illuminateth every one which cometh into the world*;—Hooker translates and applies S. John 1. 9; as generally the Greek Fathers. Comp. Bk. III. ix. 3: 'The light of natural understanding, wit, and reason, is from God; he it is which thereby doth illuminate every man entering into the world.'

[4] Summary, so far, on *Law*, and its meanings. General Definition: — 'A directive rule to goodness of operation.'

This rule, Reason, in various forms.

- (1) God's Law to himself—his own wisdom and goodness.
- (2) Law of *Natural* agents, God's wisdom directing them to good.
  - i. Without their knowledge; inanimate things.
  - ii. Through their sense; irrational animals.
- (3) Law of *Intellectual* agents, acting by intelligence and will.
  - i. Angels; their intuitive judgment of true good.
  - ii. Men; judgment of reason on what is good.

*Divine operations without*;—In distinction from what Hooker calls the necessary and internal operations belonging to God's nature, ii. 2.

[5] *Axioms or principles more general*;—The technical name, not very strictly used here, for principles common to all sciences, and supposed self-evident. In Aristotle's sense, vide Mr. Poste's transl. of the Posterior Analytics, p. 42, and App. A. 131. In Bacon's sense, vide Adv. Bk. 2. 247, or De Augm. 3. 1, and Mr. Ellis, General Pref. 1. p. 47.

Such first principles, of knowledge and of morality, without which neither intelligence nor life is possible, are not matters of revelation but come to us by reason, 'drawn out of the very bowels of heaven or earth.' Hooker is here laying the foundation for his discussion on Scripture, and on the necessary antecedents presupposed in its case.

*Themis*;—A reference to Hesiod, Theog. 126. 133. (Keble.)

[6] *Natural Laws of action or morality*, drawn from the knowledge of what man's relations are to himself and things about him.—First Law, of the supremacy of the spiritual part in man.

[7] Laws for the will, drawn by the understanding faculty, as regards duty to God and to man.—Law of duty to God, deduced from our relation of *dependence on him*.—Law of duty to men, deduced from our relation of *equality with them*.

*Minds even of mere natural men*;—'Natural,' as in vi. 3, men guided only by natural knowledge.

[8] Sentences of reason shew (1) what *must*, or (2) what *may*, or (3) what *had better* be done.—Degrees of goodness.—Final definition of the Law of Reason or Human Nature, the ‘natural measure whereby to judge our doings;’ ‘*what men by discourse of natural reason have rightly found out themselves to be all for ever bound by.*’

[9] *Marks of Laws of Reason*;—(1) Resemblance to the natural and necessary laws of the world, in producing what is profitable, beautiful, complete; (2) Investigable by reason, without revelation; (3) Generally known and owned.—In what sense and within what limits he uses the words *generally known*.

*Law of Nature*;—The term is used in this Book in three senses:—

(1) *The Law of Creation generally*;—‘That manner of working which God hath set for each created thing to keep’ (iii. 2).

(2) The Law of *inanimate and irrational creatures* (iii. 2–5; vi. 2; viii. 4).

(3) The Law of *Human Nature*;—shewn by reason, apart from divine revelation, viii. 6, 9, or the *Law of Reason*.

[10] Limitation of his use of the term, Law of Nature, or Reason, to what man *does* or *might* know, as a reasonable being.

[11] Why the Law of Reason, the ‘Law Moral,’ so ill observed.—Power of custom; disinclination to think and examine; crafty and selfish authority.—Instance of Idolatry.—Explanations; no human faculty without divine help.—Law of Nature, confined to *necessary* inferences from natural principles.

IX. Sanctions of the Law of Reason.—*Good* or *evil* follows on the Law of each nature being kept or broken.—But only to men is this good or evil, *Reward* or *Punishment*; because with him only, the power to keep or break this Law is in himself, in his will; and his working is either *righteousness* or *sin*.—Distinctions in the meaning of ‘Voluntary’: (1) *Against* will; (2) *Without* will; (3) With difficulty; (4) Degrees of difficulty.—Hence, degrees in the quality and consequences of actions.—The source of Reward and Punishment, superior authority, (1) Of men over men; (2) Of God over all moral agents.

[1] *Any one of the heavens or elements*;—Comp. iii. 2. The theory of a series of *heavens*,—the higher and greater including the lower, and influencing all natural agents beneath them; the *heavens* giving form to the matter of the *elements*,—came down from the old Greek philosophy (vide Cic. Somn. Scip. 4), as manipulated by the new Platonists, to the Schoolmen. There were ten heavens (S. Thom. Aq. Summ. Th. i. qu. 68. 4) of wider or narrower influence, viz. the spheres of the seven

planets, those of the fixed stars, of the *primum mobile*, and of the *empyrean* or heaven of fire, the immovable cause of all motion (Milton, P. L. 3. 480); and they were the instruments, 'like the hammer in the workman's hand' (Dante, Parad. 2. 128), of intelligent powers, answering (in the nine heavens beneath the highest 'empyrean') to the nine angelic orders. (S. Thom. Aq. Summ. Th. 1. qu. 108-110; Dante, Parad. c. 8, notes.) The theory supplies the groundwork of Dante's *Paradiso*. More vaguely, it was still part of the current and popular physical ideas of Hooker's age. See Bk. V. lxix; lxx. 4; lxxviii. 5; Milton, Hymn, l. 131.

*Even a very world in himself*;—The ancient opinion that man was *microcosmus*, an abstract or model of the world' (Bacon, Adv. 2. 370), and that 'the world was the image of God, and man an extract or compendious image of the world' (Ib. p. 350, from Macrobius, Somn. Scip. 2. 12), is common in the writers of the time. Cp. Coriol. 2. 1. 68; Lear, 3. 1. 10; Rich. II, 5. 5. 9; Raleigh, Hist. of the World, 1. 2. § 5. Bacon often refers to it from the extravagant use made of it by Paracelsus and the 'chymicks,' in their physical theories. (See his Wisdom of the Ancients, *Prometheus*; and his *Temporis Partus* 3. 532, Ellis and Spedding; and *Redarg. Philos.* 3. 575; Hallam, Lit. 1. 391, 2. 379, 80.) The notion, traceable to Plato's theory of the world and its one animating soul (Tim. p. 30), in its definite shape was probably Alexandrian, and originally a physical one. Galen speaks of it as 'old' (*ἀνδρες παλαιοὶ περὶ φύσεως ἱκανοί*). The later Platonists attributed it to Pythagoras (Vit. Pyth. ap. Phot. No. 159), and gave it a moral turn; *ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος μικρὸς κόσμος λέγεται, οὐκ ἄρα ὅτι ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων σύγκειται, . . ἀλλ' ὅτι πάσας ἔχει τὰς τοῦ κόσμου δυνάμεις· ἐν γὰρ τῷ κόσμῳ εἰσὶ θεοί*. The Lexicons give quotations from Philo and Galen, and other late writers. It was common in the Greek Fathers; e. g. Clem. Alex. Protept. c. 1. § 5. Suicer quotes from the two Gregories, Basil, John Damascene, and Isid. Pel., sometimes with expressions implying its abstruseness (*παρὰ τῶν σοφῶν*, or *εἴρηται παρὰ τοῖς ἔξω*). Cp. Leibn. Théod. 11. § 147.

[2] *The laws of the twelve tables*;—Hooker quotes in his note, as the 'Laws of the Twelve Tables,' the beginning of Cicero's ideal code in the Dialogue on Laws (De Legg. 2. 8). See note in Gothofred, Corpus J. Civ. Tract. ad Jus var. p. 63, ed. 1663.

X. Of Human Law.—Distinction between the *Law of Nature*, binding men absolutely as men, and the *Law Politic*, binding them as *members of Society*.—Necessity of politic society to human good; its motive, natural inclination to social life; origin of politic societies, mutual agreement determining the nature of the rules directing

them, i.e. politic laws.—*Natural Law* ('the sacred laws of man's nature') directs to *good*; *Politic Law* presumes *evil* and curbs it.—Government, *natural*, as a *general* necessity; *variable* or *positive*, in its particular forms.—*Matter of Positive Laws*, the definition of particulars of natural *right and wrong*, and those of natural *sanctions*.—Power of Legislation, derived from the whole Community; difference of laws, from variety of objects; Laws *mixedly* or *merely* human.—Law Civil; Law of the Church; Law of Nations.—Church Councils for agreement on Church Laws among Christian nations.

[1] *Their brutishness*;—Cic. de Leg. 1. 16: 'Haec in opinione existimare non in natura posita, dementis est.' The old sceptical objections were, as Mr. Hallam observes (2. 25), receiving at this time a new edge from the wonderful accounts pouring in from travellers in the newly discovered countries. Montaigne, who popularised the topic, published his Essays in 1580 and 1588. They were known in England, though Florio published his translation in the next century.

*Unless presuming man to be, &c.*;—Human or politic law is here treated as a *supplement* to the Law of Reason or Nature, rendered necessary by the special conditions of man; viz, his fall and corruption. In this he follows Thomas Aquinas (Summ. 1. 2. qu. 95, art. 1), commenting on Aristotle, Pol. 1. 2, and viewing law as a coactive discipline. Possibly he might have had in his mind Machiavelli, Discorsi, 1. 3; 'È necessario a chi dispone una repubblica ed ordina leggi in quella, presupporre tutti gli uomini essere cattivi.' So Guicciardini, Ricordi. No. 140, 'un populo animale pazzo.' Further on Hooker takes in also the view of it, in its directive and constitutive aspect.

*All men, &c.*;—Cp. Aristotle's Politics, 1. 2, the source of all this: πόλις . . . γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἐνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.

*Unto life many implements*;—In the sense of 'complementum' in the following: 'Initia quaedam habet [homo] a naturâ, scilicet rationem et manus, non autem complementum, sicut caetera animalia, quibus natura dedit sufficienter tegumentum et cibum.' (Thom. 1. 2. qu. 95, art. 1.)

[4] *But by consent of men or immediate appointment of God*;—This is the doctrine of Aquinas (1. 2. qu. 90, art. 3): 'Ordinare aliquid in bonum commune [which is the object of law], est vel totius multitudinis, vel alicujus gerentis vicem totius multitudinis. Et ideo condere legem vel pertinet ad totam multitudinem, vel pertinet ad personam publicam, quae totius multitudinis curam habet.' Comp. Bk. VIII. ii. 5: 'It seemeth to me almost out of doubt and controversy, that every independent multitude, before any certain form of regiment established, hath, under God's supreme authority, full dominion over itself; . . . God creating mankind did endue it naturally with full power to guide

itself, in what kind of societies soever it should choose to live.' See an article on Hooker, *Saturday Rev.*, Sep. 1. 1866.

*The name of Father continued still in them, who of fathers were made rulers*;—So of the Roman senate, 'Patres ab honore patriciique progenies eorum appellati' (Liv. 1. 8). 'Principes, qui appellati sunt propter caritatem patres' (Cic. de R. P. 2. 8). Among the Jews, see 2 Chron. 19. 8, Acts 7. 2, 22, 1.

[7] *That which is natural . . . that which is positive*;—*Positivus* is the late Latin (A. Gellius) translation of *θετικός* (used in another sense by Aristotle, *Polit.* 2. 12), to express the distinction in the Greek philosophy (Arist. *Eth.* 5. 10) between right which was *φύσει*, *φυσικόν*, and that which was *νομικόν*, *δταν θάνται*. It came into common use through the terminology of the schools (e. g. Thom. Aq. 1. 2. qu. 95, art. 2: 'Jus naturale dividitur contra jus positivum'). This is the distinction usual in Hooker; not *moral* and *positive*.

[8] *No reason but, &c.*;—Hooker is apt to drop the substantive verb, especially in emphatic sentences. See xi. 3.

*Corporations are immortal*;—An English law maxim, quoted again Bk. VII. xiv. 3. Hooker was a reader of law-books, and is fond of quoting legal sayings.

[9] *Pittacus*;—One of the seven Greek sages; of Mytilene in Lesbos (circ. B.C. 612–564). Aristotle, in the place quoted, cites him as exemplifying the difference between makers of *laws* and makers of *constitutions*. His was an early instance of a despotic rule founded on democracy against aristocracy (See Dict. of Biog. and Mythol.).

*These known laws of making of laws*;—See Arist. *Polit.* 4. 15. 'Legum leges,' Cic. de Leg. 2. 7.

[10] *Learned in the law*;—Sir W. Staundford, to whom Hooker refers in his note, was born 1513; Judge of the Common Pleas 1554; died 1558. His book, *Les Plee del Corone*, a digest of criminal law, was printed in 1557, and was several times republished.

[12] *Law of Nations*;—See Hallam, *Lit.* 2. 76–82, on the importance which this subject was assuming at this time, and the various works upon it. It was discussed especially by Spanish writers, who 'displayed an intrepid spirit of justice and humanity,' in treating of the rights of barbarians and infidels.

*Herewith notwithstanding we are not satisfied*;—The passage illustrates the state of feeling at the time—the age of Drake and Raleigh, of the great European leagues, and of the writers of travels, English, French, and German. (Vide Hallam, *Lit.* 2. 250–255.)

*Salomon*;—This, the Vulgate form, is the usual one in Hooker and other writers of the time. So in Bacon. The modern editions have changed it to 'Solomon.' Generally the Vulgate forms of Old Testament names are used in Hooker.

*Because nature doth presume, &c.*;—Referring to the adage (Erasm. Adag. Chil. 1. cent. 1. 69), *Ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ δαιμόνιον*,—*Homo homini deus*. ‘Antiquitas enim,’ says Erasmus, ‘nil aliud existimabat esse Deum quam prodesse mortalibus.’ (This reference I owe to a friend.) It is found in Pliny, N. H. 2. 5: ‘Deus est mortali juvare mortalem,’ and is quoted in Jer. Taylor’s Life of Christ, Preface No. 39. Andrewes, Serm. v. p. 208; Nicholson, Exp. of Catech. p. 110. Comp. Bacon, Nov. Org. 1. 129: ‘Réputet quispiam, quantum intersit inter hominum vitam in excultissima quapiam Europæ provincia, et in regione aliqua novæ Indiae maxime fera et barbara; eas tantum differre existimabit, ut merito *hominem homini Deum esse*, non solum propter auxilium et beneficium, sed etiam per status comparationem, recte dici possit.’ Compare the application in J. Hales’ Golden Rem. p. 25, 1673.

[13] Distinction between Primary and Secondary Laws in the three divisions of law—Moral, Political and of Nations. Primary, supposing good, requiring *direction*. Secondary, supposing evil, requiring *restraint*.

*National laws of mutual commerce*;—*Mutual*, the reading of the 1st and 2nd editions, is changed into *natural* in the 6th; and the misprint lasted into Mr. Keble’s text.

*Laws of arms*;—See Hallam, Lit. Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 89, on the works of Ayala 1581, and Gentilis 1589, on Rights of War.

[15] *A new foundation being laid*;—The discussion on the *Law of Nations* seems like a digression or afterthought, which has carried him away from his main subject. Human Law is a *supplement* to the Law of Reason or Nature. He now goes on to a further *supplement* to it, namely, the *supernatural* Law in Scripture. And he lays his foundation afresh in his former principle that the end of all human action, for which it needs a law or directive rule, is *good*, and ultimately the highest good.

XI. *Of the Supernatural Law*, supplying the defects of the Natural Law, as a guide to man’s perfection.—*Third* division of the Book, starting afresh from the ‘foundation’ laid down before (that everything aims at good; v. 1, 2, and attains it by conforming to what Reason makes its rule or law, ii. 1), and answering the question, why besides the Law of Nature, God has given us the Law of Scripture.—Necessity of supplementary supernatural law arising out of (1) Man’s *natural desire* of infinite perfection (1–3); (2) God’s *goodness*, not leaving unsatisfied desires which are natural (4–5); (3) Man’s inability under natural conditions to attain it (6).—*Natural* road to perfection, (1) The Moral Law, and the will to obey it; (2) Actual obedience and righteousness; (3) God’s just reward; but from this man hopelessly excluded.—Therefore, a way *above nature*, grounded on man’s sin and redemption.—Faith, Hope, Charity, their objects and nature

undiscoverable by nature.—Laws supernatural, (1) In the manner of delivering them; (2) In the matter delivered.

[1] Human action aims at perfection; i. e. the attainment of something desirable simply for itself, and for no further end.

Man's perfection, union with God by faculties capable of it, i. e. Knowledge and Will; Will perfected, actively by loving, passively by peace and joy; and this in perpetuity.—This desire of happiness or perfection universal and therefore from nature. Cp. Bp. Butler, Sermon. xiv.

*In that they have they rejoice*;—This may mean, (1) *In that which they have*, they rejoice; or, (2) *Forasmuch as they have*, possess, they rejoice. I believe Hooker meant the former. See Bk. V. lxxvi. 4, 'The impious cannot enjoy that they have.'

*For if everything were to be desired, &c.*;—Πρόβεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἀπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαλὴν τὴν ὄρεξιν. Eth. Nic. I. I. Man's desire to such good is infinite; therefore unless the good he thus desires is infinite, he does wrong. But there is no infinite good but God, who is therefore the good which man desires to have and enjoy, and which makes his perfection and happiness.

*For as to take away the first efficient, &c.*;—Our personal existence is inconceivable without some first cause, 'first efficient,' who made it to be; and our working is inconceivable without some end, 'final cause,' for which we work. *Take away, annihilate, remove*, i. e. in the order of thought.

[2] *Therefore he our felicity and bliss*;—The verb dropped, as vii. 7. 'The root thereof, divine malediction:' xi. 3, 'All this, endless or everlasting.'

[3] *Capable we are not in this life*;—But the impeding conditions of the present state being taken away, we are 'capable of good,' (1) by understanding; (2) by will, and moral affections. Distinction between the love of *desire*, and the love of *enjoyment*; and the love of good, in the *imperfect* state, 'in respect of benefits to us,' and in the *perfect*, 'for the goodness of beauty in itself.'

*As the will doth now work . . . are replenished*;—Comp. Dante, Parad. 3. 24–90, and the illustrations to the German transl. of *Philalethes*.

[4] *Three-fold perfection*;—(1) *Sensual*, of the bodily life; (2) *Intellectual*, of the moral and civil condition; (3) *Spiritual*, of a state beyond experience and sense.—The desire of this last as truly natural as either of the first.

*An axiom of nature*;—This famous maxim is repeated by Aquinas (note) from Aristotle (e. g. De Caelo, ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάρτην ποιοῦσιν).

[5] But this spiritual perfection, though desired *naturally*, unattainable *naturally*: therefore by a supernatural way, or not at all.



*When men of excellent wit*;—Hooker's manner of translation is characteristic. Compare with his English the original Latin of Lactantius and Scotus.

*Quite their charges*;—ed. 1594, 1604; changed in later editions to *quit*.

*Lactantius*;—A Christian writer of the African school, in the latter part of the third century and the beginning of the next: wrote on the philosophy of Christianity, after the earlier African apologists, Tertullian and Cyprian. His works were one of the first printed books (1465, at Subiaco), and were frequently republished in the fifteenth century.

*The wittiest of the school divines*;—John Duns Scotus (d. 1308), the *doctor subtilis*, which is expressed by Hooker's epithet. He is said to have come from Northumberland, entered the Franciscan order, and taught at Oxford and Paris. He influenced greatly the theology of his order, as Aquinas had impressed his type of doctrine on the rival order of Dominicans. Two distinct and partly conflicting lines of thought divided Thomists and Scotists even at the Council of Trent. To the mystical tendency which the Franciscan school had derived from S. Bonaventura and its founder, Scotus added a speculative boldness and largeness, which contrasted with the rigid and cautious adherence of the Dominican school to the Augustinian tradition. One of the characteristic doctrines of the Franciscans was that of the immaculate conception of the Virgin. On the other hand, for their doctrine on grace, the atonement, and the sacraments, their opponents charged them with semi-Pelagianism. Duns Scotus was the teacher of the Franciscan Occam, the head of the Nominalist school. It is a curious memorial of party-quarrels that the name of one of the most keen-witted of men should have become a byword for stupidity. Vide Todd's and Richardson's Dict. Cp. Hudibras, i. i. 154.

*The justice of one that requiteth nothing mincingly*;—*requiteth*, ed. 1 and 2; *requireth*, ed. 6. (So above, *require* for *requite*, in ed. 6.) The misprint has crept into Mr. Keble's text.

XII. Laws Natural, or of Reason, not superseded by Supernatural, but (1) supplemented; (2) reasserted.—Why Scripture 'fraught with Laws of Nature:' (1) To make clear what is less obvious; (2) To prove further conclusions; (3) To add further sanctions.—Advantages of repetition of Natural Laws in Scripture: (1) To apply principles to particular circumstances, in which mistakes are made—examples; (2) To remedy self-deceit; (3) To make certain and public the probabilities of reason, e. g. immortality, resurrection.—Summary of the arguments on the scope and special place of the Supernatural

**Law;**—to direct us to that natural end for which natural means failed:—and on the relation of the two laws.

[1] *Gratian*;—the compiler of the first Western code of Ecclesiastical or Canon Law; of Chiusi in Tuscany, and a Benedictine monk at Bologna, where he professed law in the twelfth century. He published in 1151, as a text-book for his lectures, his harmony of Church laws, digested under titles, after the manner of the Pandects, out of councils, decisions of Popes, and texts of Fathers (*Concordantia Discordantium Canonum*, sive *Decretum*), which became the official text-book, and the nucleus of further collections of canon law. He incorporated with it the pseudo-Isidorian Decretals. Died in 1158. A middle-age legend made him brother at one birth of Peter Lombard, the 'Master of the Sentences,' and Peter Comestor, the historian; they were the great twelfth-century names in law, philosophy, and history. (Busse, *Christ. Liter.* No. 1144.) See Hallam, *Middle Ages*, ch. 7; Gieseler, 3rd Period, § 60; Dante, *Parad.*, for Gratian, 10. 104; for Peter Lombard, 10. 107; for Peter Comestor, 12. 134.

XIII. Why the supernatural law written.—*To be written*, not of its essence, and adds no authority; but it is of God's providence, and is of the utmost consequence as a security.—Variety of the elements composing Scripture.—Different degrees of importance; but no portion superfluous or out of place.—What makes laws mutable or immutable; not the *author*, but the *matter* and *conditions* of them.—*Natural* laws, all immutable. All other laws, *positive*;—(1) *Supernatural*, which are either *immutable*, when their matter is *constant* and their command *express*; or *mutable*, when their matter is *variable*: (2) *Human*, of various kinds, all mutable.—Interest and value of Scripture, compared with merely natural means of knowledge of divine things.

XIV. Of the sufficiency of Scripture, (1) for its end, viz. to be a record of law supernatural; (2) on the condition common to all human knowledge, viz. the presuppositional of other truths.—meaning of '*all necessary* truth being in Scripture;' i.e. presupposing what is furnished by nature and reason; Scripture cannot be its own proof.—Meaning of '*all necessary* truth being *contained* in Scripture.' '*Contained*' means (1) express statement, (2) necessary inference; but not probable, i.e. conjectural or debateable, inferences.—Scripture in its different elements, and their different ends, has all the truth necessary for its purposes; and no more is necessary; for God has ceased to speak.—Sufficiency of Scripture for its end does not supersede necessity of reason, any more than the sufficiency of the Old Testament in its place implies superfluity of the New.—No

defect in Scripture, for the purpose, and under the manifest conditions, of its delivery; i.e. that 'Nature and Scripture, both jointly, and neither severally,' are complete for all necessary knowledge.—Tradition useless, not on *à priori* grounds, but from absence of evidence.

[1] *In very solemn manner disputed*;—Made the subject of the public conferences and disputations, by which authority endeavoured to settle the theological questions of the Reformation.

*If we define what is necessary*;—'Necessary to salvation' may mean, (1) The conditions *universally*, which in any way whatever conduce and help to it—which he rejects, as meaning too much, and being too vague; and (2) The *immediate and special* conditions of God's ordinary appointed way. But in this sense one of the first of these conditions is not in Scripture, viz. the proof of the authority of Scripture, or what books we are to esteem Scripture. His answer to this, which was one of the common topics of the controversy on the Rule of Faith, is the broad assertion that no subject whatever of human knowledge stands alone or isolated, but all presuppose an antecedent knowledge as their basis, and a knowledge of surrounding conditions for their place and limits.

*Delivered simply whatsoever is needful*;—'Simply,' i.e. without reference to other knowledge, presupposed and accompanying—opposed to 'necessary in some certain kind or form,' assuming certain given conditions.

XV. Of the mutability of laws:—Distinction between *Natural* and *Positive* laws; applying to all law, (1) Private, (2) Civil, (3) International, (4) Divine.—Supernatural law, (1) Of *individual* duties; (2) Of service and worship, *to the Church*.—What makes supernatural laws immutable; where *their reason and subject-matter are constant*.—Supernatural laws mutable, *where they have a temporary cause*.—Importance of rightly using the supernatural law, i.e. Scripture.

[1] *Impossible it is, &c.*;—Hooker's distinction is of course as old as the Greeks, and his nomenclature is the regular one of the schools. But he notices two confusions: the identification of all positive law, first with *human* law, next with *mutable* law. He objects that there is positive law which is not human; and further that there is divine law which is mutable. All *natural* law is immutable to man, and 'binds always' whether physical or rational; because it grows out of the unchangeable conditions originally imposed on the world. Whatever other laws there be, do not grow out of these conditions, and therefore are *positive*. But all positive laws of God, growing out of unchangeable conditions, revealed or established by him, are as immutable as *natural* laws. Supernatural or divine laws must be *positive* by the nature of the

case: for they 'do not depend upon any natural ground out of which they may be deduced.' Whether they are *mutable or not*, depends on the subject-matter to which they are applicable, and on the express nature of the command. Mr. Hallam is mistaken in ascribing to Hooker the unqualified doctrine of the mutability of all positive law (Lit. Pt. 2. ch. 4. 3, note). All laws relating to men in their supernatural relations, or to that supernatural society the Church, must be positive, because they could not have been known by nature. All laws, natural or supernatural (and therefore positive), relating to matters in man's condition, which are *constant* and not admitting variable accidents, are unchangeable; because there is no 'cause of change, when that which gave them their first institution remaineth for ever the same.' All others, even if divine, are mutable; as, e.g. the Jewish law of rites and ceremonies.

*Law of Heraldry*;—i.e. of heralds or ambassadors: *jus fetiale*. (Hallam, Lit. Pt. 2. ch. 4. 86.) The subject was one much discussed at the time. There is a chapter on it in Bodin de R. P. (v. 6), a book which Mr. Hallam thinks had great effect in England. (Lit. 2. 51.) It was the subject of lectures by Albericus Gentilis, an Italian Protestant, appointed through Leicester's influence Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, 1582 (Hallam, Pt. 2. ch. 4. 90); later, it came into Grotius's work, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*. (Hallam, Pt. 3. ch. 4. 116.)

*Judicialis*;—'*praecepta judicialia*,' the phrase in Aquinas for the civil part of the Old Law.

[4] *Their wits . . . were with profoundness here over-matched*;—Referring to the various sayings about the difficulty of speaking about God: e.g. Heraclitus, ἐν τῷ σοφὸν μόνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει, Ζηνὸς οὐνόμα: Plat. Tim. 28 e, τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντα ἀδύνατον λέγειν.

*Philo*;—An Alexandrian Jew, lived under Tiberius, Caius and Claudius; the first writer whose works we have, who applied the language of Greek philosophy to systematic theology. His works had been in part published in Greek by Turnebus and Hoeschel, 1552-72, and Hooker quotes them several times.

*Strabo*;—The Geographer, an Asiatic Greek, of the age of Augustus and Tiberius. His work was several times published during the sixteenth century, and Casaubon had just edited it when Hooker was writing (1587).

XVI. Summary of the Introduction on Law:—(A) The law of God to himself;—(B) The law appointed to the creation, (1) Physical law, (2) Law of angels, (3) Law of reason in individuals, (4) Law of reason in societies, (i.) Municipal, (ii.) International;—(C) Supernatural Law.—Purpose of the enquiry, to show the *connection of all law with the highest law*; and to point out a *method for judging of*

*ecclesiastical laws by reference to the first principles of all law.*—In all laws these first principles concur in influence, though in different degrees.—Caution in judging of laws; all *good* laws are results of the eternal law of God; hence, even *doubtful* ones to be examined seriously and respectfully.—Examples of the *connection* of different principles of law; natural with spiritual; angelic with human.—Examples of *confusion*, in applying laws to actions.—Two things to be kept in mind: (1) That various laws may in different degrees affect the same matter; (2) That the bearing of each kind of law on action must be carefully distinguished.—Instances, how *food* falls under *Law Natural*, whether *physical* or *moral*; under *Divine* law repeating *natural*; under *Positive*, either *divine* for spiritual purposes, or *human*, for *civil* purposes, or for *ecclesiastical*, of discipline, or communion. Conclusion;—‘To measure by any one kind of law all the actions of men were to confound the admirable order wherein God hath disposed all laws, each as in nature, so in degree, distinct from other.’

[2] *Laws apparently good*;—‘Apparently,’ i.e. ‘manifestly’; opposed to laws, in the next sentence, of which ‘we perceive not the goodness,’ and which are open to question.

[3] *Receive impression*;—Scholastic phrase, especially for the influence of the heavens on lower things. The notion was that the law or force impressed itself on matter, as the seal on the wax. It is frequent in Dante, especially in the *Parad.* (1. 103; 2. 139; 10. 29; 17. 76).

*Concerning the law of Christ towards his Church*;—Mr. Keble suggests with probability that the true reading is *love*: but all the early editions read *law*, and I have followed him in keeping their reading. The first and second editions read *lawe*, which might easily come from *love* written carelessly: *v* being at this time, at least in Hooker, only initial, and *u* medial, for both the sounds which we distinguish by *v* and *u*.

[7] *Certain laws concerning food*;—Mr. Keble quotes various statutes of Elizabeth, about fish diet. Thus 5 Eliz. c. 5, ‘An Act touching Politick Constitutions for the Maintenance of the Navy,’ &c., made every Wednesday a fish day, under penalties, for the encouragement of shipping and fisheries, and for ‘the sparing and increase of flesh victual.’ The act was partly altered, 27 Eliz. c. 11, and 35 Eliz. c. 7. But Hooker was probably referring more generally to the regulation, in whatever way, of trade, and other points relating to food, which was an important subject of legislation in the last reigns as well as in this.

*Zonaras*;—Secretary and Minister to the Emperor Alexius Comnenus (1030–1118), afterwards a monk on Mount Athos. He wrote a chronicle coming down to his own time; and commentaries on the Apostolical Canons and those of the general councils.

[8] With this 'celebrated sentence' Mr. Hallam (Pt. 3. ch. 4. 20) compares the definition of Suarez, that 'eternal law is the free determination of the will of God, ordaining a rule to be observed, either first, *generally*, by all parts of the universe as a means of a common good, whether immediately belonging to it in respect of the entire universe, or at least in respect of the singular parts thereof; or, secondly, to be *specialy* observed by intellectual creatures in respect of their free operations.' ('Legem aeternam esse decretum liberum voluntatis Dei statuentis ordinem servandum, aut generaliter ab omnibus partibus universi in ordine ad commune bonum, vel immediate illi conveniens ratione totius universi, vel saltem ratione singularum specierum ejus, aut specialiter servandum a creaturis intellectualibus quoad liberas operationes earum.') 'This crabbed piece of scholasticism,' adds Mr. Hallam, 'is nothing else in substance than the celebrated sentence on law which concludes the First Book of Hooker. Whoever takes the pains to understand Suarez will perceive that he asserts exactly that which is unrolled in the majestic eloquence of our countryman.' The same idea had been expressed in Dante, *Parad.* 1. 104-121. It is also worth while to compare Hooker's first sketch of his treatment of this thought, which has called forth so many examples of eloquence, *Serm.* iii. p. 616: 'Justice, that which flourishing upholdeth, and not prevailing disturbeth, shaketh, threateneth with utter desolation and ruin the whole world: justice, that whereby the poor have their succour, the rich their ease, the potent their honour, the living their peace, the souls of the righteous departed their endless rest and quietness; justice, the chiefest matter contended for at this day in the Christian world: in a word, justice, that whereon not only all our present happiness, but in the kingdom of God, our future joy dependeth. So that whether we be in love with the one or with the other, with things present or things to come, with earth or with heaven; in that which is so greatly available to both, none can but wish to be instructed.' Hooker, in the *Ecclesiastical Polity*, has gone beyond this. Compare Wordsworth, 'Ode to Duty':

'Stern Law-giver! yet thou dost wear  
The Godhead's most benignant grace;  
Nor know we anything so fair  
As is the smile upon thy face:  
Flowers laugh before thee on their beds,  
And fragrance in thy footing treads;  
Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong:

And the most ancient heavens through thee are fresh and strong.'

## GLOSSARY.

### A.

- Ability**, ii. 3 (in the early editions spelt 'habilitie' and 'ability,' sometimes in the same passage; e.g. vi. 3), in the general sense of 'being able to do;' often joined with 'power;' Serm. iii. 615.
- Absolute**, ii. 6; iii. 4; v. 2, in the Latin sense, perfectly finished, perfect. So II. vi. 1; viii. 5; V. lxxii. 2, lxxvi. 9. Cp. Hamlet, v. 2. 105, 'absolute gentleman;' Henry V, iii. 7. 24, 'A most *absolute* and excellent horse;' 2 Tim. iii. 17, Genevan vers. (1560), 'That the man of God may be *absolute*, being made perfect unto all good workes.'
- Accident**, viii. 5, in a neutral sense, anything befalling or happening to: 'Notwithstanding the bitter *accidents* wherewith virtuous actions are compassed.' Cp. Tempest, v. 1. 250, 'happened *accidents*;' 305, 'The story of my life, And the particular *accidents* gone by.' Perhaps in the logical sense (xv. 3), 'Any such variable *accident* as the state of man, &c., is subject to.'
- Account**, (sb. and vb.; spelt both 'accompt'—Fr. *compter*, Lat. *computare*, —and 'account'), value: xiv. 1, 'No part of true philosophy, no art of *account*, no kind of science.' Vide x. 1, 2; xv. 4.
- Accustom**, 'with:;' viii. 'things *wherewith* they had been accustomed.'
- Adjoin** (vb. act.), x. 15. Serm. iii. p. 638, in the *active* sense; common in Hooker instead of 'join' or 'add.'
- Affect**, v. 2; vii. 5, in the Latin sense, aim at. x. 4; xv. 4, feel love for.
- Agree to**, vi. 1, belong to: 'That which *agreeth to* (*convenit*) the one now, the other shall attain to in the end.' So V. lxix. 2, 'Is not verified of time itself, but *agreeth* unto those things which are in time.' VII. xvi. 1; VIII. iv. 5, 6. Fr. *agréer à gré*; Ital. *a grado, gradire*; Lat. *gratum, gratiae*. Vide Diez, Etym. Wörterb. *Grado*.
- Aim**, v. 2; xi. 1. Old Fr. *esmer*, Lat. *aestimare*. See Diez, *Esmar*.
- Albeit**, i. 2; ii. 5, &c.
- Alienation**, ix. 1, 'of mind.'

**All**, emphatic, with 'so:' ii. 3. p. 8, 'The effects notwithstanding are *all* so limited as we see they are.'

**Am** to (cp. **Being** to), viii. 6: 'Where many things *are* to concur to one effect, the best is to guide,' &c.; xiii. 2, 'The question whether *we be now* to seek for any revealed law.'

**Amiable** (Fr. *aimable*; Lat. *amabilis*. The Fr. *amiable* is the late Lat. *amicabilis*), lovely, what moves love: viii. 1, 'That which is good in the actions of men doth not only delight as profitable, but as *amiable* also;' viii. 4, 'Their intuitive intellectual judgment concerning the *amiable* beauty and high goodness,' &c. Cf. V. li. 3, 'Pity, which maketh the sceptre of Christ's regency even in the kingdom of heaven *amiable*.'

**Ancient**. (The alternative spelling common in the early editions, *auncient*, as in other words of Fr. origin, *chaunce*, *chaunge*, *graund*, *commaund*, *demaund*, is an indication of pronunciation: so *graunt*.) Fr. *ancien*; vide Diez, *Anzi*. 'The ancient' (plur.), iii. 4; V. vii. 3; xxxix. 5; xli. 2, where modern editions have changed it to 'ancients.'

**Annihilate**, x. 13; xi. 1.

**Any**, used before intervening pronoun and adj. without partitive sign: x. 13, 'By any their several laws and ordinances.'

**Apparent**, -ly (in early editions, often *apparant*; so, *currant*: the form lasted in *dependant*, *independant*, *descendant*; derived through French forms), (1) The object of perception, opposed to the inward substance (*φαίνεσθαι*—*εἶναι*): vii. 6, 'Goodness doth not move by being, but by being *apparent*.' (2) What is visible and plain, opposed to what is hidden and obscure: viii. 5, 'The main principles of reason are in themselves *apparent*;' vii. 6, 'Sensible goodness is most *apparent*, near, and present;' 'If reason have taught it rightly to be good, yet not so *apparently*;' x. 4, 'To take away all kind of government in the world were *apparently* to overturn the whole world.' So, xiv. 1; xvi. 1, 2. VII. xiii. 2, 'It is *apparently* therefore *untrue*,' for 'plainly:' cp. II. viii. 9,—Hooker's usual and frequent sense of the word. (3) The unfavourable sense, 'what seems, and is not,' does not occur so far as I have observed.

**Apt**, iii. 4; vii. 6, fitted—where Hooker (note in Keble) gives as equivalent, 'able;' xi. 3.

**Aptness**, i. 1, readiness. In early editions there are two forms of words in -ness; either *aptnes*, or *aptnesse*. The modern form does not appear, as far as I have noticed.

**Arch-philosopher**, x. 4, of Aristotle, the 'head of all philosophers:' V. lxxi. 11; lxxxi. 9.

**Argue**, prove, as an *argument*, to be a proof of; viii. 2.

**Ascertain**, make certain: xvi. 5, 'The law both *ascertaineth* the truth,' &c. Fr. *ascertener*, *acertes* (Cotgr.). The form *certeine* occurs.



**Authentic**, iii. 4.

**Available**, x. 8, availing, valid: 'Laws are *available* (Fr. *valable*) by consent.' Cp. II. vii. 8; V. lxii. 4, of baptism, 'for ever *available*.' Cp. Raleigh, in Todd's Dict.; J. Hales, p. 61, 'If to die in a state of perfect sequestration from the world were so precious, so *available*, how much more available to live in it.'

**Averted**, i. 1, of minds turned away by prejudice.

**Axiom**, loosely, for leading rules, v. 2, 'in philosophy'; viii. 5, 7; xvi. 3. So VI. iii. 4, 'an *axiom* of love;' a frequent word in Hooker.

## B.

**Behoof**, x. 11. Cp. parallel Teutonic forms in Richardson.

**Behoveful**, viii. 9; x. 4. The early editions spell variously, *behove*, *behoove*, *behooveful* (so, *woont*, *woonder*, *foorth*, *toong*, *proove*, *mooveth*). The variation continued late; vide Todd's Johnson.

**Being**, common word for nature, existence: ii. 2, 'The *being* of God is a kind of law to his working'; xi. 1, 'The first efficient of our *being*;' iii. 4, 'Those forms which give them their *being*;' xiii. 3, 'The complete *being* of man.' Cf. III. xi. 20, 'A number of particularities . . . which make for the more convenient *being* of those principal and perpetual parts of ecclesiastical polity.' Cf. use of the verb, vii. 6, 'Goodness doth not move by *being*, but by being apparent.'

**Being to** (cp. *am to*), with verb, equivalent to Lat. participle in *-rus*, or rather, the Greek *μᾶλλον*: iii. 4, 'Whose spirit *being to* execute the same;' iv. 1, 'Our Saviour *being to* set down the perfect idea of that which we are to pray for.' Cf. V. xlvii. 3, '*Being to* stand, to speak, to sue, in the presence of so great majesty.' Cp. 'am, are, to:' i. 2, 'Much of that we *are to* speak;' III. i. 13, 'Of these things we are not now to dispute.' It is a favourite phrase with Hooker's admirer, J. Hales; e.g. pp. 132, 135, 136, 150, 183, ed. 1673.

**Beseeming**, viii. 9, the Lat. *decorum*, Gr. τὸ πρέπον.

**Birth**, xv. 4, origin: 'The nature and original *birth*, as of all other laws, so also,' &c.

**Blend**, iii. 2; vii. 6, in unfavourable sense, for *confused* mixture.

**Bootless**, xi. 5. See Morris' Specimens of Early English, p. 392.

**Brook**, viii. 2; x. 7, endure; more widely used than with us. Bacon (New Atlant. iii. 143, ed. Spedding) speaks of ships that could 'hardly brook the ocean.' Cp. like instances in Richardson.

**Brutishness**, x. 1, senselessness.

## C.

**Canon**, rule, ii. 1; iii. 1; viii. 5, 7, nearly always spelt with a capital, as if a technical word.

**Card**, chart (Fr. *carte*, *charte*, Lat. *carta*): ii. 5, 'That law, which

hath been the pattern to make, and the *Card* to guide the world by.' Cp. Bacon, Essay xviii. on Travel, 'Let him carry with him also some *card* or book describing the country;' and Essay xxix. '*Cards* and maps;' Macbeth, i. 3. 17, 'The shipman's *card*;' Hamlet, v. 2. 107, 'He is the *card* and calendar of gentry.' Cp. Sermon. iv. p. 652, 'That we may know as a shipmaster, *by his Card*, how far we are wide, either on the one side or the other.'

**Cause**, i. 2, and elsewhere, in the vague sense of matter; which has become still more vague in the Ital. *cosa*, Fr. *chose*.

**Centre**, viii. 8, of a mark: comp. Winter's Tale, i. 2. 138.

**Choose but**, 'cannot choose but,' frequent in Hooker to express an absolutely inevitable consequence: iv. 3, 'Their adoration, love and imitation of God, *could not choose but* be also interrupted;' viii. 3, 'Appetite . . . *cannot choose but* rise at the sight of some things:' vide viii. 1; V. lxxi. 2. A curious impersonal use is in x. 3, '*How could it be chosen but* that when families were multiplied . . . envy, &c. must grow among them.' So Bk. V. Dedication, § 8. And compare the *proper* use of the word in vii. 2, 'If fire consume the stubble, it *chooseth not* so to do.'

**Circumstances**, in the original sense of the conditions, qualifications, &c. which surround a thing: xii. 2, 'Inasmuch our actions are conversant about things beset with many *circumstances*, which cause men of sundry wits to be also of sundry judgements concerning what ought to be done.' Compare Shakespeare's use of the word, a frequent one with him. In IV. i. 3 = detail: 'To what purpose all this *circumstance*?' i. e. formalities of manumission.

**Civil**, living in civil society: xv. 4, 'Men that are *civil*' opposed to those living out of political society—translation of *πολιτικοί πολιτεύεσθαι*. So a '*civil* and moral man' is opposed to a 'religious.' Bacon, Advert. on Church Controversies, p. 91. Cp. 'Morality and *civility*' = *ἠθικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ*, J. Hales, p. 37.

**Civilly**, xv. 4; xvi. 5, opposed to 'spiritually.'

**Clean**, completely: i. 2, 'clean laid aside;' iv. 3, 'clean contrary;' xv. 3, 'clean otherwise;' III. i. 13, 'Excommunication neither shutteth out from the mystical, nor *clean* from the visible church.' Cp. 'quite and clean.'

**Cloy**, v. 3, *κόρον ἔχειν*.

**Collection**, viii. 11; xiv. 2, inference, gathered from facts or words.

**Colour**, i. 1, pretext; ii. 6, semblance.

**Comfort**, ii. 1, strengthen: 'The evidence of God's own testimony added to the natural assent of reason . . . doth not a little *comfort* and confirm the same;'—used in Hooker's time in a much wider sense than with us. Bacon speaks of water 'by union *comforting* and sustaining itself.' Adv. ii. 322.

Commerce, xvi. 6, intercourse generally.

Common sense, vi. 5; viii. 4; xv. 4. The word is an instance, one among many, of a technical term of scholastic philosophy passing, with a larger but more vague meaning, into popular use. In Aquinas, Summ. Th. 1. qu. 78, art. 4, resp. 2, *communis sensus* is the interior sense which receives the reports of the separate and special ones, and is their root and centre of reference; and so it is used by Hooker (viii. 4) of beasts. But there was also a classical sense of the phrase, for the *common sentiments* of mankind. From the two—a definite term of a theory of sensation, and a loose one involving a moral as well as an intellectual reference,—comes a third use, which is our common meaning, and is found in Hooker, a loose term for intellectual power not special or professional; as in Love's Labour's Lost, i. 1. 58-64, where what is shown by 'study' is contrasted with what is shown by 'common sense.' Comp. All's Well that Ends Well, ii. 1. 175.—

'And what impossibility would slay

*In common sense* (ordinary judgment), *sense* (a judgment beyond it) saves another way.'

Communion, x. 4.

Compass, xi. 5 (verb)=translation of *comprehendere*; ii. 2 (noun), range, limit. Cp. V. lxii. 14, 'To enclōse the minister's vocation within the *compass* of some essential part of the sacraments.' Diez traces the word from the Rom. and old Fr. *compassar*, (1) keeping even step, opposed to *trapassar*; (2) then, generally, measure; (3) then, the instrument for measuring, and that which it described.

Composition, x. 4; xvi. 1, agreement; Lat. *sense*. Cp. 'the *compounding* of controversies' (Bacon, Advert. on Church Controversies, 83).

Conceit, (1) *subjecti*, the power of conceiving in the mind, ii. 2; iv. 3; vi. 4; x. 5: (2) *objecti*, the thing conceived, iv. 3; vi. 3; vii. 3; x. 12, the technical *conceptus*. In the First Book almost always spelt, in the early editions, *concept*, like *receipt* and *deceit* (Bacon, Essays, 9). In the later Books the form *conceit*, with *receit*, comes in. The modern unfavourable sense of the word does not appear, as far as I am aware, in Hooker, with whom the word is a common one (he speaks of the 'true *conceit* of unworthiness,' V. xlvii. 2), or in Shakespeare and Bacon. In our English Bible, where it occurs seven times, an unfavourable tendency is visible, but given it by the phrase in which it is used, 'wise in his (their) own *conceit*.' It was one of those words which are always on the edge of a bad sense; as *fancy* and *imagination* suggest a want of ground, or *opinion* suggests, without necessarily involving, positiveness without reason: and *conceit* at last fell from a neutral into the bad sense, probably through the Bible phrase, and such combinations as *self-conceit*=self-opinion. The unfavourable sense in Hooker's use is in another direction; e.g. 'A controversy ...

upon *conceit* taken at some words by me uttered in a most harmless meaning'—a *fancy* or *supposition* of their meaning leading to offence. (Answer to Travers, § 1.) Hooker has the corresponding 'misconceit,' Sermon. iii. p. 637, Pref. i. 2; 'preconceit,' Pref. iii. 9. He has 'out of *conceit* with,' V. xxii. 20; 'That which best liked (pleased) their own *conceit*,' xiii. 1.

Condition, iii. 1, constitution. II. iv. 4.

Confirm, xiv. 5, make out by proof.

Controller, vii. 3; II. vi. 2. *Control* is a common word with Hooker for censure, or check with criticism. (Pref. viii. 7; III. viii. 4, 5, &c.) Fr. *contrôler*, *contre-rôler*; Lat. *rotula*, -us; vide Diez, *Rotolo*.

Convenient, viii. 11; x. 4, suitable.

Corporation, x. 8, in the legal sense ('corporations are immortal') which Ducange attributes to the English lawyers: generally, of a body: iv. 2, angels, 'linked in a kind of *corporation* among themselves.'

Cured, viii. 2, i.e. not *healed*, but *treated* for healing. Comp. Hales, Golden Rem. p. 135.

Current, i. 1.

Cut off, i. 2.

## D.

Defeated of, iii. 2, deprived of, disappointed. So VII. xvi. 6, '*defeated* of that succour.' *Defeat*, make void. Cp. V. lxii. 13, '*defeat*, disannul, annihilate' sacraments; ib. 15, '*defeat* such baptism;' ib. 22, '*defeating* or making it altogether void;' so III. i. 1, 12; VIII. vii. 3, '*defeat* the king of his profits.' From Fr. *défaite*, *défaire*. Comp. Phil. de Comines, i. 5, 'Tous lesquels seigneurs le Roy avoit désapointez et *defaits* de leurs estats.' Low Lat. *diffacere*, or *defacere* (Ducange); quite different from the Lat. *deficere*. So from the French verbal noun form (*faire*, *fait*, *feat*, *fitte*), comfit, benefit, profit, forfeit, surfeit, counterfeit. The old adj., *perfit*, or *parfitte*, Fr. *parfait*, which survived to Milton's time (Par. Lost, xi. 36, Guest's English Rhythms, i. 51), has been corrected into 'perfect.' 'Defect' is of course directly from the Lat.

Definitive, viii. 4.

Directive, viii. 4.

Disable, xii. 3, make incapable: 'Man having utterly *disabled* his nature unto those means.' Cp. Sermon. iii. p. 617.

Discipline, i. 3, in technical sense of the Puritan reformers. Vide Pref. i. 2; III. iii. 2; V. lxxii. 14.

Discourse, vi. 4; vii. 7; viii. 3, 5, 7, 8; xiv. 1, reasoning; from the technical sense of the school logic: as Hamlet, i. 2. 150, 'A beast that wants *discourse* of reason;' ib. iv. 4. 36, 'Such large *discourse*,

looking before and after;' Othello, iv. 2. 154, '*Discourse* of thought, or actual deed.'

**Discover**, i. 2; iii. 4; vii. 4; xi. 6; xvi. 2, disclose, make visible, uncover; Fr. *découvrir*. Not, as far as I have noticed, in the sense of 'finding out.' So Bacon, New Atlant. 129, 'At the beginning He *discovered* the face of the deep, and brought forth dry land.' And the common meaning in the Auth. Vers.; e.g. Ps. xviii. 15; xxix. 9; Is. xxii. 8.

**Disgrace**, vii. 7, discredit, dishonouring: 'To the singular *disgrace* of nature.' As noun and verb it has the active sense, dishonour, to dishonour, as an *agent*, not as a *cause*. II. i. 4; III. viii. 4, 'They never use reason so willingly as to *disgrace* reason;' VII. xi. 10, 'Injurious we are to God, . . . when . . . we take occasion to disauthorize and *disgrace* the works he doth produce,' &c. Bacon, Adv. of Learning, p. 6, speaks of the 'discredits and *disgraces* of learning, which it hath received from ignorance.'

**Divinely**, viii. 1, for felicitously. So VIII. ii. 12, 'Most *divinely* Archytas maketh unto public felicity these four steps;' as Cic. de Senect. 13, '*divine* enim Plato appellat,' &c.

**Domestical**, x. 2.

**Donative**, xi. 5, 'bestowed by way of donative,' transl. of 'munus suum fecit.' II. v. 7.

**Draught**, iii. 4, drawing or representation, sketch.

**Drift**, ii. 4; xvi. 1.

## EF.

**Efficiency**, iii. 4, working, operation. Simply, without the later notion of *perfect* working.

**Efficient**, iv. 1: 'God which moveth mere natural agents as an *efficient* only, doth otherwise move intellectual creatures' (i. e. the one as an external agent, the others as an object of their will); xi. 1, 'As to take away the *first efficient* of our being were to annihilate utterly our persons, so we cannot remove the *last final cause* of our working, but we shall cause whatever we work to cease.' From the Scholastic terminology, '*causa efficiens*.'

**Endeavour**, vi. 2, effort, tendency; translation of the Latin *nisus*. Fr. *mettre en devoir*; see examples in Littré, Fr. Dict. *Devoir*. Kelham, Dict. of Law French 1799, has the Law Fr. '*ceo qu'il endeavora faire*' = 'what he ought to do therein.'

**Enforce**, of necessary reasons, xvi. 5.

**Entrance**, i. 2; xvi. 1, preliminary part, introduction; II. i. 2. Cp. Sermon. iii. p. 638; Sermon. v. p. 659; Bacon, Adv. i. p. 264: a common word in J. Hales.

**Estate**, xv. 4, where we use 'state:' 'a future *estate* hereafter.' (Cp.

- State.**) Serm. iii. p. 605, 'As long as the manners of men retain the *estate* they are in.' Cp. Ezek. xxxvi. 11.
- Every**, (cp. **Sundry**.) without a noun: '*Every of which* their several functions,' iv. 2; '*Every or any of these*,' xvi. 5; '*Every of these*,' IV. iii. 2; 'In each of the people towards other, . . . and in their pastor towards *every of them*,' V. xxxix. 1; '*Every* later endeavoured to be more removed . . . than the rest had been,' Pref. ii. 2, III. i. 14, vide Serm. iii. 599. With intervening pronoun; '*Every* the least thing,' viii. 5. So Tempest, v. 1. 249, '*Of every* these happened accidents;' cp. As You Like It, v. 4. 178, '*Every of* this happy number;' Ant. and Cleop. i. 2. 38, '*Every of* your wishes.'
- Evidence**, iv. 1, in the technical sense, immediate, intuitive certainty.
- Exact**, **Exactness**, v. 2, complete finish.
- Exceptions**, i. 1, objections, from the Roman law term. Vide Sandars' Justin. Instit. pp. 71, 578.
- Exemplary**, iii. 4: '*exemplary* draughts or patterns,' serving for an example; iv. 1, '*exemplary* goodness,' of the nature to be copied. Cf. J. Hales, p. 91, 'So easily the faults of great men, *adolescunt in exempla*, become *exemplary*.'
- Exigence**, ix. 1, constraint. Serm. iii. p. 637.
- Exquisite**, v. 2, most choice, carefully perfect: 'His absolute exactness they imitate by tending unto that which is most *exquisite* in every particular.' So in Shakespeare; his use shows sometimes an ironical touch coming in.
- Extreme**, -ity, viii. 7: 'Sith we would not be *extremely* dealt with, we must avoid all *extremity* in our dealings.'

## F.

- Fall into**, xi. 3: 'Tediousness cannot *fall into* those operations that are in the state of bliss.' Vide Incident. So III. x. 3, 'Which cause cannot *fall into* any law . . . divine.' *Fallen*, often spelt *falne* in the early editions; so, *known*, *knownen*.
- Fancy**, vi. 2; viii. 4, technically, for the capacity of inward representation, opposed to sense; *φαντασία* of Aristotle. The early editions mostly have 'phancie,' and so J. Hales, ed. 1673.
- Fare**, iii. 2: 'Even so it *fareth* in the natural course of the world.'
- Fawn**, xii. 2: 'fawn upon ourselves.'
- Feeling**, xii. 2, lively: 'the *feeling* sense;' V. li. 3, '*feeling* pity.' In Bacon (Advert. touching Controv. p. 76, Spedding) a '*feeling* Christian' is opposed to a 'politic man.' See Todd, and Richardson.
- Few**, x. 3: 'those few the rest.'
- Form**, (1) iii. 4, technically, the philosophical term of the Schools, to denote that complete aggregate of elements or combination of qualities

which make a thing what it is, and different from other things; it is opposed to the *matter* of which they consist. See V. lviii. 2; lxi. 4; lxii. 14; lxxvi. 4; lxxviii. 2; lxxix. 7. It is one of the terms derived through the Schoolmen, from the Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle; see Hooker's explanatory note, and V. ix. 1, 'The workman hath in his heart a purpose, he carrieth in mind the whole *form* which his work should have.' Hence, *to formalize*, i. e. give form to, as V. lvi. 11, 'The Spirit, which anointed the blessed soul of our Saviour Christ, doth so *formalize*, unite and actuate his whole race.' Shakespeare hardly uses it, in the technical sense; but this influences his favourite use of it, for the order and rule by which a thing is: as in King John, v. 7. 26, 'Set a *form* upon that indigest;' iii. 1. 253, 'All *form* is formless, order orderless;' and his use of the adj. *formal*, 'a *formal* man,' in Com. of Errors, v. 1. 105, and Ant. and Cleop. ii. 5. 40, is a man in his true nature, opposed to one out of his sound mind, or 'a Fury crowned with snakes.' (2) ii. 1, shape and order: 'the *form* and measure of working.' Cp. Bacon, Adv. p. 209, 'The hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind the *form* of forms.' (3) vii. 3, in the popular sense: 'Several fashions and *forms* of appetite.' We may note the degradation of meaning in *form*, *formal*, from meaning the highest and truest idea of a thing, its inmost and most real being, to its stiff and empty outside: so the verb *to formalize* came, through the French, to mean, to arrange the formalities of a duel; J. Hales, p. 84, and see Bacon, Advert. on Church Controversies, p. 76, '*Formalizeth* both sides to a further opposition.' The transition from its use, e. g. in Aquinas, to that of modern language, was going on.

**Frame**, iii. 1: '*frame* unto,' iii. 2; '*frame* according to,' v. 3; x. 14.

**Fraught**, xii. 1, properly of the lading of a ship; also used as a verb.

Cp. *freight*, *freight*; Germ. *fracht*. 'The Scripture is *fraught* with laws of nature.'

**Frustrate**, xi. 4, adj.

**Furious**, ix. 1, mad. Cp. VII. ix. 1, transl. of *μαρινός*.

**Further**. The form *further* occurs occasionally in the early editions.

## G.

**Generality**, vi. 4; x. 6, general proposition.

**Generally**, (1) viii. 4, 10; x. 11, in the strict sense, of *the whole kind*.

So II. viii. 1, 'It may not well be denied that all actions of men endued with the use of reason are *generally* either good or evil.' See V. lv. 1, 'Since God in Christ is *generally* the medicine which doth cure the world;' opposed to 'Christ in us,' 'particularly,' II. iii. 1; V. xliii. 4. (2) In the looser sense of 'ordinarily.'

**Genitive case.** Hooker writes the genitive in *-s* as an inflexion (without apostrophe): '*Natures law*,' '*Jupiters counsel*.' In the Fifth Book, *his* occurs after proper names: 'Trojan the emperor *his* own vicegerent,' xxxix. 2; 'Novatianus *his* conceit,' lxii. 6; 'Christ *his* apostles,' lxxviii. 5; 'Glaucus *his* change,' lxxix. 16. With the word *sake* there is no mark of the genitive: 'worke sake,' Pref. i. 1; 'distinction sake,' V. iv. 3.

**Give.** The early editions occasionally retain the old forms, *geveeth*, *geven*; so, but irregularly, *hetherto*, *whether* for *whither*.

**Go about to**, to seek to do, i. 1. Cp. S. John vii. 19, 20, transl. of *ἔπειθε*; Acts ix. 29, *ἐπιχειρεῖν*.

**Good**, viii. 1, Hooker's account of the meaning of the word.

**Gracious**, x. 14 (spelt *gratious*), full of benefits: 'The abuse of councils should cause men to study how so *gracious* a thing may again be reduced to their first perfection.'

**Grand**, viii. 7, '*grand* mandates;' x. 4, 'a whole *grand* multitude;' xvi. 5, '*grand* society.'

**Grudge**, x. 9, murmuring.

## H.

**Haphazard**, viii. 2.

**Haply**, in the early editions generally spelt 'happily.'

**Helm**, x. 9: 'The *helm* of chief government.'

**Heraldry**, Law of, xv. 1, transl. of *Jus Fetiale*, that of the Roman heralds; vide Dict. of Class. Antiq. *Fetiales*. See note to xv. 1.

**Howbeit**, ii. 4 Cp. 'Be it that,' &c., xiii. 3.

## I.

**Idea**, iv. 1, standard, pattern (printed in italics), Gr. *ἰδέα*: 'The perfect *idea* of that which we are to pray for,' i.e. the Lord's prayer. Cp. Rich. III. iii. 7. 13, 'The right *idea* of your father, Both in your form and nobleness of mind;' in *Much Ado*, iv. 1. 226, it is a mental picture. It only occurs once more in Shakespeare, *Love's Lab.* iv. 2. 70, in a catalogue of technical words. Bacon, Adv. p. 471, 'The *idea* of a perfect orator.' It occurs once in Milton, *Par. Lost*, vii. 557, in Hooker's sense here.

**Impatiency**, viii. 2.

**Impertinent**, xvi. 4, irrelevant.

**Implement**, x. 3: 'Unto life many *implements* are necessary,' i.e. anything supplying a want (*quod implet*), as a tool completes the power of the hand. In xi. 4, he uses the word *supplement*: 'Those things which life itself requireth either as necessary *supplements* or as



beauties and ornaments thereof.' Cp. Timon of Athens, iv. 2. 17.  
'All broken *implements* of a ruined house.'

**Import**, iii. 2, imply—a common word with Hooker.

**Impotent**, viii. 8, in the Latin sense of 'without self command,' when 'the strength of passion is the weakness of the passionate.' (J. Hales, p. 48, ed. 1673.) So in the Preface, ii. 4; and IV. ix. 1, 'If some should be so vain and *impotent* as to mar a benefit with upbraiding.' Used in common meaning, VII. ii. 2, 'Lame and *impotent* kind of reasoning.' So V. xlviii. 2.

**Impression**, iii. 3; xvi. 3, technical term in the Schools for the influence of higher agents received by subordinate ones. Hence, in more general sense as vii. 6.

**Incident into**, iii. 3, 'Swervings now and then *incident into* the course of nature.' So II. iii. 1; V. lxxxi. 15. Cp. parallel expression 'Tediouſness cannot *fall into* those operations that are in a state of bliss,' xi. 3, from the Latin phrase, as used in the Scholastic language (note to iii. 1): 'Videmus res naturales contingentes, hoc ipso quod a fine particulari suo et adeo a lege aeterna exorbitant, *in eandem legem incidere*.' Hooker, I believe, always says *into*: the modern editions have sometimes changed the old reading to *unto*; e.g. x. 7; V. lxxx. 8.

**Inclinable**, iii. 4; vii. 7.

**Inconvenient**, x. 7, unsuitable.

**Indifferency**, x. 7, impartiality. Cp. II. i. 3, 'I hope no *indifferent* amongst them will scorn or refuse to hear,' i.e. no impartial person. So 'unindifferent,' IV. vii. 4.

**Indivisible**, viii. 8.

**Induce**, xii. 1: '*induce* a persuasion.'

**Industrious**, iv. 1, full of activity: 'those *industrious* angels,' transl. of πολύμοχοι.

**Infallible**, viii. 5. Cp. II. i. 3, '*Infallible* evidence of proof, as leaveth no possibility of doubt or scruple behind it.' II. iv. 2; vi. 1; vii. 3. 5.

**Infallibly**, xii. 2, without mistake: 'That we might more *infallibly* understand what is good and evil.'

**Infidel**, xv. 4, in the simple negative sense, equivalent to one not having the faith, whether from not knowing it, or from rejecting it. Vide III. viii. 6. 'Festus, a mere natural man, an *infidel*, a Roman, one whose ears were unacquainted with such matters.'

**Injuriously**, xvi. 1, wrongfully: '*injuriously* traduced.' See II. i. 1; vi. 3; Serm. iii. p. 637, 'A sort of men, *injuriously* unto the God of heaven;' VII. xi. 10, '*Injurious* we are to God.'

**Injury**, verb, i. 1, used in the participle 'injured.' Fr. *injurier*. Cp. III. viii. 9, 'To detract from the dignity thereof were to *injury* God himself.' See VI. iii. 3; v. 2.

**Innocents**, vi. 3; vii. 4; ix. 1, idiots: '*Innocents*, which are excluded by natural defect from ever having reason,' contrasted with madmen, 'which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right reason.' So III. viii. 11, '*innocents* and infants.' Beaumont and Fletcher, and Massinger use it in this sense, but not Shakespeare. Used, V. lx. 7, lxiv. 2, 3, 5, in the simple negative sense of *νήγία τέκνα*, like 'incapable and shallow *innocents*.' Rich. III. ii. 2. 18.

**Insinuate**, vii. 6, '*insinuate* itself;' viii. 5, suggest; a favourite word in mediæval Latin, with no unfavourable meaning.

**Instance**, xiv. 2, in the technical sense of particulars invalidating a general assertion (*instantia*, *ἐνστάσις*, in Arist. and his Lat. transl.).

**Instancy**, x. 14, earnestness (Lat.).

**Intentive**, xi. 4: 'very *intentive* desire;' earnest, Lat. *intendo*; as he says above, 'Unto this they bend themselves.' Cp. V. xxxiv. 1, 'Effectual prayer is joined with a vehement *intention* of the inferior powers of the soul.' Sermon iii. p. 598, 'greater *intention* of brain.'

**Intuitive**, viii. 4.

**Inure**, i. 2; vi. 3; viii. 10; xvi. 7, accustom. Hooker says, 'to inure with a thing;' so '*wherewith* they have been accustomed,' viii. 2. By itself, vii. 6, 'Custom *inuring* the mind by long practice.' A favourite word with Hooker. III. xi. 8; V. i. 2; xxi. 4; xxxvii. 2. See **Ure**.

**Inveigle**, vii. 7: 'Satan *inveigling* us,' spelt in the early editions '*inveagling*.' It seems to be from a French form, preserved in Law French, *enveogler*, which Kelham translates 'to inveigle, blind; *enveoglez*, blind; *en inveoglisment*, in avoidance, in deceit of.' *Enveogler* seems to be from the same form as *aveugle*. Ital. *avocolo*. See **Diez**.

**Investigable**, vii. 7; viii. 9.

**It, its**, iii. 5: 'of *its* own accord' (ed. Keble), but all the early editions up to 1632 'of *it* owne accord.' Vide Morris, Specimens of Early Eng. p. xxxi. I have not found another instance of this use in Hooker. It is curious how, in the case of neuter nouns, he avoids the occasion for it: in place of *it* he has, *his*, *her*, or *thereof*. On the variations of *it* and *its* in the early editions of Shakespeare, see Cambridge edition, Tempest, note 8; Winter's Tale, note 7; Lear. i. 4. 209. *It* in the quartos; *its* in the later fol. *It*, possessive, occurs in the English Bible of 1611 (Levit. 25. 5.), in the older editions.

**Iterate**, xiii. 1.

## J.

**Judicials**, xv. 1, civil laws: 'The *judicials* which God gave to the people of Israel to observe;' '*praecepta judicialia*.' (Aquin, i. 2, qu. 99, art. 4; qu. 108, art. 2.) So III. x. 4, 'those ancient *judicials*.'

**Jump**, viii. 8, as we use *just*: '*hitting jump* that indivisible point or centre wherein goodness consists.' Cp. Othello, ii. 3. 392; Hamlet, i. 1. 65, '*jump* at this dead hour' (where the folios read *just*); v. 2. 369, '*So jump* upon this bloody question,' which Pope changed to *full*. Cp. use of the verb in Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, v. 1. 244, '*Each circumstance . . . do cohere and jump*;' Taming of the Shrew, i. 1. 185, '*Our inventions meet and jump* in one;' 1 Henry IV, i. 2. 67; Othello, i. 3. 5, '*Though they jump* not on a just account.'

## K.

**Καλοκαγαθία**, viii. 1 (note).

**Key**, vii. 7: 'The apostle, who *knew* right well that the weariness of the flesh is a heavy clog to the will, *strieth mightily on this key*.'

**Kind**, iii. 2: 'the law of their *kind*,' i. e. nature, or race. In Pecock's Repressor (circ. 1450), 'the moral *lawe of kinde*,' pp. 6, 23; 'the grete see of *lawe of kinde*,' p. 30, is the 'law of nature.'

## L.

**Later, latter**; the first is the usual, if not the constant form. But the doubling of letters in the early editions is so uncertain, that the word may have been meant to be read as the second form.

**Leastwise**, v. 2: '*at leastwise*.'

**Lest**, mostly written *least*.

**Let** (noun), i. 1; x. 2.

**Let** (with *hinder*), ii. 6, as a customary double phrase. Richardson distinguishes between the roots of *let*, in its two senses; and connects *let*, '*hinder*,' with words (Goth., A. S.) of the same family as *late*, with the sense of *retarding*.

**Let go**, x. 7, pass by. Lat. *omittere*.

**Lightly**, xii. 1. As Mark ix. 39.

**Like** (verb), vii. 2; xvi. 4: 'The angels best *like* us, when we are most like them in all parts of decent demeanour;' '*To like of*' a thing, iv. 3; '*Of* anything more than God they could not by any means *like*;' VIII. vi. 13, 'When the mightiest began to *like* of the Christian faith.'

**List**, vii. 3; Serm. iii. p. 598; V. lxxi. 4, '*as themselves list*;' lxx. 1; II. vi. 4, 'What then *listeth*.'

**Lively**, viii. 9, used adverbially. So he uses as adv. *kindly, orderly*.

**Look**, viii. 10, interjectionally: 'But *look*, wherewith nations are inured, the same they take to be just and right;' as in the translation of Prov. xix. 17, in the Offertory sentence, 'and *look*, what he layeth out, it shall be paid him again.'

## M.

**Make**, 'Make for,' vii. 7: 'Nor let any man think that this doth *make* any thing *for* the just excuse of iniquity;' 'Make *to*, or *unto* the purpose;' 'Somewhat it will *make unto* our purpose,' x. 7. So II. vii. 6, 'Which words *make* so little *unto* the purpose.'

**Manage**, xv. 4: 'Manage community of life;' transl. of *véμειν βλοκ κοινόν*. The more usual spelling in the early editions, *menage*, which lasted into the next century, e.g. in Izaak Walton, points to the influence of French forms, as in *vertue* (always), *hainous*, *parfit*, *maister*.

**Manner** (early editions, generally *maner*, especially in the first books), one of a numerous class of words of general signification formed in the Romance languages from *manus*: cp. *manage*, *ménage* -r; *maintain*, *maintenir*; *manceuvre*, *manure*, *maner* ('taken in the *maner*'); *manual*. See Diez, Etym. Wört. *Manico*, &c. Fr. *manière*; Low Lat. *manuarius* ('*Manuary* trader,' Eccl. Pol. V. lxxxi. 8); Ital. *maniero* ('falcone *maniero*, di mano'): a way of handling; then generally a way or sort. iv. 1, 'Their longing to do by all means *all manner* good to the creatures of God;' viii. 10, '*all manner* laws.' So Pref. viii. 6, '*all manner* evil;' V. iv. 3, '*all manner* virtuous duties;' V. vi. 1, '*all manner* actions;' V. liv. 7, '*all manner* graces;' II. vii. 4, '*no manner* force;' VIII. ii. 13, '*no manner* person.' (But in ix. 1, '*no manner of* harm.') This old form (Chaucer, Pecoock, Bp. Fisher, Jewel, Def. 158) occurs in the original edition of the Bible of 1611 (Levit. vii. 23; xiv. 54. Todd). Cp. 'what *mister* man,' in Chaucer and Spenser. In the phrases 'all manner good,' 'all manner of good,' the thought seems to waver between an adjectival compound (to express *omnigenus*, *omnimodus*, *παντοίος*) and the noun with the genitive. John Trevisa (Morris, Specimens of Early English, p. 338) says, 'Thre maner speche,' 'thre maner people;' Bp. Fisher (in Todd's Johnson) says, 'three maner wayes;' Bacon (Essay lviii.) writes, 'There be three manner (sing.) of Plantations.' Cp. use of *kind* and *sort*, in 'those *kind* of writings' (Bacon); 'these set *kind* of fools,' Twelfth Night, i. 5. 83; 'These *kind* of knaves,' Lear, ii. 2. 96; 'all *kind* of natures,' Timon of Athens, i. 1. 65. Here, x. 7, 'those *kind* of positive laws.'

**Mere**, ii. 2; iii. 4, qualifying a thing by itself, simply: 'Every *mere* natural agent;' x. 8; V. i. 2, 'Their *mere* religion.'

**Mincingly**, xi. 5, in small measure. See Diez on Fr. *Mince*.

**Minerals**, iv. 3, a place in which metals or precious stones are found, either mines, as here, 'Some among the *minerals*, dens, and caves that are under the earth;' or a matrix, as in Hamlet, iv. 1. 26, 'Like some ore among a *mineral* of metals base.' Cp. John Hales, p. 34, 'Spirits that converse in *minerals*, and infest those that work in them.'

**Mirror**, iii. 4, what shows a reflected image or ideal, pattern: 'Some absolute shape or *mirror* always present before her;' iv. 1, 'The *mirror* of human wisdom,' i.e. perfect type, Aristotle. So J. Hales calls Canaan 'The *mirror* of the world for fertility and abundance of all things' (p. 7). See Diez, *Miroir*.

**Moe**, **mo**, old English form for *more* (Chaucer, Pecoock, 1450; Spenser. See Morris, Specimens of Early English, p. xxvi.). It occurs twice in this Book, iii. 4, 'One . . . *moe*' = *plures*; x. 2, 'Many . . . *moe*.' Pref. ix. 4. Frequent in the first four Books, where modern editions read '*more*.' II. iv. 4; v. 5; vii. 2: III. v. 1: IV. ii. 2; vi. 1; xiii. 9: V. Dedic. 4; ix. 2; lxxii. 16. So VIII. iv. 7. It is found in the Auth. Vers. 1611. The Lincolnshire servant, 'Tummas,' in Heart of Midlothian (ch. 33), says, 'There are *moe* masters than one in this house.'

**Momentary**, viii. 5, momentary; Fr. form '*momentané*.'

**Mother**, a favourite word in Hooker for what is primordial and elementary: iii. 2, '*Mother* elements of the world;' viii. 6, '*Mother* of all those principles.' Cp. III. ix. 3, 'If anything proceed from us corrupt . . . the *mother* of it is our darkness;' V. xv. 1, '*mother* sentence;' Sermon ii. § 36, '*mother* cause;' VIII. ii. 12, 'Time the only *mother* of sound judgment;' Answ. to Travers, § 21. See Sermon iii. 602, 606, 'The *mother* of life,' i.e. the heart; Sermon iv. 650. J. Hales, Hooker's imitator, has 'That grand and *mother* blessing,' p. 178.

**Mutter**, xi. 6.

**Mutual**, xvi. 5: '*mutual* contentions.'

## N.

**Natural**, vii. 7, natural man; i.e. man going only by light of nature. Cp. III. viii. 6. So Bacon, Essay ii. 'Only as a philosopher and *naturall* man;' and so he speaks of Machiavelli (Advert. on Controv. p. 80); and J. Hales, 'The laws of *natural* men, who had no knowledge of God' (pp. 75, 115, 210; ed. 1673).

**Need**, vii. 3, used impersonally; vii. 4, 'Where understanding *needeth*.'

**Neighbour**, xi. 5: 'God and man should be very near *neighbours*;' transl. of 'Nihil inter Deum hominemque distaret.'

**Nice**, i. 2, fastidious; VI. iv. 2: 'They made it not *nice* to use one of God's ministers.'

**No**, emphatic before *not*: xii. 2, '*No*, not gross iniquity.' So III. xi. 7; V. lxxi. 8; lxxvi. 5.

## O.

**Obliquity**, viii. 1; xi. 6: '*nature's obliquity*.'

**Observants**, iv. 1: 'Such *observants* they are *thereof*;' like 'predicants,' 'partizants,' 'zelants' (Bacon), 'malignants.' Cp. Lear, ii. 2. 98, 'Silly ducking *observants*, that stretch their duties nicely.'

- Odds**, viii. 2: 'Maketh almost no *odds* between them;' V. lxii. 10, 'There was *odds* between Cyprian's cause and theirs;' VIII. iii. 2, 'The *odds* between their hope and ours.'
- Oftenness**, viii. 8: 'often,' as adj.; '*often* meditations,' Pref. viii. 6; '*often* occasions,' V. lxxii. 17.
- Omit**, x. 13, pass over.
- Only**, adj. (spelt *onely*), ii. 5: 'One *only* God;' x. 3, 'One *only* family;' x. 14.
- Open**, vi. 3, plain, palpable: 'Things of inferior and more *open* quality,' xvi. 1.
- Open** (vb.), ii. 6; viii. 7, 8; xvi. 1.
- Opposite** (noun), xvi. 5, opponent: 'Whereon our *opposites* in this cause have grounded themselves.' So III. xi. 9, 'Their potent *opposites*;' V. vii. 3. Cp. Hamlet, v. 2. 62, 'Between the pass and fell incensed points of mighty *opposites*;' Twelfth Night, iii. 4. 221, 'Your *opposite*;' 255, 'Most skilful, bloody and fatal *opposite*.'
- Oracle**, iii. 4: '*oracle* of Hippocrates,' text, or saying. *Oracles* xv. 4, *ἀγία*, of Scripture. Almost always spelt with a capital, as a technical word. See x. 7.
- Originally**, ii. 3, in the way of origin.
- Other**. Hooker writes 'divers *other*' (pl.), iii. 4. See vol. iii. 117, Keble's edition; where G. Cranmer objects to the use.
- Otherwhere**, xiii. 2; V. xx. 2; Comedy of Errors, ii. 1. 30, and 104.
- Outward**, viii. 4: 'The rule of God's operation *outward*;' i.e. distinguished from those of his own nature, ii. 2.
- Overseen**, viii. 2, mistaken: 'So many have been *overseen*.' Cp. Throgmorton to Cecil, 1560 (Froude, History of England, vii. 306): 'Whatever any man doth make your mistress to believe, assure yourself that there never was princess so *overseen*, if she do not give order to that matter betimes.' It does not occur in Shakespeare.
- Oversway**, vii. 6.

## P.

- Painful**, -ness, troublesome, laborious, vii. 7.
- Painims**, **Paynims**, iv. 1; xv. 4, heathens; Fr. *payen*, *payenisme*; Low Lat. *paganismus*. *Paynyme* is used for 'heathenism,' in Robt. Glouc. pp. 401, 403, 412, opposed to Christendom: cp. Joinville, 'tante la *paennime*' (p. 44. ed. Michel). Next, *paynymys* for 'heathen men,' Robt. Glouc. 410.
- Part**, xvi. 2: 'Judge in the worse *part*;' (Latinism;) x. 9, 'To exercise all *parts* of rare and beneficial virtue;' Latinism, of stage action. 'For all *parts*,' all sides, x. 5.
- Pass**, x. 9: 'The greatest offices . . . to *pass* by popular election.'
- Passions**, xi. 3, in the neutral sense of states of feeling: 'The soul, as it

is perceptive, perfected by those supernatural passions of joy, peace, and delight.'

Permit, x. 5: 'All *permitted* unto their wisdom and discretion,' left to.

Pertinent, xvi. 3, relevant.

Peruse, i. 2, examine, or read through with attention.

Polestar, iii. 4: '*polestar* of the world.'

Prejudice, vii. 6, prejudgment: 'The *prejudice* of sensible experience;' x. 13, 'No nation can lawfully *prejudice* (anticipate by its own law) the law of nations.' So Pref. ii. 8, 'He gained the advantage of *prejudice* against them if they gainsayed, and of glory above them if they consented.' From the Latin technical law language; vide Sanders' Justinian, 71, and examples in Smith, Lat. Dict. *præjudicium*. Used also in the sense of 'hurt,' x. 13.

Presuppose, Presupposal, viii. 7; x. 2; xiv. 1, 4, a favourite word with Hooker.

Pretend, i. 2, put forward, allege. So VI. v. 1; II. v. 6, 7.

Prime, x. 2: '*Prime* of the world.' So VII. xiii. 2; xv. 14.

Probable, -bly, with us is said of the *positive effect* of proof, and means generally that it is convincing and satisfactory—that the balance is clearly on one side. In Hooker it is generally used of the *nature* of the proof, and means that it falls short of being conclusive. It is opposed to 'infallible truth' (see Bk. V. Dedic. 5), to 'demonstration' (Answ. to Trav. § 24, 'demonstrated . . . probably discoursed'), to necessary, x. 10; xiv. 2; viii. 11; xvi. 5. We lay stress on the *positive* aspect, its likeness to certainty: the earlier writers on the *negative*, its falling short of certainty. But in iii. 1, 'probably gathering,' i.e. with fair proofs. Cp. x. 10.

Proceed, (1) go forward: xi. 1, 'Our desires do *still proceed*,' i.e. ever go forward or beyond. So 4, 'The very *process* of man's desire . . . should be frustrate, if there were not,' &c. xvi. 4. (2) Used passively, xvi. 1, 'All parts of knowledge have been thought by wise men to be then most orderly delivered and *proceeded* in,' progressively learned, step by step; x. 7, 'An oracle *proceeded* from wisdom.'

Process, iii. 4; xi. 4, growth, advance, course, as in Henry VI, Pt. I. iv. 2. 35, 'Ere the glass . . . finish the *process* of his sandy hour.'

Purchase, vii. 1, acquire; Fr. *purchasser*, Ital. *procacciare*. It occurs before 1300: see Morris, Specimens of Early English, 'King Alexander,' 136.

Purity, iii. 4: the 'purity' (e.g. of a power) is what it is in itself, apart from the things on which it works; 'The order of things,' in the *purity* of God's own knowledge and will 'is called *Providence*;' in the things themselves, called by the ancients 'Destiny.' From the language of the Schools: cp. Bacon's 'Actus *purus*,' Nov. Org. i. 75, 51; 'The *pure* knowledge of nature and universality,' Adv. p. 264. Cp.

Chaucer, *Knights Tale*, 421. 'The pure fettres on his schynes grete Weren of his bittre salte teres wete.'

## Q.

**Quite** (vb.) (so in the edd. of 1594 and 1604; 'quit' 1622, and later), xi. 5: 'Got not so much as to *quite* their charges' (like '*quit* the fine,' or 'the penalty,' *Merch. of Ven.* iv. i. 381; *Com. of Err.* i. i. 23. Lat. *quiet-us, -are*; Fr. *quitter*. In such syllables the final *e* was very irregular; e.g. we find *complet, requisit*); transl. of 'Operam simul et industriam perdiderunt.' Cp. Chaucer, *Prol.* 770, 'The blisful mastir quyte you your meede.'

**Quite and clean**, xii. 3. So in *Serm.* i. p. 471; ii. p. 501; iii. p. 641; *Preface* viii. 12. Common in Hooker.

## R.

**Ramistry**, iv. 4; see note.

**Rapt**, iv. 1.

**Read**, xvi. 2: God's law 'discovereth and (as it were) *readeth itself* to the world by them' (human laws).

**Reflex**, iv. 3, reflection: 'By *reflex* of their understanding on themselves.'

**Regiment**, i. 1; iii. 4; x. 1, 5; xvi. 6, usual word of the time for 'government.' So '*Church regiment*,' xiv. 5. Cp. 'His potent *regiment*,' *Ant. and Cleop.* iii. 6. 95.

**Relief**, iii. 2, support.

**Relieve**, iii. 5; xiii. 1; xiv. 5, to compensate for a defect.

**Remiss, -ly**, vi. 2; xi. 4.

**Resemblance**, 'resemblance *with* God,' v. 2.

**Resemble** (active), iv. 1, to reflect a likeness; 'That character which is nowhere but in themselves and us *resembled*.' Cp. V. xxxvii. 2, 'Yea, so to imitate them, that whether it *resemble unto us* the same state wherein our minds are.' See also v. 2; vii. 2.

**Resolution**, iii. 4, in the same sense. See II. i. 3, the full phrase, '*resolution of doubts*,' *Serm.* iii. 598.

**Resolve**, x. 14, to set free from doubt. II. iv. 2; vi. 3.

**Respect**, xvi. 4, have regard to. Hooker uses the adj. *respective*, 'wary and *respective* men,' V. i. 1, i.e. circumspect: again, 'a *respective eye*' (*Answ. to Trav.* § 26), partial, or anxious. So 'Voices given *respectively*, with a kind of secret dependency and awe' (with respect of persons), *Pref.* ii. 4.

**Rewardable**, xi. 5.

**Right**, viii. 1. See Hooker's tracing of the meanings of it.

**Riotous**, xiii. 3, rank: '*Riotous* branches, wherewith we sometimes behold most pleasant vines overgrown.'



**Ripe**, vi. 2, faculties, perfection *in kind*; opposed to 'raw'; III. viii. 4.  
**Ripeness**, vi. 3, of age.

## S.

**School**, of nature, xii. 1, 2: '*School* divines,' xi. 5.

**Sea**, xi. 3: 'God, that *sea* of goodness.' Cp. Pref. viii. II, '*sea* of matter;' VI. iii. 3. The middle-age metaphor (Parad. I. 114, '*lo gran mar dell' essere*;' Pecoock's Repressor, i. 6. p. 20, 'The *grete see* of lawe and of kynde,') seems at this time on the point of passing into a mere word of quantity, like Lat. *Silva*, or Fr. *Monde*. Cp. Hamlet, '*a sea* of troubles,' and De Quincy, Works, 7. 120. But the process stopped. Cp. Pref. i. 1; V. lxvii. 4.

**Sedulity**, xi. 4.

**Seek**, xiii. 2: 'Be to *seek*.'

**Seldomness** (written *seeldomnes*), viii. 8, as 'oftenness.'

**Sensible**, vi. 2, 3; vii. 6, belonging to sense: '*sensible* capacity.'

**Sensual**, x. 6; xi. 4 (in simply neutral meaning), belonging to man's lower nature; so 'perfection, sensual, intellectual, spiritual.'

**Sequel** (written *sequele*), ix. 1, the concrete result. Cp. Pref. viii. 13, 'What other *sequel* can any wise man imagine but this?' and in the next section (14), '*consequence*' used in the abstract, 'a thing of so perilous consequence.'

**Servitor**, vii. 4, servant.

**Sever**, iii. 2, distinguish: '*Sever* the law observed by the one from that which the other is tied to.'

**Several**, x. 13; xiv. 3. Cp. V. viii. 1, '*Every several* man's actions;' xiv. 'They had their *several* [partitions] for heathen nations, *their several* for men, *their several* for women,' &c.; xxix. 3, 'An ornament therefore not *several* for the ministers;' IV. xiii. 1, 'Their *several* manners from other churches.' *Several*, for distinct, iii. 1; see note.

**Severally**, opposed to jointly, iii. 1; iv. 2; xiv. 5; xvi. 5.

**Shew**, show; the first is the more common form; but both appear in the early editions. I have kept the variation.

**Side-respect**, x. 7, partiality. Cp. his use of 'respect,' 'respective.'

**Simply**, xiv. 1. 5, in technical sense, without reference to any qualifications, as opposed to 'under conditions.' ('Simpliciter—secundum quid.') II. i. 4, '*Simply*, without any manner of exception, restraint, or distinction, teach every way of doing well.'

**Since** (temporal), Pref. viii. 7; iii. 2 (twice), 4; xiv. 4; II. vii. 2; III. xi. 20. See *Sithence*.

**Sincere**, x. 13, in the Latin sense of 'pure;' opposed to 'depraved.'

**Singled**, xvi. 6.

**Sith**, equivalent to *since*, logical; v. 2; viii. 7; ix. 2; x. 8; xi. 6; It remains in one instance in the Auth. Vers., Ezek. xxxv. 6.

**Sithence**, equivalent to *since*, temporal; vi. 3; viii. 9; x. 8; xiv. 9. *Since*, the contracted form of *sithence*, rarely occurs in Hooker (see **Since**), who uses for the illative sense, (besides *sith*.) 'seeing,' 'forasmuch as,' 'whereas.' See Marsh, Lectures, 584; Morris, Specimens of Early English, p. 402, and Gloss.

**Sociable**, iii. 4; x. 1, 12; xv. 2, 5, capable of society.

**So far forth**, iii. 2; viii. 5, proportionably.

**Solicitor**, vii. 3: 'The will's *solicitor*.' Cp. Pref. viii. 7, '*Solicitors* of men to fasts, to often meditation.'

**Sort**, in such sort, iii. 2; xii. 1; xiv. 4, 5: 'after a *sort*,' ii. 2; 'in wonderful *sort*,' xv. 4.

**Spring**, vi. 1, first beginning: 'Men, if we view them in their *spring*;' Serm. iii. p. 639, 'First *spring* of Christian religion.'

**Stand**. *Stand in stead*, xiii. 3; xi. 4; III. ix. 1. *Stand to*, viii. 7: 'I may not *stand* here to open.' *Stand with*, viii. 5. *The case stands*, viii. 2.

**State**, for 'estates' of a kingdom, iii. 2; III. xi. 20, 'God's clergy are a *state*;' IV. ix. 3, 'The *state* of Bishops;' for establishment, or constituted order, i. 1.

**Stay** (noun), iii. 2, support; in III. i. 10, hindrance: '*Stay* unto us from performing our duty.'

**Stay** (vb.), vii. 3, 7, arrest, stop: 'Bridle to *stay* us.'

**Still**, used of continuance, not merely up to a certain date, but generally, equivalent to 'ever,' *déjà*, as in xi. 5; viii. 3: 'Things casual do vary, and that which a man doth not chance to think well of cannot *still* have the like hap;' viii. 6, 'The best things do *still* produce the best operations;' 'The best have not *still* been mindful,' i.e. constantly, always. See III. viii. 14; IV. vii. 3; xi. 12; V. lxxii. 15. Shakespeare joins it with participles: '*Still*-vexed Bermoothes;' '*Still*-lasting war,' Rich. III. iv. 4. 344.

**Stint**, ii. 3; xi. 1, for limit. So V. lv. 2, 9.

**Stomach at**, resent (Lat.), x. 7. Cp. Pref. ii. 6, 'Where *stomach* doth strive with wit, the match in not equal.'

**Sundry**, i. 2: '*Sundry* the works' (as 'any' and 'every'). So II. vii. 6, '*Sundry* their sermons:' also 'sundry of,' xiii. 1, xii. 2, for various; 'Circumstances did cause men of *sundry* wits to be of *sundry* judgments.'

**Surcease**, xiv. 3. Fr. *sur* and *cesser* (Todd, Richardson). If there was such a word as *surcesser* (I have only found it in Kelham's Dict. of French Law Words, 1746), the common word is *surseoir*, *supersedere*, with the part. *sursis*, and the verbal noun *sursise*, *sursis*. And these are the forms in legal Latin and French. (Kelham, and Ducange, *supersisa*, quoting Legg. Will. Conq. § 50, 'Qui clamore audito insequi supersederit, de *sursisa* erga regem emendet.' 'Ki le cri orat e sursera, la *sursise* [envers] li rei amend.') Our word appears to be, as so often, from the French verbal or participial noun, with a

confusion of spelling (as *sease* for *cease* in Gower, *sursease* in Fabyan Chron. quoted by Richardson). See Pref. viii. 4, 'Writs of *surcease*:' V. lxxi. 8 (noun), 9 (verb). Bacon uses 'surseance' (Church Controv. pp. 76, 94, Spedding).

**Surmise** (noun), viii. 3, '*Surmises* and slight probabilities:' (verb), xi. 4, to conjecture, opposed to 'conceive;' 'Which with hidden exultation it rather *surmiseth* than conceiveth.' (Compare 'suspected.') In V. lxxv. 3, opposed to 'found;' VIII. iv. 3, 'gathered by strong *surmise*.' Fr. *surmettre* (in the part. or verbal form, *surmise*, as 'promise' from *promis*, *promesse*, *promettre*), originally, 'to put a charge upon a man.' See Ducange, *supra mittere*, accusare: 'Et mittit ei *supra* quod olim sanguine ejus fudit et furtum fecit.' He quotes from a document of 1370, 'Les quelz compaignons firent arrester le suppliant en lui *surmettant* qu'il leur devait cent frans;' and from one of 1317 the noun *surmise*, charge. So in Kelham; and State Trials (Sir T. More), quoted in Richardson.

**Suspected**, xi. 4, 'this only *suspected* desire,' dimly imagined, opposed to 'known delight.'

**Swerve**, iii. 1, 3; ix. 1, deviate, vary. **Swerving** (noun), a common word in Hooker. (See parallel forms in A. S. and Dutch, in Richardson.) Always in the early editions written *swarve*, which lasted into the next century, e. g. J. Hales, ed. 1673. So the O. E. *herken*, *hert*, are written *harken*, *hart*, and the O. E. *herbergh*, *stert*, and *sterve* (Chaucer), have become *harbour*, *start*, and *starve*. Shakespeare makes *convert* rhyme to *depart* and *art*, Sonnet 11 and 14, and *deserts* to *parts*, Sonnet 17.

## T.

**Take in disdain**, xv. 4.

**Take place**, of a saying, 'That of Theophrastus *taketh place*,' iii. 3, xiv. 4; of a class of rules, viii. 8; of a law, iii. 1.

**Tenure**, probably by confusion of spelling for 'tenor,' iii. 2 (twice); viii. 3: '*tenure*, statute, and law;' '*tenure* and course;' 'they keep one *tenure*.' But in IV. ii. 2, he writes 'the *tenor* of their writings.' In III. i. 12, '*gratie cursum*' is translated 'the *tenure* of the grace of God.'

**Than**. Hooker makes no distinction between *than* and *then*, always writing *then*; the distinction appears occasionally in the reprints, e. g. the sixth. Usage had varied: in the translation of the Gospels, Wycliffe has *than* for both, Tyndale *then*. In J. Hales, ed. 1673, it is always *then*.

**That**, 'in that,' forasmuch as, insomuch as, xi. 1. (?)

**The**, in the first edit. *the* sometimes elided before a word—*th' affaires*, ii. 6; *th' effects*, ii. 3: sometimes elided and joined with a noun—'*thapostle*,' vii. 7; '*thapostle* S. Paul,' viii. 3. In Hooker's time this

way of writing was going out; it is generally corrected in the re-prints.

Tome, xiii. 3.

Touch (vb.), iii. 5; viii. 2; x. 11, of subject of discourse. (Fr. *toucher*; Ital. *toccare*; Old Germ. *zuchôn*. Diez.)

Toy, xv. 4, trifle, 'follies and toys;' IV. i. 3; V. lix. 3, 'toy of novelty;' as often in Bacon's Essays, e. g. lviii. of a supposed cycle of weather in the Low Countries. Hooker uses 'toyish,' V. lxiv. 4.

Travel, iii. 2; xi. 5, for labour, and xv. 4, for journeying. Fr. *travail*, which has its equivalent in all the Romance languages. According to Diez the original meaning was *trouble*, then *labour*. The English sense of *journeying* is peculiar. The derivation is uncertain: see Diez, Etym. Wörterb. Our distinction between *travail* and *travel* was not observed in the early edd. of Hooker: in J. Hales, ed. 1673, it is usually reversed. The French form, *travail*, predominates. Bacon's 18th Essay is on '*Travaile*,' and he uses both forms for 'labour.' Hooker thus expresses the connection between the two meanings;—'Rest is the end of all motion, and the last perfection of all things that labour. *Labours in us are journeys*, and even in them which feel no weariness by any work, they are but ways whereby to come unto that which bringeth not happiness till it do bring rest.' Bk. V. lxx. 4.

Tutor, vii. 4, guardian. V. lxxx. 6.

Twice, usually written in the old form *twise*. So *thries*, *thrise*.

## U.

Unadvised, xvi. 2: '*Unadvised* disgrace,' disparagement not intended.

Unbeseeming, viii. 9.

Uncapable, iii. 3.

Uncomfortable, iv. 1.

Unframeable, xvi. 6.

Unsatiable, iv. 1.

Unsensible, vii. 1, not the object of sense: 'things sensible;' 'things *unsensible*.'

Unweariable, iv. 1.

Unwittingly, vi. 3.

Ure (see Inure): 'Put in *ure*.' Pref. ii. 2; IV. viii. 4; V. lxxiii. 8; Serm. ii. § 11. It was a word of the French law language, *mis en ure* (Kelham). The dictionaries, Todd, Nares, Richardson, after Skinner and others, say, contracted from *usura*. Perhaps *œuvre*, *mis en œuvre*, as *manure* from *manœuvre*.

Utter (vb.), i. 1.

Utterly, x. 8: '*Utterly* without our consent we could . . . be at no man's commandment living.'

## V.

**Vacuity**, vi. 1, of intellectual powers.

**Vain**, xii. 1, without cause.

**Very** (adj.), to qualify a thing in its most *precise* and *absolute* sense: 'Our God is one, or rather *very* Oneness,' ii. 2; 'The *very* things we see,' i. 2; ix. 1,—as the '*very* image,' Heb. x. 1; 'my *very* son Isaac,' Gen. xxvii. 21. Or as the *extreme* instance: 'Down went the *very* temples of God,' Pref. viii. 6,—as the '*very* hairs of your head,' 'the *very* elect,' Matt. x. 30; xxiv. 24. Cp. '*Very* nature,' ix. 2; V. iii. 4, 'the rites *even* of *very* divine service.' Observe the accumulation in (II. i. 1) 'the *very* whole entire form of our Church polity.'

**Very near**, vi. 3.

**Vital**, xi. 4, belonging to this life: 'That which cannot stand man in any stead for *vital* use.'

**Volubility**, iii. 2, revolving motion: 'If celestial spheres . . . by irregular *volubility* turn themselves any way as it might happen.'

## W.

**Wade**, go deep into, investigate, be occupied with; one of Hooker's frequent words: ii. 2; iii. 2; vi. 4; viii. 7; xv. 4. It is used by Hooker's admirer, John Hales. (See parallel forms in A. S. and the Teutonic languages in Richardson.) In Hooker, it is used for the general sense of making way through something difficult or intricate: sometimes (Bk. V. lxvii. 4), but not always, with the idea of *deep water* present, as in the early examples of the word.

**Want**, i. 1, 'that which wanteth,' is deficient.

**Ward**, viii. 7: 'Laws of duty to men-*ward*;' ib. 'to them-*ward*.'

**Well-spring**, x. 12. Cp. V. liii. 1, 3; lxxii. 15; VI. iii. 4, a frequent word with Hooker.

**Wiseman**, viii. 11. Spelt as one word in Hooker, as nobleman, madman, goodman.

**Wit**, ii. 5; vii. 1, Lat. *ingenium*: 'of certain turbulent *wits*,' i.e. Catiline's associates. (Cp. Bacon, Essay i. 'certain discoursing *wits*.)

The word is used simply for 'sense,' VII. v. 5, 'This construction doth bereave the words partly of *wit*, partly of truth.' Cp. ix. 3.

**Wittingly**, vii. 2.

**Witty**, xi. 5, generally, of intellectual keenness: he calls Scotus 'the *wittiest* of the School divines.'

**Work**, set on work, x. 1.

**World**, ix. 1: Man 'a *very world* in himself:' see note.

## Y.

**Year**, usually in the old form *year*.

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THE END.

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